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1. Introduction 
 
In the evening [after the battle of Poitiers] the Prince of Wales gave a 
supper for the King of France, Lord Philippe, his son, Lord Jakeme de 
Bourbon and most of the captured counts and barons of France. The 
Prince seated the King and his son  . . . at a high table well provided, 
and the rest of the nobles at other tables. The whole time, the Prince 
served at both the King’s and other tables as humbly as he could. He 
refused to sit at the King’s table, insisting that he was not yet worthy to 
sit at the table of so mighty a prince and so brave a soldier as he [the 
King of France] had proved himself to be on that day. He constantly 
kneeled before him, saying: "Dear sir,  . . . My father will certainly 
show you every mark of honour and friendship in his power, and will 
come to such a reasonable understanding with you that you will 
always remain firm friends. In my opinion, you have good cause to be 
joyful, although the battle did not go in your favour, for today you 
have won the highest renown of prowess, excelling the best of your 
knights. I do not say this to flatter you, for everyone on our side, 
having seen how each man fought, unanimously agrees with this and 
awards you the prize and the chaplet, if you will consent to wear 
them’. At these words all those present murmured their approval, 
French and English remarking to each other that the Prince had spoken 
nobly and to the point. Their esteem for him increased and it was 
generally agreed that in him they would have a most chivalrous lord 
and master if he was granted life and to persevere in such good 
fortune.1 
                                                 
1 Luce, Siméon, ed.: Chroniques de Jean Froissart, Société de l´Histoire de France. Livre 1.Tome V 
§ 397. Hereafter abbreviated SHF. Tome et §. This passage will be further dealt with in Chapter 
2 where the original text is also found in the notes. See note 140 pp. 40 - 41. 
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1.1.The Problem 
 
The passage quoted above is taken from the Chroniques, a historical narrative, more 
than a million words in length, written in Middle French prose in the last half of the 
14th century by Jean Froissart, a poet and chronicler from Valenciennes in Hainault.2 
Froissart left a large range of writings: numerous poems,3 and Méliador, an 
Arthurian roman. However, the most widely read work is his chronicles, which 
amongst other things recount the events of the Hundred Years War between France 
and England and their respective allies, the dealings and life at the court of the Count 
de Foix, popular uprisings in England, Flanders and France, and the downfall of the 
English King, Richard II. The passage quoted deals with Edward the Black Prince’s 
treatment of the French king, John the Good, after the battle of Poitiers in 1356, where 
the English destroyed the French army while raiding out of Bordeaux, and it is often 
referred to as a prime example of chivalrous behaviour and aristocratic mentality in 
the Middle Ages. Although Froissart claims that somewhere close to 6,000 men died 
that day together with ‘the finest flower of French chivalry’,4 he is seemingly more 
preoccupied with the gallant behaviour of the young Prince than with the horrible 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
2 Froissart was born, we believe, in 1337 and died at the very beginning of the 15th century, 
most likely in 1404. On Froissart, see Jones, Michael: 'Froissart, Jean', in Oxford dictionary of 
national biography, Oxford 1984. t. 21. pp. 57 - 60. 
 
3 Froissart's other work includes Le paradis d'amour (c.1361-2), Le joli mois de mai (c. 1363), Dit dou 
bleu chevalier, Dit de la marguerite (c.1364), L'espinette amoureuse (c. 1369-70), La prison amoureuse 
(c. 1371-2) and Le joli buisson de Jonece (1373). 
 
4 SHF Livre I.Tome V. § 395. ‘Et fu là morte, si com on recordoit adonc pour le temps, toute li 
fleur de le chevalerie de France: de quoi li nobles royaumes fu durement afoiblis, et en grant 
misère et tribulation eschei, ensi que vous orés recorder chi après. Avoecques le roy et son jone 
fil monseigneur Phelippe, eut pris dix sept contes, sans les barons, les chevaliers et les escuiers; 
et y mors entre cinq mil et sept cens et six mil hommes, uns qu´autres. Quant il furent tout ou 
en partie repairiet de la cace et revenu devers le prince . . . si trouvèrent que il avoient deux tans 
de priosnniers qu'il ne fuissent de gens.’ 
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tragedy that just had taken place.5 The description of the Black Prince, not only 
entertaining his defeated opponent courteously, but serving King John in what 
Froissart describes as a humble manner, praising the defeated opponent’s prowess 
and martial skills, bears witness to a society where people adhered to different ideals 
and were motivated by other values than modern men. Thus, the passage brings us 
to the theme of this thesis, namely the ideals and values described and propagated 
by Froissart in his Chroniques. 
 
Since the publication in 1930 of F. S. Shear’s monograph Froissart, Chronicler and Poet, 
very few scholars have analyzed Froissart´s historical narratives until the beginning 
of the eighties when J. J. N. Palmer edited the symposium Froissart. Historian.6 In 1981 
Georg Jäger published Aspekte des Krieges und der Chevalerie im XIV. Jahrhundert. 
Untersuchungen zu Jean Froissart´s Chroniques.7 The chivalry depicted in Froissart´s 
historical narrative was further dealt with in the 1985 monograph by George T. 
Diller; Attitudes chevaleresques et Réalités politiques chez Froissart.8 In the past ten years 
or so three important full - length works on Froissart have been published; Peter 
Ainsworth's Jean Froissart and the Fabric of History from 1994,9 Michel Zink's Froissart 
et le temps from 1998 10 and Marie-Thérèse de Medeiros Hommes, terres et histoire de 
                                                 
5 For a thorough outline of the preliminaries and the battle of Poitiers see Green, David: The 
battle of Poitiers 1356. Stroud 2002. 
 
6 Palmer, J. J. N., ed.: Froissart: Historian. Woodbridge 1981. Froissart’s work has, for instance, 
been the subject of Coulton, G.C: The Chronicler of European Chivalry. London 1930 and 
Wilmotte, M.: Froissart. Brussels 1942.  
 
7 Jäger, G.: Aspekte des Krieges und der Chevalerie im XIV. Jahrhundert. Untersuchungen zu Jean 
Froissarts Chroniques. Bern 1981. 
 
8 Diller, George T.: Attitudes chevaleresques et Réalités politiques chez Froissart. Microlectures du 
premier livres des Chroniques. Genève 1984. 
 
9 Ainsworth, Peter: Jean Froissart and the Fabric of History. Truth, Myth and Fiction in the 
Chroniques. Oxford 1990.  
 
10 Zink, Michel: Froissart et le temps. Paris 1998. 
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confins: les marges mériodionales et orientales de la chretienté dans les 'Chroniques' de 
Froissart, from 2003.11 A collection of essays resulting from a symposium at Amherst, 
edited by Donald Maddox and Sara Sturm-Maddox was published in 1998.12  
 
Froissart has often been labelled as the 'Chronicler of Chivalry', sometimes in a 
disparaging manner. Especially harsh was the critic of some historians and literary 
scholars of the first half of the 20th century. Auguste Molinier, for instance, claimed 
Froissart to be superficial and unable to disclose the intentions of princes,13 while 
Paris Gaston and Alfred Jeanroy saw Froissart as an author who did not reflect on 
the events he describes; 'all which is not brilliance, light or exterior life escape him.‘14 
According to Albert Pauphilet, Froissart´s understanding of the world and the 
society he lived in, was so limited that ‘compared to writers like Villehardouin and 
Commynes, he does not appear very intelligent’.15   
 
These severe judgements are clearly wrong, says George T. Diller in his analysis 
Attitudes chevaleresques et Réalités politiques chez Froissart from 1984.16 In his narrative, 
                                                 
11 Medeiros, Marie-Thérèse de: Hommes, terres et histoire de confins: les marges mériodionales et 
orientales de la chretienté dans les 'Chroniques' de Froissart. Paris 2003. 
 
12 Maddox, Donald and Sara Sturm-Maddox, eds.: Froissart across the Genres. Gainesville 1998. 
 
13 ‘Enfin il n'a vu que le coté extérieure des choses . . . il n´a du monde de son temps qu´une 
idée superficielle, et n´a jamais deviné les intentions de princes’. Auguste Molinier in Les 
Sources de l´Histoire. Tome IV. Paris 1904. p. 13.   
 
14 Paris, Gaston and Jeanroy, Alfred: Extraits des chroniqueurs francais. Paris 1927. p. 186. 'Il a 
merveilleusement peint son époque et il l´a peu comprise; il n´a pas réfléchi sur ces 
événements, dont le récit lui plaisait tant . . . Tout ce qui n´est point éclat, lumière, vie 
extérieure, lui échappe: Le bruit de l´histoire lui en a caché le sens.' 
 
15 Pauphilet, Albert: Historiens et Chroniquers du Moyen Age, édition établie et annotée par Albert 
Pauphilet. Textes nouveaux commentés par Edmond Pognon. ‘Bibiothèque de la Pléiade’, no. 
48, Paris 1952. p. 374. 
 
16 Diller, George T.: Attitudes chevalereques et Réalités politiques chez Froissart. Microlectures du 
premier livres des Chroniques. Genève 1984. p. 6. Diller discusses the opinions above in the 
Introduction to his book and asks: ‘Autant que l´exemple qui fait briller la renommée du preux, 
l´écriture ici ne deviendrait-elle pas l´instrument d´une volonté de scruter la mentalité des 
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Froissart was able to illuminate both the causes of events and the mentality of his 
contemporaries, says Diller. The view that Froissart was essentially occupied by 
relating glorious events has, however, also been argued by scholars writing more 
recently. To Froissart, says Pierre Tucoo-Chala, the Hundred Years war was a series 
of man-to-man combat - 'une suite de prouesses' - that do not end but to give way to 
descriptions of sumptuous tournaments and refined celebrations.17 Froissart´s goal 
according to Stephen G. Nichols, was 'to create an image of a world in which 
prowess, in the quasi-mystical sense of the term developed from Arthurian romance, 
shines forth as the guiding principle of men's actions with an intensity equal to that 
of any previous age evoked by myth or epic.'18 Philippe Contamine argues that 
Froissart´s primary objective was to present his public, the chivalrous class, with 
models and heroes to whom they could refer and compare themselves.19 
 
According to the American medievalist William Brandt we must understand that 
chivalry, the aristocratic codex for correct behaviour, ordered men’s lives on the most 
important level and provided the measure for failure and disorder.20 However, 
chivalry was not only a behavioural codex. It was also a perceptual mode giving 
form and meaning to the reality in which the knight lived, he says.21 As a result 
                                                                                                                                                        
contemporains, voire celle du chroniquer lui-meme: cette écriture ne serait-elle pas enfin 
capable de répandre de la lumière sur leurs codes interprétatifs du passé?’ 
 
17 Tucoo-Chala, Pierre: Gaston Fébus - Un grand prince d'Occident au XIVe siecle. Pau 1976. p. 33. 
 
18 Nichols, Stephen G.: 'Discourse in Froissart's Chroniques' in Speculum, Vol. 39, No.2 April 
1964. pp. 279 - 87. 
 
19 Contamine, Philippe: 'Froissart: Art Militaire, pratique et conception de la Guerre' in Palmer, 
J. J. N.,ed.: Froissart: Historian. Woodbridge 1981. pp. 132 - 34. 'Froissart entend fournir aux 
jeunes gentilshommes, aux écuyers débutant dans le métier des armes, qu´ils soient riches ou 
pauvres, “matere et exemple”, il veut leur procurer des modèles, des héros pour s´y référer ou 
s´y comparer. Les Chroniques sont et seront la “memore des bons et li recors des preus." ' 
 
20 Brandt, W. J. : The shape  of Medieval History. New Haven 1966. p. 108. 
 
21 Brandt, W. J. : The shape  of Medieval History. New Haven 1966. p. 140. 
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aristocratic chroniclers like Froissart were unable to interpret the world as anything 
other than a stage where the noble acted according to chivalrous stance.  
 
Viewpoints like the ones related above have found support in the fact that Froissart 
himself, at the beginning of his chronicles, states the aim of his work to be to inspire 
young knights to valiant behaviour: 'Et ce sera à yaus matère et exemples de yaus 
encoragier en bien faisant, car la memore des bons et li recors de preus atisent et 
enflament par raison les coers des jones bacelers, qui tirent et tendent à toute 
perfection d'onneur, de quoi proèce est li principaus chiés et li certains ressors.'22  
 
However, in recent years, George T. Diller’s view that Froissart´s work, his intentions 
and his scope, should be considered to be far more complex and broader than 
hitherto believed has been supported by Peter F. Ainsworth and Michel Zink. 
Although Ainsworth, Diller and Zink agree that Froissart essentially was occupied 
by transmitting to posterity the ancient values of chivalry,23 and admired chivalry 
and all it stood for unreservedly,24 all three scholars have also argued that Froissart´s 
chronicles are far more than just endless celebrations of prowess, tournaments and 
glorious feasts, especially, in the later parts of his chronicles and in the revised 
edition of his first book, the 'Rome edition', undertaken at approximately the same 
time as he was finishing the last of the four books making up his chronicles.25 Here 
we find a narrative marked by a changing ethos, 'un idéal chevaleresque, et par 
conséquent romanesque et moral, qui se heurte constamment à sa quête de la vérité 
                                                 
22 SHF Livre I.Tome II. Prologue. 
 
23 Ainsworth, Peter: Jean Froissart and the Fabric of History. Truth, Myth and Fiction in the 
Chroniques. Oxford 1990. p. 6. 
 
24 Diller, George T.: Attitudes chevalereques et Réalités politiques chez Froissart. Microlectures du 
premier livres des Chroniques. Genève 1984. p. 31. 
 
25 Zink, Michel: Froissart et le temps. Paris 1998. p. 53. 
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historique', 'accents of a discreet irony' and a subtle shift of perspective 'to be 
watching human history from a more detached position than hitherto.'26 
 
Related to the discussion above is a more general debate amongst historians on the 
decline of chivalry in the later middle ages. In a biography relating the life and deeds 
of Gaston Fébus, one of the men seemingly most admired by Froissart in his account, 
Pierre Tucco-Chala states:  
 
'Vers le milieu du XIVe siècle coexistent au sein de la chevalerie 
trois type d'hommes se mouvant dans des univers mentaux 
différents: les idéalistes estimant indispensable de respecter en 
toute circonstance le code de l'honneur, répudiant toute 
manoeuvre stratégique comme une traîtise, concevant le combat 
comme un jugement de Dieu où l'on s'affronte loyalement en 
fonçant l'un contre l'autre; les réalistes estimant au contraire ces 
pratiques révolues, utilisant toutes les méthodes pour gouverner 
à condition d'avoir le succès, meurtre et parjure compris; à mi-
chemin certains essayèrent de tenir compte des faits tout en 
essayant de sauver les apparences. Edouard III d'Angleterre 
appartenait à cette dernière catégorie, Jean II le Bon à la première; 
le résultat était connu d'avance. Charles II le Mauvais roi de 
Navarre pencha vers la solution annonçant les tyrans de la 
Renaissance . . .'27 
 
                                                 
26 Ainsworth, Peter F.: Jean Froissart and the Fabric of History. Truth, Myth and Fiction in the 
Chroniques. Oxford 1990. p. 261 - 64. 
 
27 Tucoo-Chala, Pierre: Gaston Fébus - Un grand prince d'Occident au XIVe siecle. Pau 1976. p. 35. 
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Tucoo-Chala's argument that the middle of the 14th century was a transitional time 
when chivalrous ideals were loosing ground in favour of a new mentality is in 
keeping with the general ideas set forward, almost a century ago, by Johan Huizinga 
in his famous book The Waning of the Middle Ages where he discusses the status of 
chivalry and its implications for noble behaviour at the end of the period now 
referred to as the Middle Ages.28 According to Huizinga the social, technical and 
political changes of the later Middle Ages meant that chivalrous values and the quest 
for honour had to give way to the quest for material gain and victory.29 Huizinga 
saw late medieval chivalry as ‘a rather artificial revival of things long dead, a sort of 
deliberate and insincere renascence of ideas drained of any real value’.30 While the 
nobleman of the earlier Middle Ages had been guided by a strict moral code, 
chivalry in the later Middle Ages had become an historical anachronism and had 
outlived its value both as a guide to social behaviour and as an ethical code, says 
Huizinga, a view also shared by other scholars of his time. ‘Self-interest, backed by 
diplomacy, was rapidly replacing the medieval sentiment of honour, and in the 
following century chivalric principles had so completely succumbed to 
Machiavellian doctrines that Commynes, the counsellor of Louis XI, asserts as his 
maxim that honour is always on the side of the winner’, writes F. S. Shears in his 
book on Froissart. Chronicler and Poet,31 while the English medievalist Raymond 
Kilgour in his book The Decline of Chivalry, argued that chivalry had lost its deeper 
value for society by the end of the thirteenth century with ‘the advent of such a 
                                                 
28 First published in 1919 as Herfsttij der Middeleeuwen: Studie over levens- en gedachtenwormen der 
veertiende en viifiende eeuw in Frankrijk en de Nederlanden. Harlem 1919. For a recent discussion on 
Huizinga and his work see Peters, Edward and Simons, Walter P.: 'The New Huizinga and the 
Old Middle Ages' in Speculum. Vol. 74. No. 3. July 1999.  pp. 587 - 620. 
 
29 Huizinga, Johan: The Waning of the Middle Ages. Harmondsworth 1965. p. 65 and p. 73.  
 
30 Huizinga, Johan: ‘La valeur politique et militaire des idées de chevalerie à la fin du moyen 
age’, originally a lecture given at the general assembly of the Société d´Histoire Diplomatique, 
June 16, 1921. Here quoted from Men and Ideas. New York 1959. pp. 196 - 206. 
 
31 Shears, F.S.: Froissart. Chronicler and Poet. London 1930. p. 146. 
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figure as Philippe le Bel, a living symbol of the coldly practical spirit that succeeds 
each burst of human enthusiasm’.32 Undermined and challenged by for instance the 
bourgeois ethos, a more practical, rational and modern approach to war and politics 
became the norm and the quest for material gain and victory increased.33 Thus, late 
medieval chivalry was but mere 'posturing', a game 'whose participants in order to 
forget reality, turned to the illusion of a brilliant, heroic existence', concluded Kilgour 
who based his findings on an in-depth analysis of various texts from the Late Middle 
Ages, including Froissart´s chronicles.  
 
Although the works quoted above are now considered fairly outdated, a fairly 
similar opinion to Kilgour's has been voiced by the American medievalist Gabrielle 
Spiegel in the conclusion to her book Romancing the past. The Rise of Vernacular Prose 
Historiography in Thirteenth-Century France: 'Historical writing in Old French prose 
had begun as the historiography of a lost cause, offering a threatened elite a vehicle 
through which to recuperate a sense of social worth and political legitimacy', says 
Spiegel. 'The French aristocracy's romancing of the past, in that sense, entailed both 
the mise en roman -- the recasting of historical writing into Old French -- and the quest 
for a lost world of chivalric power, ethical value, and aristocratic autonomy, all of 
which had been severely undermined by the growth of royal government in the 
thirteenth century.'34 
                                                 
32 Kilgour, Raymond L.: The Decline of Chivalry as shown in the French literature of the Late Middle 
Ages. Cambridge. Massachusetts 1937. p. 4. 
 
33 In his essay ‘The Merchant in Medieval Society’, the Russian scholar Aron Gurevitch sees the 
Merchant as the type of person who eventually merged into the more rational, calculating 
politician and military-leader we find later. The aristocrat, however, was completely different 
from his town-dwelling contemporary. ‘To the warlike virtues and the impulsive emotivity of 
the nobles he (the Merchant) opposed careful calculation and cause-and-effect thinking; to 
irrationality, he opposed rationality’. See Gurevich, A.: ‘The Merchant’ in Le Goff, Jaques, ed:  
The Medieval World. London 1990. p. 281. 
 
34 Spiegel M. Gabrielle: Romancing the past. The Rise of Vernacular Prose Historiography in 
Thirteenth-Century France. Berkeley 1993. p. 317. 
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Maurice Keen, in his work Chivalry from 1984, also set forward the opinion that the 
traditional chivalrous ethos was not always lived up to in late medieval society. 
Here, Keen points out the gap between the chivalrous ideal, as it is found in romance 
works and historical narratives of the age, and actual chivalrous practices in the later 
Middle Ages.35 However, unlike what many historians have believed, says Keen, a 
discrepancy between the ideal propagated in literary and historical texts and actual 
practice was not something new in the later Middle Ages. On the contrary, already in 
the twelfth century we find authors like Orderic Vitalis, William of Tyre and Peter of 
Blois all complaining that the knights of their day had lost their vigour and morale. 
This observation, he says, challenges the whole notion of a chivalrous ideal in 
decline, because it is on the assumption of a profound contrast between the modes of 
thought, ideals and practices in the earlier Middle Ages that chivalry is said to be in 
decline in the later Middle Ages.36 In fact, says Keen, there was no such thing as a 
'break' between the chivalrous ideals and practices of the earlier and later middle 
ages, and the concept of chivalry lost none of its force. 'It's essential constituents - 
loyalty, generosity and courage - were not much altered. Where old ways, modified 
as necessary, could be related to altered structures, there chivalry did not fade or 
decline with the coming of the Renaissance. It might parade in new dress . . . but 
what this denoted was a change of the chivalric courtier's wardrobe rather than a 
change of heart.'37   
 
                                                 
35 Keen, Maurice: Chivalry.  Yale 2005. (1984). p. 230. 
 
36 Keen, Maurice: ‘Huizinga, Kilgour and the Decline of Chivalry’ in Medievalia et Humanistica. 
Studies in Medieval & Renaissance Culture. ed. Paul Maurice Clogan. Cambridge 1977. p. 5.   
 
37 Keen, Maurice: Chivalry.  Yale 2005. (1984). p. 249. 
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Keen's view that chivalry as a concept continued to be of vital importance in the later 
Middle Ages has been supported both by Malcolm Vale38 and the French historian 
Jean Flori.39 It is also in accordance with the view set forward by John Barnie in his 
book War in Medieval Society from 1974 where he argues that there is no reason to 
conclude that late medieval aristocratic authors saw a real discrepancy between the 
harsher aspects of war and politics and the chivalrous ideals.40 The chivalrous code, 
although simpler and more eclectic than researchers have thought, still provided a 
mental framework for members of the nobility, he states,41 an opinion shared by 
Richard Vernier in his recent biography on Bértrand du Guesclin,42 one of the men 
highly praised by Froissart in his account, and Peter Coss who in his book The Knight 
in Medieval England states that 'No one now seriously believes that the chivalry of the 
fourteenth century was a corruption of a twelfth century ideal.' 43 
                                                 
38 Vale, Malcolm: War and Chivalry: Warfare, Aristocratic and Culture in England, France, and 
Burgundy at the End of the Middle Ages. London 1981. p. 128. Vale opposes the view that chivalry 
had a minimal influence on war and politics in the later Middle Ages. Instead it changed, and 
chivalrous sentiments of honour and renown were welded on to concepts of service to the 
prince. The cult of honour, which replaced chivalry in the sixteenth century, had much in 
common with chivalric ideas, and the behaviour of Renaissance nobles in war was still 
informed upon personal honour and loyalty to a sovereign prince, like in the earlier days, says 
Vale.   
 
39 Flori, Jean: Chevaliers et chevalerie au Moyen Age. Paris 1998. p. 269. 'Au XVe siècle, malgré les 
tendances qui s'amorcent dans cette direction, l'on est encore loin de cet ultime avatar de la 
chevalerie, dont l'idéologie imprégnait encore fortement les esprits, mêlant l'éthique guerrière 
et le sens de l'honneur aux mondanités aristocratiques et aux vanités des apparences. L'étude 
des règlements de ces ordres de chevalerie, celle des lois de l'héraldique et des traités qui s'y 
rapportent, l'analyse des biographies chevaleresques qui se multiplient à cette époque, révèle 
l'omniprésence de cette idéologie chevaleresque dans les esprits du Moyen Age finissant et ses 
survivances ultérieures.' 
 
40 Barnie, J.: War in Medieval Society. Social Values and the Hundred Years War. 1337 - 1399. London 
1974. p. 56.  
 
41 Barnie, J: War in Medieval Society: Social Values and the Hundred Years War. 1337 - 1399. London 
1974. p. 58. 
 
42 Vernier, Richard: The Flower of Chivalry. Bértrand du Guesclin and the Hundred Years War. 
Woodbridge 2003. pp. 14 - 15. 
 
43 Coss, Peter: The Knight in Medieval England 1000 - 1400. Stroud 1993. p. 110. 
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As we may see, most modern historians working specifically on chivalry in the late 
middle ages seem to agree that there was in fact no such thing as a decline in the 
chivalric sentiment and ideals in this period. Although a slight tension between the 
chivalrous ideal propagated and the descriptions of practice might be felt in the 
historical narratives of the age, this is similar to what we may find in earlier works. 
However, Peter Ainsworth and Michel Zink have reached other conclusions in their 
works on Froissart. In the discussion of the first book of Froissart´s chronicles and its 
various redactions, Ainsworth argues that the Rome manuscript of this book, 
probably undertaken around the same time as Froissart finished his fourth book, is 
marked by a changing ethos and an atmosphere marked by 'malice, opportunism, 
hypocrisy and self-interestedness alongside the depiction of chivalrous valour and 
energy'.44 The chronicler seems to be aware, here, of the ironic distance between 
appearance and reality, between ideal and practice, says Ainsworth who also points 
out that warfare is increasingly evoked by Froissart as a social evil, even as deeds of 
chivalry are commended. ' . . . it is as though Froissart does not quite succeed in 
reconciling the many perceived contradictions between old, trusted ideal, and new, 
model behaviour that are reflected in his pages', states Ainsworth.45 
 
 According to Michel Zink this change takes place even before the redaction of the 
Rome manuscript, at the beginning of Book III where Froissart describes his Voyage 
en Béarn and his visit at the court of Gaston Fébus. 'Un moment vient où la référence 
au passé romanesque perd sa raison d´être. Froissart ne croit plus à l´avènement de 
la chevalerie, parce qu´il découvre - l' âge et l'expérience venant, à mesure aussi qu'il 
                                                 
44 Ainsworth, Peter: Jean Froissart and the Fabric of History. Truth, Myth and Fiction in the 
Chroniques. Oxford 1990. p. 268. In addition Froissart here introduces a somewhat unexpected 
gallery of pragmatists, says Ainsworth, like for instance Jean III, duke of Brabant, a new type of 
political creature in the Chroniques, 'ambitious, cynically self-interested and dangerous.' 
 
45 Ainsworth, Peter: Jean Froissart and the Fabric of History. Truth, Myth and Fiction in the 
Chroniques. Oxford 1990. p. 305. 
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devient plus exigeant avec l'information qu'il recueille et qu'il la contrôle plus 
soigneusement - que les comportements politiques et même militaires se conforment 
rarement à l'idéal chevaleresque'. At the moment when Froissart introduces himself 
and his experiences in the text, the nature of his work is changing, says Zink.46 
 
Zink and Ainsworth seem to be of the opinion that the discrepancies between ideal 
and reality are not so easily disregarded in Froissart´s work, and can be seen as a sign 
of a changing ethos - a change in mentality. However, unlike Kilgour and Huizinga, 
Zink and Ainsworth are unwilling to claim that Froissart was unaware of this 
himself, or that he lacked the capability to understand what he was doing. 'Vraiment, 
Froissart n'est plus le jeune homme euphorique, ébloui par la cour de la reine 
Philippa et par le panache chevaleresque', says Zink.47 Citing Dembowski's statement 
that 'There is no real reason to believe that Froissart was unaware of the 
contradictions between the facts of fourteenth-century political life and his concept of 
the "restored" ideals of chivalry',48 Ainsworth says that he would only add to this 
viewpoint 'that Froissart´s awareness, coupled with a growing apprehension, seems 
to have deepened over the years.'49  
 
Brian Stock, in the book Listening for the Text, states that in any given community or 
period of time, two sorts of change are presumably going on at once.50 'There is real 
change, which is happening but may not be perceived, and there is perceived change, 
                                                 
46 Zink, Michel: Froissart et le temps. Paris 1998. p. 63. 
 
47 Zink, Michel: Froissart et le Temps. Paris 1998. p. 96. 
 
48 Ainsworth is citing Dembowski, P. F.: Jean Froissart and his "Meliador" in Context, Craft and 
Sense. Lexington 1983. p. 181. 
 
49 Ainsworth, Peter: Jean Froissart and the Fabric of History. Truth, Myth and Fiction in the 
Chroniques. Oxford 1990. p. 305. 
 
50 Stock, Brian: Listening for the Text. On the uses of the Past. Philadelphia 1990. p. 76. 
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which may or may not be taking place.' According to Stock, historical writing is 
largely the story of perceived change, in the sense that it does not reflect change 
directly. Instead, historical narratives tell the story of various, partial recordings of 
change.  In the following I will attempt to discuss and analyze the values and ideals 
propagated by Froissart in his chronicles. Do we find that Froissart is essentially 
celebrating prowess and other traditional chivalrous virtues in his descriptions of 
great magnates, military campaigns and politics? Or may we, as has been argued by 
Ainsworth and Zink, find evidence of a change in his outlook and ideals? And if we 
do, what can Froissart's account disclose when it comes to changes in views on 
society, war and politics at the end of the 14th century?  
 
1.2. The author and his Chroniques 
 
The Chroniques is a historical narrative, consisting of four books, relating a whole 
range of events in the period from around 1322 to 1400. It is based on material 
Froissart collected both from other texts and from what he heard or experienced 
himself. According to the author the collection of material for his chronicles started 
shortly after the battle of Poitiers in 1356, when he was in his early twenties,51 and his 
account was first based on the work of Jean le Bel,52 canon of Liège and author of a 
prose chronicle relating the early stages of the Hundred Years War.53 Le Bel's 
                                                 
51 Fowler, Kenneth: ‘Froissart, Chronicler of Chivalry’ in History Today. Vol 36. (1986), pp. 50-54. 
Froissart claimed to have had a vivid interest in chivalrous culture and history from an even 
earlier age. See also Ainsworth, Peter: 'Jean Froissart: a sexcentary reappraisal' in French studies. 
Vol. LIX, No.3. 2005. pp. 364 - 72. 
 
52 Although Froissart chose to alter le Bel´s description completely at some crucial points, many 
of the passages in Froissart's Chroniques have been copied from le Bel. For a longer discussion of 
this, see Zink, Michel: Froissart et le temps. Paris 1998. pp. 32 - 35. 
 
53 Viard, J. et Déprez, E., ed.: Chronique de Jean Le Bel, Société de l´Histoire de France. Hereafter 
abbreviated Jean le Bel: Chronique. SHF. Chp. Jean le Bel was initially a soldier and the constant 
companion of Jean, Count of Beaumont, with whom he went to England and Scotland in 1327. 
Le Bel later retired to Liège where he held a canonry at the cathedral and composed what he 
called ‘Vrayes Chroniques’ (‘True Chronicles’), recounting the events of the reign of Edward III. 
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chronicle, which has recently been analysed by Nicole Chayreyron,54 was written at 
the request of Count Jean of Beaumont, with whom le Bel went to England and 
Scotland in 1327. The events related by le Bel are often in accordance with what we 
know to be historical realities.55  
 
Froissart started writing his chronicle when he, in the period 1361 - 68, was in the 
service of Philippa of Hainault, Queen of England, her husband King Edward III, and 
their sons, Edward (later called the Black Prince) and the Duke of Clarence. At the 
English court, Froissart met with many leading English knights and French prisoners 
from the battle of Poitiers and hostages for the treaty of Brétigny (1360), and was able 
to gather first hand information about these events. He also witnessed the departure 
of Edward, the Prince, for Gascony in 1362 and saw Jean the Good of France return to 
English captivity in February 1364 'to save his honour' after his son, Louis, Duke of 
Anjou, had escaped his imprisonment in England.56 Froissart also stayed at the court 
of David II of Scotland at Edinburgh for a while. In 1366, Froissart travelled to 
Brabant where he met his later patrons the duke Wenesclas and his wife. Somewhat 
later, in 1367, he was present at the baptism of the future Richard II at Edward, the 
Prince's, court at Bordeaux. Around this time, preparations were also being made for 
the Prince's expedition to support Pedro of Castile in his struggle against his bastard 
brother, Enrique de Trastamara. This struggle ended in the battle of Najera in April 
                                                                                                                                                        
His work was known only in fragments until 1861 and a complete edition was not published 
until 1863. 
 
54 Chareyron, Nicole: Jean le Bel Le Maitre de Froissart, grand imagier de la Guerre de Cent Ans. 
(Bibiothèque du Moyen Age, 7.) Brussels: De Boeck Université. 1996. 
 
55 Chareyron, Nicole: Jean le Bel Le Maitre de Froissart, grand imagier de la Guerre de Cent Ans. 
(Bibiothèque du Moyen Age, 7) Brussels: De Boeck Université, 1996. See chapter II 'Dossiers de 
l' histoire et quête de la vérité'. 
 
56 At Bretigny the English were confirmed in possession of Aquitaine, Calais and Ponthieu, and 
King John, a prisoner of war since Poitiers, was released on promise of a huge ransom. 
However, important hostages, including his son Louis, were retained to guarantee payment. 
When Louis fled, John returned to England where he later died.  
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1367 where Enrique was defeated. Although Froissart was not present, these events 
are, as we shall see later, amply described in the chronicles. 
 
After the death of Philippa in 1369 Froissart spent much of his time in Brabant, where 
he enjoyed the favour and protection of a series of nobles in Hainault and elsewhere. 
He also became the chaplain of Guy II de Chatillon, Count of Blois, under whose 
auspices he was ordained canon of Chimay. On the Count's request, he continued the 
work on his chronicles, and travelled as far as Orthez in Béarn, a territory bordering 
French territory in Languedoc, English territory in Gascony and the Kingdom of 
Navarre in Spain to gather information for Book III of his chronicles. Here he met 
Gaston Fébus of Foix, Count of Béarn, an encounter further discussed in chapter 2. 
The last part of Froissart´s narrative, Book IV, was also written at the request of Guy 
de Blois, and recounts events like the French-English negotiations at Abbeville in 
1393, his return to England in 1395 - 96 where he personally met Richard II and the 
affaires and intrigues at the French and English courts. It ends with the description of 
Richard's downfall and death in 1399. 
 
Book I of the Chroniques exists in three main versions. The first of these, preserved in 
about fifty manuscripts, incorporates virtually unchanged, long passages of le Bel’s 
chronicle.57 The seconde rédaction, the Amiens MS, exists in a single complete 
manuscript. This is also the case for the third version, the Rome MS, which was 
probably undertaken at the same time as Froissart was completing the second half of 
Book IV (around 1400). This edition is generally considered less reliant on le Bel, 
fuller and more original than the preceding versions.58 The manuscripts of Book II 
(completed in 1387 - one later recension), Book III (completed between 1390 and 
                                                 
57 See note 4 on p. 220 in Ainsworth, P.: Jean Froissart and the Fabric of History. Truth, Myth and 
Fiction in the Chroniques. Oxford 1990. 
 
58 Froissart, Jean: Chronicles. Trans. Geoffrey Brereton. London 1968. See ‘Introduction’ p. 25 and 
the discussions by Diller, Zink and Ainsworth. 
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1392) and Book IV (completed around 1400) contain relatively minor differences 
among them.59  
 
As already mentioned, Peter F. Ainsworth and George T. Diller have argued that the 
Rome manuscript version of Book I differs from the earlier redactions on several 
accounts, which could be relevant to the subject of this dissertation.60 However, 
although there can be no doubt that making more extensive use of several of the 
different redactions could have provided insight into changes in Froissart´s outlook 
and values, I have chosen to concentrate on the main text in the Societé de l´Histoire 
de France edition of the three first books for the purposes of this analysis.61 Since the 
SHF edition is not complete, I have relied on the edition by Kervyn de Lettenhove 
for the study of the fourth book.62 I have also made use of the very recent 'Lettres 
Gothiques' edition of Book I and II of the Chroniques by Peter Ainsworth and George 
T. Diller63 and Book III and IV by Peter Ainsworth and Alberto Varvaro.64 It is my 
hope that these mixed source-references do not confuse my readership too much. 
Although I have enjoyed the support of Geoffrey Brereton's abbreviated translation 
into English,65 the translations into English are mine if not otherwise stated. 
                                                 
59 Zink, Michel: Froissart et le Temps. Paris 1998. p. 38. 
 
60 Ainsworth, Peter F.: Jean Froissart and the Fabric of History. Truth, Myth and Fiction in the 
Chroniques. Oxford 1990. p. 254. and Diller, George T.: Attitudes chevalereques et Réalités politiques 
chez Froissart. Microlectures du premier livres des Chroniques. Genève 1984. 
 
61 See note 1. p. 1. of this dissertation.  
 
62 Froissart, J.: Oeuvres de Froissart. ed. Kervyn de Lettenhove. Osnabruck 1967. Tome XV and 
XVI. Hereafter abbreviated Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome et page. I have 
relied on this edition of Book IV because the SHF edition has not been complete.  
 
63 Froissart, Jean: Chroniques. Livres I et II. eds. Peter Ainsworth and George T. Diller. Paris 2001. 
Hereafter abbreviated Chroniques. Livre I et I. Livre et .§. At the time when I started my work on 
Froissart's Chroniques this edition was not yet published.  
 
64 Froissart, Jean: Chroniques. Livres III et IV. eds. Peter Ainsworth and Alberto Varvaro. Paris 
2004. Hereafter abbreviated Chroniques. Livres III et IV. Livre et §. 
 
65 Froissart, Jean: Chronicles. Trans. Geoffrey Brereton. London 1968. 
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1.3.  Some methodological considerations 
 
As related above, Froissart´s stated goal at the beginning of his chronicles was to 
relate and preserve for posterity 'matère et exemples' to encourage brave men to 
honourable enterprise.66 These 'brave' men, we must assume, were primarily 
members of the contemporary nobility and Froissart´s work gained wide popularity. 
His work was found in the libraries of several prominent contemporary aristocrats 
including his various patrons, amongst them Jean de Hainault, Queen Philippa of 
England, the duke Wenesclas of Brabant and Guy, count of Blois.67 However, 
according to Philippe Contamine, Froissart wrote for the whole chivalrous class, not 
just kings, princes and great magnates who could afford his costly illuminated 
manuscripts. 68 
 
Froissart's account is rarely biased in favour of knights of a specific party or 
nationality. On the contrary, the author’s 'prime concern seems to be impartial, in the 
chivalrous sense of the word, towards those whose deeds of prowess fill his pages', 
says Ainsworth.69 Still, his ambition to entertain, inform and please his aristocratic 
audience may have had wide implications when it comes to the presentation of 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
66 SHF Livre I. Tome II. Prologue. 
 
67 Froissart describes his relationship with Guy at the end of the chronicles: 'Je en ay fait 
mention pour ce que ce conte Guy de Bloys mist en grant entente en son temps que je sire Jean 
Froissart voulsisse ordonner et ditter ceste histoire, et moult luy cousta de ses deniers; car on ne 
pourroit parachiéver et continuer une si longue narration, que ce ne soit à moult grant paine et 
à grans coustages.' Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. p. 71. 
 
68 Contamine, Philippe: 'Froissart: Art Militaire, pratique et conception de la Guerre' in Palmer, 
J. J. N.,ed.: Froissart: Historian. Woodbridge 1981. pp. 132  - 34. 
 
69 See discussion of this in Ainsworth, Peter: Jean Froissart and the Fabric of History. Truth, Myth 
and Fiction in the Chroniques. Oxford 1990. p. 31. 
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events and actions.70 Adapting his account to the expectations and tastes of his 
public, their horizon d' attente,71 Froissart may at times have changed what he must 
have known to be the objective truth about an event or a person in order to make a 
moral point or to celebrate the implicit values in the recorded event or sequence of 
actions. We may also find that events or actions may have been omitted in order not 
to detract from the hero’s or the collective’s honour. 'A la limite, il s'agit d'une sorte 
de falsification consciente de la réalité pour permettre de laisser croire aux chevaliers 
que leur vie se déroule conformément à un schéma réunissant l´idéal chrétien et 
l´honneur des hommes d´armes', says Pierre Tucco-Chala.72 
 
As a result we cannot draw entirely reliable conclusions about actual behaviour or 
events on the basis of a reading of the Chroniques. Instead, one can obtain an 
understanding of how a chronicler writing primarily for an aristocratic audience 
explained and portrayed human behaviour and historical events. Although some of 
the actions and events portrayed and presented as ‘truthful' may have been 
invented, modified and constructed, Froissart´s narrative is authentic in the sense 
that the descriptions give reliable insight into the values and ideals the author 
wanted to propagate. By portraying what he perceives as glorious deeds or 
wrongful action, Froissart reveal the virtues, abilities and behaviour he admired and 
the actions and qualities he perceived as low, undignified, reprehensible and 
shameful. ‘On these, . . . the Chronicles, communicate to us directly . . . the voices and 
                                                 
70 See Froissart's own discussion of this in Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome 
XIV. 1- 3. 
 
71 Jauss, Hans Robert: Pour une esthétique de la réception; traduit de l'allemand par Claude 
Maillard; préface de Jean Starobinski. Paris 1978. pp. 49 - 55. 'Le système de réferences 
objectivement formulable qui, pour chaque oevre au moment de l'histoire où elle apparait, 
résulte de trois facteurs principaux: l'expérience préalable que le public a du genre dont elle 
reléve, la forme et la thématique d'oeuvres antérieures dont elle présuppose la connaissance, et 
l'oppostion entre langage poétique et langage pratique, monde imaginaire et réalité 
quotidienne'.  
 
72 Tucoo-Chala, Pierre: Gaston Fébus. Un grand prince d'Occident au XIVe siecle. Pau 1976. p. 33. 
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emotions of the fourteenth century’, says George T. Diller in ‘Patrons and Texts’ in 
Froissart: Historian. 73 
 
1.4. Some considerations on causality and 'explanation'  
 
Although some have claimed Froissart´s accomplishment to be mediocre, it may, on 
the other hand, be argued that Froissart was far too observant and reflective to be a 
good source for more widespread ideas and attitudes.74 Albert T’Serstevens, for 
instance, says that he finds Froissart closer to us than other medieval authors 'par le 
mouvement du style, par l´originalité de la composition, par l´intimité de ses 
portraits, par la poésie de ses descriptions, par le tour des anecdotes et le naturel du 
dialogue'.75 
 
According to Mark Phillips, the historical writing of the Middle Ages was a mere 
‘representation’ of the past, while the more complex historical texts of the 
Renaissance were aimed at ‘explaining’.76 What the medieval historian only 
‘presented’, the Renaissance historian would ‘organize’ and ‘analyse’, a sign of the 
                                                 
73 Diller, George. T.: ‘Froissart: Patrons and Texts’ in Froissart: Historian. Woodbridge 1981. p. 
153. 
 
74 In Peter Ainsworth’s view, some of the textual developments in Froissart’s text have no true 
counterpart in any of the historical works produced by his contemporaries. Consequently, they 
offer us a strong criterion for a (pertinent) contrast between his work and that of other 
fourteenth-century historiographers, he says. However, Ainsworth also argues that they do not 
offer us this contrast in terms of a convenient opposition between, on the one hand, one gifted 
‘historian’ and a collection of mere ‘chroniclers’ on the other. Instead, one should say instead 
that Froissart's Chroniques embodies a textual richness that is unique. See Ainsworth, Peter: Jean 
Froissart and the Fabric of History. Truth, Myth and Fiction in the Chroniques. Oxford 1990. pp. 49 -
50. 
 
75 T´Serstevens, Albert.: Escales parmi les livres. Paris 1969. p. 75. 
 
76 Phillips, Mark: ‘Representation and Argument in Florentine Historiography’. Storia delle 
storiografia, 10 .1986. pp. 48 – 63.  
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latter's more modern outlook and mentality.77 Phillip's view on the historical writing 
of the Middle Ages is in accordance with the opinion set forward by William Brandt 
in the Shape of Medieval History where he specifically includes Froissart's work in his 
general categorisation. Here Brandt argues that the aristocratic narrative sources of 
the Middle Ages are marked by the fact that they habitually report the events in the 
most elementary relationship to each other.78 Events are either juxtaposed without an 
explicit relationship or they are conjoined in the simple relationship indicated by the 
connectives ‘and’ and ‘then’, or more occasionally ‘so’, ‘after’ and ‘when’. A modern 
historical narrative is based on a conviction that meaning lies within the relationships 
between the events, says Brandt. Through an examination of the causal processes 
behind the events modern historians answer questions like ‘How did such-and-such 
come to be?’ or ‘Why is it that . . .?’ However, the connectives most often used by 
authors of medieval aristocratic narratives lack causal force and cannot explain 
anything. This, because the relationships these words establish are limited and 
purely temporal.79 To attempt to get at the ‘how’ of an event was totally alien to the 
medieval aristocratic historian, says Brandt. Instead 'his attention was monopolized 
by that other serious human concern, values.'80 
 
Bernard Guenée, however, in an essay on the various genres of historical writing in 
the Middle Ages, does not agree that the lack of 'causality' or 'explanation' in 
medieval historical-writing was due to the authors lack of ability to explain, but 
                                                 
77 This is a view also set forward by Hayden White's who claims that the historical texts of the 
Middle Ages could be replaced by proper historical narrative only when a sense of public order 
in the modern state prevailed, providing a ‘subject’ for narrative representation. See White, 
Hayden: The Content of the Form. Ch.1. 'The value of Narrativity in the Representation of 
Reality.' Baltimore 1987. Originally published in Critical Inquiry 7, no. 1. 1980. 
 
78 Brandt, W.: The Shape of Medieval History. New Haven 1966. p. 86. 
 
79 Brandt, W.: The Shape of Medieval History. New Haven 1966. p. 87. 
 
80 Brandt, W. J. : The Shape of Medieval History. New Haven 1966. p. 106. 
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because their audience did not expect it: 'Si les historiens de ce temps s´en sont tenus 
à un simple récit narratif et ne se sont pour ainsi dire jamais risqués à un récit 
explicatif, ce n´est pas que les relations causales leur échappassent ou qu´ils fussent 
tous de médiocres esprits, c´est que, sauf exception, les meilleurs d´entre eux se 
résignaient à etre historiens au sens où leurs contemporains l´éntendaient,' says 
Guenée.81  
 
Froissart predominately presents the events he relates chronologically, and as Brandt 
has pointed out, many of the paragraphs start with words and sentences like 'Ouant', 
' Or advint', 'Après', 'En ce temps' or ' Nous retourrons', that serve to place the related 
events in time. However, contrary to Brandt's finding there are also several 
paragraphs in Froissart´s work that open with words and sentences with far more 
explanatory force, for instance 'Adonc', 'Ensi' (or Ainsi) or 'Vous savez'. These clearly 
points to a causal relationship between paragraphs and other events. In addition, the 
narrative is marked by a technique that Michel Zink calls l'entrelacement, 'un procéde 
de composition . . . qui consiste à mener de front et à raconter alternativement les 
aventure de plusieurs personnages: "A présent le conte cesse de parler de X et revient 
à Y. Vous avez entendu comment Y avait fait ceci ou cela  . . .' This technique, says 
Zink, permits Froissart to bring forth series of events, which meet and part, only to 
meet again later. In the meantime they influence each other, sometimes directly, at 
other times indirectly.82  
 
According to Pierre Tucco-Chala, Froissart had his own distinct vision of history. 
Except for those of Jean Le Bel, previous chronicles had been simple compilations of 
                                                 
81 Guenée, B.: ‘Histoires, annales, chroniques. Essai sur les genres historiques au Moyen Age’, 
Annales-Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations 28. 1973. p. 1010. 
 
82 Zink, Michel: Froissart et le temps. Paris 1998. p. 51. 'Ce procéde permet de faire entrer en 
résonance diverses séries d'événements qui se rencontrent, divergent, se croisent à nouveau 
plus loin, influent les unes sur les autre tantôt directement, tantôt de très loin à travers toute 
une cascade d'intermédiaires.' 
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vaguely connected events: ‘simple éphémérides mettant bout à bout des indications 
brutes’.83 Contrary to these Froissart takes care to create a continual narration in 
chronological order, and he also attempts to capture the reader with literary effects 
and ‘une progression savante’, says Tucco-Chala. Zink, like Tucoo-Chala, believes 
that Froissart treats the historical 'matère' he relates in his Chroniques in a manner far 
more complex than we may find in many other contemporary works,84 and attempts 
to unveil causes and effects by combining what Zink calls  'plan logique et plan 
chronologique'. In Peter Ainsworth's opinion, Froissart, the chronicler, is to be 
understood, above all, in terms of his search of the moral truth behind the events he 
writes about. ‘Without being a moralist in the fullest sense, (Froissart´s) history-
writing surely approximates to an attempt to “get at” the motivations behind human 
behaviour, as he perceives them’, he says.85  
 
As we will see in the following, there can be no doubt that Zink and Ainsworth are 
right to argue that Froissart is indeed able to explain the causes and effects of various 
events, in addition to celebrating the actions of individuals. His originality and 
ability to 'explain', does not, however, in my opinion, make his account less suitable 
as a guide to the moral universe, ideals and values of the author and his audience. In 
German Historiography from the Tenth to the Twelfth Century, Sverre Bagge argues that 
                                                 
83 Tucoo-Chala, Pierre.: ‘Froissart, le grand reporter du Moyen Age’, L'Histoire 44. 1982. pp. 52 - 
63. Also see ‘Froissart dans le Midi pyrénéen’ in Palmer ed.: Froissart. Historian. 1981. 
 
84 Zink, Michel: Froissart et le temps. Paris 1998. p. 50. ' . . . dans sa volonté de dégager les effets 
et les causes, Froissart, combine plan logique et plan chronologique (à la difference de la 
composition annalistique, qui est encore d' une certaine façon celle des Grandes chroniques de 
France, celle du religieux de Saint-Denis, Michel Pinton, pour toute sa subtilité que Bernard 
Guenée a si bien mise en evidence).' The aim to reveal causes and effects and combine 'plan 
logique et plan chronologique,' is something which according to Zink, becomes more and more 
apparent as Froissart's work progresses: '(Dans) les livres III et IV . . . . un troisième paramètre - 
l'ordre de l'enquête - vient se combiner aux deux autres (l'ordre de causes et l'ordre des 
évenements). 
 
85 Ainsworth, Peter: Jean Froissart and the Fabric of History. Truth, Myth and Fiction in the 
Chroniques. Oxford 1990. p. 306. 
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the originality and quality of a work does not necessarily mean that it cannot be used 
to study more general attitudes and mentality. On the contrary,  'great works . . . 
often make explicit what is implicit or difficult to trace in more average texts,' he 
says.86 According to Bagge, these ‘great works’ are also better if we want to study 
change and originality in the intellectual field.  
 
One may, nevertheless, argue that Froissart, the product of the merchant middle class 
of Valenciennes in Hainault,87 did not necessarily express the values of the 
aristocracy in the same manner as for instance his contemporary, Geoffroy de 
Charny, who wrote his book on chivalry based on his own experience as a knight 
and magnate.88 It should for instance be noted that contrary to writers like for 
instance Georges Chastellain, chronicler of the fifteenth-century Burgundian Court, 
who says little or nothing about 'the estate of the good towns, of merchants and 
labouring men',89 Froissart relates what he believed were the opinions of burghers 
and even peasants several times in his account, although not, as we shall see later, 
always in a very positive manner.90 He also, on occasions, attributes positive qualities 
                                                 
86 Bagge, Sverre: Kings, Politics, and the Right Order of the World in German Historiography c 950 - 
1150. Leiden 2002. p. 21. 
 
87 For an outline of Froissart´s background see Zink, Michel: Froissart et le temps. Paris 1998. p. 5 
- 8.  
 
88 On Charny's work and life see Richard W. Kaeuper's Introduction to Elspeth Kennedy's 
translation of Charnys book: de Charny, Geoffroi: A Knight's own book of Chivalry. Introduction 
by Richard W. Kaeuper. Translation by Elspeth Kennedy. Philadelpia 2005. 
 
89 Oeuvres de Georges Chastellain, ed. Kervyn de Lettenhove, Brussels, 1863-66. Chastellain says: 
'It is not becoming to give such a long exposition (of this estate) as of the others, because it is 
hardly possible to attribute great qualities to them, as they are of a servile degree.’ Huizinga 
analyzed Chastellain's narrative in the chapter 'The Hierarchic Conception of Society,’ in his 
book The Waning of the Middle Ages. Harmondsworth 1965. 
 
90 This is an observation in opposition to the conclusions drawn by Jean Giono. In Tableau de la 
littérature Française, Jean Giono claims Froissart´s main aim was to produce a ‘spectacle’ for his 
patrons, presenting them with exactly what they wanted to see. Because of this, says Giono, 
Froissart does not see the people or the burghers. In my opinion, this is clearly not correct. See 
Giono, Jean: Tableau de la litérature francaise. Paris 1962. pp. 138 - 39. 
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to certain members of the bourgeoisie. However, if we consider the popularity of 
Froissart's work amongst the members of cosmopolitan upper class society it is hard 
to believe that the ideals he expresses in his work were contrary to what this group 
believed to be 'the right order of the world'. 
 
In spite of the fact that merchants and the peasants were clearly not excluded from 
Froissart´s mental universe, it also remains that his main focus is on the action and 
the deeds of noblemen and knights. And although he was not a knight himself, like 
de Charny, he had, as pointed out by his biographer Shears, long frequented the men 
who enact his story: ‘He had heard their counsels and shared their life, at court, if not 
in camp’.91 That Froissart shared the mental and moral universe of his protagonists is 
an opinion also voiced by Peter Ainsworth. 'Froissart seems to have harboured the 
lifelong desire of crossing the threshold into the ranks of chivalry,' he says. ‘His 
condition as a tonsured cleric rendered him more than suitable for the “office” of 
Secretary to the court of European Chivalry . . . ’92  
 
Every member of late medieval aristocracy may not have shared the ideals and 
values found in Froissart´s work. Still, I believe the link between the values and 
ideals he propagates and the mental universe of his aristocratic audience to be 
strong. The fact that his work was highly esteemed by prominent members of the 
aristocracy is seen in the author's portrayal of his meeting with Count Gaston of 
Fébus of Foix, a meeting further dealt with in the next chapter. 
 
 
                                                 
91 Shears, F.S.: Froissart, Chronicler and Poet. London 1930. p. 173. 
 
92 Ainsworth, Peter: Jean Froissart and the Fabric of History. Truth, Myth and Fiction in the 
Chroniques. Oxford 1990. p. 77. 
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2. The chivalrous ideal 
 
In the Introduction we saw that Froissart states that one of the main goals of his 
historical narrative was to transmit chivalrous values to posterity.93 Of special 
importance, he says, was the virtue 'prowess' - 'car c'est une si noble vertue et de si 
grant recommendation, . . . mère materièle et lumière des gentilz hommes.'94 A 
nobleman who does not act with prowess, says Froissart, cannot achieve 'parfaite 
honneur' - 'perfect honour', which in addition to the 'glore dou monde' - esteem in 
the eyes of his peers, was the goal of a nobleman's activities. According to most 
modern historians of chivalry, like Maurice Keen, Georges Duby, Jean Flori, John 
Barnie and others, honour is of fundamental importance to an understanding of the 
chivalrous ethos.95 However, according to Barnie, it is not enough to understand that 
gaining honour was of great importance to the members of the aristocracy. We also 
need to have a clear concept of what honour actually was. To dismiss the portrayals 
of extreme courtesy or bravery, as quixotic, foolish or bearing witness to 'chivalric 
excess', is to seriously misunderstand the aristocratic mind, he says.96 Instead 
aristocratic narrative sources like Froissart´s Chroniques should be re-examined in the 
light of the concept of honour. 
 
                                                 
93 SHF Livre I. Tome II. Prologue. 'Or doient donc tout jone gentil homme, qui se voellent 
avancier, avoir ardant desir d'acquerre le fait et le renommée de proèce, par quoi il soient mis et 
compté ou nombre des preus, et regarder et considerer comment leur predicesseur, dont il 
tiennent leurs hyretages et portent espoir les armes, sont honnouré et recommendé par leurs 
bien fais.' 
 
94 SHF Livre I. Tome II. Prologue. Froissart continues: ' . . . et si la busce ne poet ardoir sans feu, 
ne poet li gentilz homs venir à parfaite honneur, ne à glore dou monde, sans proèce.' 
 
95 Barnie, J: War in Medieval Society: Social Values and the Hundred Years War. 1337 - 1399. London 
1974. p. 75. 'The honourable man must demonstrate his honour continually before his peers, 
and this in turn often involves challenging the honour of others . . .' 
 
96 Barnie, J: War in Medieval Society: Social Values and the Hundred Years War. 1337 - 1399. London 
1974. p. 79. 
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Barnie, in his otherwise eminent book on war and social values in late medieval 
society from 1974, relied on the definition of honour set forward by Julian Pitt-
Rivers. However, more recently, the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu has 
proposed that we see honour as a kind of ‘symbolic capital’.97 In his analysis, 
Bourdieu outlines four different concepts of capital: economic, cultural, social and 
symbolic. Common to all four forms of capital is that they are resources to be used 
within specific areas of human life. However, they are different in regards to their 
nature. The three first are fairly concrete and can, in a medieval aristocratic setting, 
be regarded as material wealth (castles, land, riches), social and familiar standing, 
cultural knowledge and networks. The last concept, symbolic capital, is different, 
however, because it relies on an understanding that ‘capital’ is not necessarily a 
fixed entity, but depending on the extent to which a group, in this case the medieval 
nobility, recognises something as valuable and of importance. As we have seen 
above, there can be no doubt that to have 'perfect honour' was of great importance 
to Froissart and his audience. This honour, we are to understand, could be gained or 
augmented by behaving in accordance with a particular set of values.  
 
According to Bourdieu, symbolic capital is different from the other forms of capital, 
because we do not instantly see how it functions as a capital. This dimension is, 
however, clearly seen when people act in opposition to the ethical code or ideal; it 
leads to a loss of prestige, sometimes excluding the social actor from the group or 
community to which she belong, thus undermining the basis for her social and 
cultural capital, and in the end her economic capital as well. However, the ethical 
code -- what is perceived to be of ‘importance’ and ‘value’ -- will vary in time and 
space, and from community to community.   
 
                                                 
97 Bourdieu, Pierre: Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge 1977. pp. 171 - 73 and The Logic of 
Practice. Cambridge 1990. pp. 112 - 22. 
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The importance of having and obtaining honour in the aristocratic milieu of the 
Middle Ages is best understood when we look at how honour functions as a 
criterion. As we may see above, Froissart´s opinion was that the good nobleman is 
he who pursues the quest for honour, or who actively tries to augment his symbolic 
capital. This is a view Froissart shares with several medieval aristocratic writers, 
who outline the importance of honour and the actions one should perform in order 
to obtain it, in their instructive works. L'Arbre de Batailles by Honoré Bonet,98 for 
instance, is a work specifically aimed at making le chevalier know the right course of 
action in any circumstances, while Raymond Lulle in Le livre de l'Ordre de la 
Chevalerie written around 1275 outlines the origins and role of chevalerie, the 
qualifications needed for the perfect knight and how members of the nobility should 
treat each other honourably. According to Lulle, the primary purpose of the knight 
is to defend his lord, especially against attacks from lesser men: ' . . . le mauvais 
chevalier qui aide plutôt le peuple que son seigneur, ne suit pas l'office pour lequel il 
est appelé chevalier.'99 Lulle's concept of honour is in keeping with Bourdieu's in the 
sense that he believes that the honour of a knight can be augmented by behaving in 
accordance with the guidelines he proposes. 'Pour l'honneur du chevalier', says 
Lulle,' il convient qu'il soit aimé car il est bon; qu'il soit craint, car il est fort; qu'il soit 
loué, car il est faiseur du bien; qu'il soit prié, car il est est intime et conseilleur du 
seigneur.'100  
                                                 
98 Bonet, Honore: The Tree of Battles of Honore Bonet; ed. G. W. Coopland. Harvard 1949. L'Arbre 
de Batailles is a work aimed at making le chevalier know the right course of action in any 
circumstances. Here war is described as the personal conflict between two great seigneurs and 
the perfect knight, as Bonet describes him, should stay loyal, help paying the lord's ransom, 
and volonteer as a hostage. 
 
99 Lulle, Raymond: Le Livre de l'Ordre de la Chevalerie. Ed. Guy Trédaniel. Introduction, 
traduction et notes par Bruno Hapel. Paris 1990. pp. 28  - 29. Lulle mentions the following 
qualifications for a perfect knight; 'la justice, la sagesse, la charité, la loyauté, la verité, 
l'humilité, la force, l'esperance, la célerité et les autres vertus  semblables à celle-ci . . .' 
 
100 Lulle, Raymond: Le Livre de l'Ordre de la Chevalerie. Ed. Guy Trédaniel. Introduction, 
traduction et notes par Bruno Hapel. Paris 1990. pp. 75 - 77. 
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Although Lulle wrote at a time when he had left the practice of knighthood to 
become a quasi-friar, Lulle was himself a former knight who had experienced life 
both at court and in battle. This was also the case for Geoffroy de Charny who in 
1350 - 51 wrote a chivalric treatise called Le livre de chevalerie101 for the Company of 
the Star, the new chivalric order of his king, John the Good. De Charny was a 
celebrated French knight, admired for his accomplishments in jousts and 
tournaments, for having taken the cross in 1345 and for having been active in most 
of the major campaigns against the English. He was killed in the battle of Poitiers 
where he was King John's standard-bearer. In his work de Charny, similarly to 
Froissart, advances the principle that prowess is an essential chivalric trait and leads 
to honour - 'the highest human good'. The author also points to the connection 
between honour and other worldly rewards when he states that knights performing 
with honour also 'gained recognition, rise in status, profit, riches and increase in all 
benefits'.102 The greatest honour, according to Charny, could be won by never fleeing 
from a battle. 
 
In the introduction to a new, translated edition of Charny's text, Richard W. 
Kaeuper, says that it is important for students of chivalry to avoid both scholarly 
and popular misconceptions about the chivalrous ideal.103 Medieval chivalry was a 
highly serious code, he says, and was in no sense frivolous or ephemeral, concerned 
                                                 
101 de Charny, Geoffroi: Le livre de chevalerie. The English translation by Elspeth Kennedy is 
based on two French manuscripts: Brussels, Bibliothèque Royale de Belgique: 1124 - 26, FF 83 - 
136; and Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, nouvelle aquisitions française, 4736, ff 36 -87. See pp. 41 
- 42 in de Charny, Geoffroi: A Knight's own book of Chivalry. Introduction by Richard W. 
Kaeuper. Translation by Elspeth Kennedy. Philadelpia 2005.  
 
102 de Charny, Geoffroi: A Knight's own book of Chivalry. Introduction by Richard W. Kaeuper. 
Translation by Elspeth Kennedy. Philadelpia 2005. p. 59. 
 
103 de Charny, Geoffroi: A Knight's own book of Chivalry. Introduction by Richard W. Kaeuper. 
Translation by Elspeth Kennedy. Philadelpia 2005. pp. 1 - 3. 
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only with a few outward forms of social life. If we want to understand chivalry as it 
functioned in the Middle Ages, says Kaeuper, we must demolish the structures, 
many of them venerably Victorian, which stand in the way, and start with sound 
medieval evidence. According to Kaeuper, Charny's book on chivalry is a gold mine 
in this respect, because it reveals where a thoughtful model knight stands in the 
vigorous medieval debate over chivalry.104  
 
Although Froissart was not a knight like de Charny, we may expect his text too, to 
provide information about chivalrous ideals and values, for instance in his portrayal 
of the Count of Foix, Gaston Fébus 105 and other men whom he clearly admired. 
 
2.1. Froissart´s aristocratic ideal and his meeting with Gaston Fébus  
Froissart arrived at Orthez, at the court of Gaston III Fébus, count of Foix, seigneur 
souverain of Béarn, viscount of Marsan, Gabradan, Nébouzan, Lautrec and the 
Terres-basses d'Albigeois and co-seigneur of Andorra from 1343 to 1391, on the 25th 
of November 1388. The chronicler stayed at the Count's court at Orthez for around 
twelve weeks, and the information he received there gave him most of the material 
                                                 
104 de Charny, Geoffroi: A Knight's own book of Chivalry. Introduction by Richard W. Kaeuper. 
Translation by Elspeth Kennedy. Philadelpia 2005. p. 16. 
 
105 Gaston Fébus of Foix (1331-1391), Count of Foix from 1343. Gaston Fébus was, as we shall 
see, a clever administrator and made the county of Foix one of the most influential and 
powerful domains in France. In 1345, early in the Hundred Years War, Gaston fought against 
the English and in 1347 was named special lieutenant general in southern France. Suspected of 
conspiring against France with his brother-in-law, Charles II the Bad, king of Navarre, he was 
imprisoned in 1356. When he was released he left to fight the pagans in Prussia. In 1358, after 
his return to France, he saved some members of the royal family as they were besieged in the 
marketplace of Meaux during the peasant revolt called the Jacquerie. In 1380 Gaston Fébus was 
named lieutenant general of Languedoc by Charles V of France, but upon the latter's death that 
same year he lost the position to the Duke de Berry. Enraged, Gaston defeated the Duke in 
combat and then retired to his mountain estates. For a comprehensive overview of the life of 
Gaston Fébus of Béarn, see Tucoo-Chala, Pierre: Gaston Fébus. Un grand prince d´Occident. Pau 
1976 and Gaston Fébus. Prince des Pyrénées ( 1331 - 1391). Anglet 1993. 
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for the third book of his chronicles, a book many see as the most accomplished part 
of his work.106 When Froissart left for the court of Gaston Fébus in 1388, he was in 
the service of the count Guy of Blois, and in the prologue to the third book, the 
author states his mission clearly; he wanted to go as far as Béarn in order to gain 
knowledge of the affaires of the Iberian peninsula.107 But in addition to relating these 
important events, Froissart was able to give his readers a portrait of one of the most 
renowned knights of his time. 'Le plus grand chroniqeur de langue française du 
XIVe siècle trouva sur les bord du gave à Orthez un homme assez proche de ce 
prince idéal dont il cherchait l'existence à travers toutes les cours occidentales,' says 
Pierre Tucoo-Chala.108   
 
But the stay at Orthez was not only advantageous for the chronicler and his work. 
The Count, in Froissart´s description, was very pleased to have encountered the 
author, who at this point had gained some reputation for his work.109 'Il était de 
surcroit un très grand ecrivain, perfectionnant sans cesse son art pour arriver à sa 
                                                 
106 Tucoo-Chala, Pierre: Gaston Fébus. Un grand prince d´Occident. Pau 1976. pp. 121 - 41. 
 
107 Chroniques. Livres III et IV. § 1. pp. 91 - 92. 'Et là fu enfourmez de la greigneur partie des 
besoignes qui estoient avenues ou royaume de Castile, ou royaume de Portingal, ou royaume 
de Navarre, ou royaume d' Arragon et ou royaume d'Engleterre, ou pays Bourdelois et en toute 
la Gascoingne. . . . Ainsi fu je en l'ostel du noble conte de Foiz requeillis et nourris à ma 
plaisance, ce estoit ce que je desirroie, à enquerre toutes nouvelles touchans à ma matiere. Et je 
avoie prestz à la main barons, chevaliers et escuiers qui m'enfourmerent, et li gentil conte de 
Fois aussi. Si vous vouldray esclarcir par beau langaige tout ce dont je fuz adonc enfourmez, 
pour rengrossier nostre matiere et pour exemplier les bons qui se desirent à avancier par armes, 
car se ci dessus j'ay prologué grans faiz d'armes, prinses et assaulx de villes et de chastaulx, 
batailles adreciees et durs rencontres, encores en trouverez vous ensuivant grant foison, des 
quelles et desquelz par la grace de Dieu je feray bonne et juste enarracion.' 
 
108 Tucoo- Chala: Gaston Febus. Un grand prince d'Occident. Pau 1976. p. 220. 
 
109 Chroniques. Livre III et IV. § 1. p. 91. 'Le quel conte de Fois, si trestost comme il me vit, me fist 
bonne chiere et me dist en riant, en bon françois, que bien il me congnoissoit, et si ne m'avoit 
onques maiz veu, mais pluseurs foys avoit bien ouy parler de moy.' 
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maturité au moment de la rédaction de son Livre III,' says Pierre Tucoo-Chala.110 
Froissart claims that he was warmly welcomed and invited to participate in the 
activities of the court.111 He presented the Count with his roman Méliador and was, 
according to his own testimony, allowed to recite from it every evening. Fébus on 
his side was probably flattered by the great interest Froissart demonstrated in his life 
and the government of his realm and wanted to be portrayed in way that celebrated 
his deeds and qualities.112 All in all, the author’s stay at Gaston Fébus’s court clearly 
left a long-lasting impression, and from what we can gather, Gaston Fébus of Foix 
was the embodiment of all the great qualities the author hoped to find in a prince: 
 
Le conte Gaston de Fois dont je parole, en ce temps que je fu 
devers lui, avoit environ cinquante neuf ans d'aage. Et vous 
di que je ay en mon temps veu moult de chevaliers, roys, 
princes et autres, mais je n'en vi onques nul qui feust de si 
beaux membres, de si belle fourme ne de si belle taille: viaire 
bel, sanguin et riant, les yeux vairs et amoreux là où il lui 
plaisoit son regart getter. De toutes choses il estoit si tres 
parfait que on ne le pourroit trop louer. Il amoit ce que il 
devoit amer et haioit ce qu'il devoit haïr. Saiges chevalier 
estoit et de haulte emprinse, et plain de bon conseil. Il n' eust 
onques nul mescreant avecques lui. Il fu preudons en regner. 
                                                 
110 Tucoo- Chala, Pierre: Gaston Fébus. Un grand prince d´Occident. Pau 1976. p. 122. 'Ce fut une 
chance supplémentaire pour Fébus, il rencontra un homme en pleine possession de son talent 
et au sommet de sa carrière.' 
 
111 Chroniques. Livre III et IV. § 1. p. 91. 'Si me retint de son hostel et tout aise, avecques le bon 
moien des lettres que je lui avoie aportees, tant que il m'y plot à estre . . . Et je meismes, quant je 
lui demandoie aucune chose, il le me disoit moult volentiers. Et me disoit bien que l'istoire que 
je avoie fait et pursuivoie seroit ou temps à avenir plus recommandee que nulle autre.'  
 
112 ‘This warm welcome seems to have augmented the chronicler’s self-confidence in his role as 
Secretary of Chivalry', says Peter Ainsworth. Ainsworth, Peter: Jean Froissart and the Fabric of 
History. Truth, Myth and Fiction in the Chroniques. Oxford 1990. p. 143. 
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Il disoit planté d'oroisons, tous les jours: une nocturne du 
psaultier, heures de Nostre Dame, du Saint Esperit, de la 
Croix, et vigilles de mors. Tous les jours faisoit donner .v. 
frans en petite monnoie pour l'amour de Dieu, et l' aumosne 
à sa porte à toutes gens. Il fu larges et courtois en dons, et 
trop bien savoit prendre où il appartenoit, et remettre où il 
afferoit. Les chiens sur toutes bestes il amoit, et aux champs, 
esté et yver, aux chaces volontiers estoit. D'armes et 
d'amours volontiers se desduisoit . . . Il prenoit grant 
esbatement en menestraudie, car bien s'i congnoissoit. Il 
faisoit devant lui ses clers volentiers chanter chançons, 
rondiaux et virelaiz . . . '113 
 
 
As we may see above, Froissart´s description of Gaston Fébus starts with a physical 
portrait, one of very few in the chronicles.114 Fébus, says Froissart, was the best-
looking man he had ever encountered. However, in spite of this, the description is 
rather limited and drawn in the usual eulogistic style of the age, speaking of his 
features in general praising terms.115 With the exception of his eye-colour, none of 
the characteristics mentioned above would make it possible to distinguish Fébus 
                                                 
113 Chroniques. Livres III et IV. Livre III. § 13. pp. 174 - 77.  
 
114 None of the famous kings and princes, like Edward III, John le Bon or the Black Prince are 
described by Froissart. 
 
115  The Middle Ages had inherited from classical oratory a scheme governing panegyric which 
was frequently applied to the praise of contemporary kings and heroes. The topics appropriate 
to panegyric are conveniently summarized in De inventione where Cicero identifies eleven 
attributes which may be developed for purposes of praise and blame, These are: name, nature, 
manner of life, fortune habit, feeling, interests, purposes, achievements, accidents, and 
speeches. Together they provide a schema, which attempts to formalize all significant aspects of 
a man's life. See Cicero: De inventione, ed. and trans. H. Hubbell. 1949. 
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from other good-looking noblemen of the age.116 The purpose seems to have been to 
integrate Gaston Fébus in the physical ideal of the time; to create a picture of a 
charismatic chivalrous hero, a man other men would admire and obey.  
 
Thomas of Walsingham for instance, in his work Historia Anglicana, describes 
Edward III as 'elegant of body, as his height neither exceeded that which was seemly 
nor yielded overmuch to shortness.' In addition, the king 'had countenance like an 
angel', says Walsingham, 'the more venerable for its human mortality, in which 
shone forth such extraordinary beauty that if anyone had openly looked upon his 
countenance or dreamed of it by night, he would without doubt hope for delightful 
solace to befall him that day.'117 150 years before Walsingham the author of L'Histoire 
de Guillaume le Maréchal claimed that William Marshal was a man with 'limbs so well 
proportioned that he who made him must have been an artist'.118 'He had dark hair 
and a handsome face, says the author and 'his posture could have belonged to a 
Roman Emperor. He was broad-shouldered and was as well turned out as one could 
be . . . ' As we may see, all three authors not only describe the physical characteristics 
of their heroes, but also enhance the positive message by comparing them to angels, 
Roman emperors, works of art and in Froissart's case, other men. 
 
                                                 
116 According to Tucoo-Chala, Gaston Fébus had 'une opulente chevelure blonde qu'il laissait 
toujours flotter au vent', but even this very distinguishable trait, is not mentioned by the 
chronicler. See Tucoo-Chala: Gaston Febus. Un grand prince d'Occident au XIVe siecle. Pau 1976. p. 
8. 
 
117 Barnie, J: War in Medieval Society: Social Values and the Hundred Years War. 1337 - 1399. London 
1974. Appendix. pp. 139 - 145. 
 
118 Meyer, Paul, ed.: L'Histoire de Guillaume le Maréchal, comte de Strigeuil et de Pembroke. Societé 
de l'Histoire de France, (SHF) no. 255, 268. Paris 1891-1901. Hereafter abbreviated HGM. Verses 
714 – 736. 
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One peculiar exception to this praising of the hero's beauty is Cuvelier's Chanson de 
Bértrand Du Guesclin,119 written around the same time as Froissart was working on 
his chronicles. Here Cuvelier emphatically describes the physical appearance of the 
young Bértrand as the ugliest child from Rennes to Dinan; 'Flat nosed and dark, 
gross and uncouth . . .'120 According to Richard Vernier, du Guesclin's recent 
biographer, the Chanson de Bértrand Du Guesclin seems to be our first textual source 
for the enduring theme of Bértrand's ugliness.121 However, in this particular case, 
Vernier believes that the heavy emphasis on Bértrand's appearance serves a specific 
purpose, 'that of introducing the motif of the Ugly Duckling. Or more to the point, of 
the Diamond-in-the-Rough . . .'122 
 
However, with the exception of Cuvelier's description of du Guesclin, a beautiful 
and athletic exterior was a natural part of the hero’s physical attributes in medieval 
                                                 
119 See La chanson du Bértrand du Guesclin de Cuvelier. ed. by Jean-Claude Faucon. Préface de 
Philippe Ménard. Three volumes, including Text, Critical Introduction, Variants, Notes, 
Glossary and Index. Toulouse. Éditions Universitaires du Sud. 1990 - 3. Hereafter abbreviated 
La chanson du Bértrand du Guesclin. Verses. 
 
120 See Vernier, Richard: The Flower of Chivalry. Bértrand du Guesclin and the Hundred Years War. 
Woodbridge 2003. pp. 20 - 22. 'Whether or not he sat still long enough to pose for one, no 
contemporary life portrait of du Guesclin has reached us,' says Vernier. On the monuments in 
Saint-Denis and in Le Puy, both reputed to be good likenesses, the short stature and 
disproportionately broad shoulders are noticeable; but this is after all the physique developed 
by a man who has spent more than forty of his sixty years swinging the battle axe', says 
Vernier. Although the facial features are anything but delicate, they are not much coarser than 
those, for instance, of the royal Duke of Berry, he states. When comparing the face of his gisant 
in the royal necropolis of Saint-Denis, Vernier finds him, if not handsome, at least healthy 
comparison with those of his neighbours and masters, Charles V and his Queen. Indeed if 
Bértrand's features are compared, not to some synthetic ideal of aristocratic countenance, he 
says, but to existing contemporary portraits, it is hard to understand what all the fuss was 
about.  
 
121 The common folks of Bordeaux is said to have called Du Guesclin 'an ugly peasant, with a 
gross body and ferocious face'. La chanson du Bértrand du Guesclin de Cuvelier. Verses 14598 - 
14605. 
 
122 In L' Histoire de Guillaume le Maréchal, the author relates how it was said that the young 
Marshal did nothing but sleep, eat and drink while staying at the Count of Tancarville's house 
in Normandy. "What's the use of this big-eater?" people said to eachother. . . He (the Count of 
Tancarville) listened smilingly and said: "He will do just fine! . . . You do not know who I am 
feeding here!". See HGM Verses 768 - 804. 
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literature, something which can be explained by the fact that ‘beautiful’ often meant 
‘good’ or ‘worthy’. A handsome appearance was therefore taken as the visible proof 
of a good character, a sign of the hero’s moral standing. Alternatively, when 
Froissart describes the peasants of the French popular revolt, La Jaquerie, he calls 
them ‘villains – small and dark’ thus, indicating an actual physical difference 
between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ men.123 'In a feudal society where class distinctions had all 
the virulence of racial prejudice, fair hair and skin, tall, straight bodies and well-
proportioned limbs were the stock characteristics of the aristocracy,' says Richard 
Vernier, and opinion Froissart seems to have shared.124 
 
The literary and cultural tradition, and the society of the later Middle Ages, also led 
to an admiration of war and qualities referring to the noble’s function as a warrior - 
his prowess - skills and boldness in armed conflict. Also Gaston Fébus took pleasure 
in arms, as we may see from the portrayal above. However, Froissart had already 
described Fébus’ prowess before he came to Orthez - in Book I of his chronicles. The 
French defeat at Poitiers, related by Froissart in Book I, had led to a veritable internal 
economical crisis and a breakdown in justice. This led to popular uprisings, 
especially amongst the peasants of the Beauvaisis and large parts of the Ile de 
France.125 The rebels were called Jaques.126 In a passage relating the events of this 
                                                 
 
123 SHF Livre I. Tome V. § 416. ‘ces villains noirs et petis et mal armés . . .’  Whether this was 
based on real physical differences is not certain, but as far as Froissart saw it the difference 
between the social classes was not only a matter of different clothing, speech and behaviour. 
There was also a genuine physical difference, distinguishing the men who were born to rule 
from the men whose destiny it was to be subjects.  
 
124 Vernier, Richard: The Flower of Chivalry. Bértrand du Guesclin and the Hundred Years War. 
Woodbridge 2003. p. 20. 'Peasants had to be content with coarse features and tanned skin, 
lumpy bodies, simian arms and bandy legs,' says Vernier and points to the description of the 
vilain in the thirteenth-century romance Aucassin and Nicolette. 
 
125 SHF Livre I. Tome V. § 415. 
 
126  See discussion in Tucoo-Chala: Gaston Febus. Un grand prince d'Occident au XiVe siecle. Pau 
1976. p. 30. 'The name Jaques came from the name Jaques Bonhomme given to peasants in 
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uprising, Froissart describes the role of Gaston Fébus in the fight against the Jacques 
where he saved several noble ladies, amongst them the duchess of Orléans, the wife 
of the dauphin, the future Charles V, from the attack of the armed peasants.127  
 
When Gaston Fébus, together with his cousin, the Captal de Buch,128 met the Jacques, 
on their way home from Prussia, the Count's force, according to Froissart, was made 
up of no more than forty lances.129 Still, they managed to kill more than seven 
thousand of the men who ‘had performed dreadful calamities and filled the nobility 
with horror’.130 When confronted by noblemen the Jacques proved to be cowards, 
says Froissart, who portrays the Jacques as fearing the blows of lances and swords. 
                                                                                                                                                        
France, whence the Jaquerie. The name is thought to derive frim jacque (a jerkin) considered as 
the peasants' distinctive wear, though a garment of that name was worn by Edward III at 
Winchelsea and by Bolingbroke on the eve of his coronation - in the second case made of cloth-
of-gold', says Brereton. See Froissart, Jean: Chronicles. Trans. Geoffrey Brereton. London 1968. p. 
476. 
 
127 SHF Livre I. Tome V. § 415 - 16. The main focus of the participants in the Jaquerie was, 
according to Froissart, to destroy the nobles, knights and squires who had disgraced and 
betrayed the realm, and the barbarous acts that followed were ‘worse than anything that ever 
took place between Christians and Saracens’. Noblemen and their families were killed, says 
Froissart who, in spite of claiming that he could not bring himself to write about the things that 
happened to the noble ladies, gives a few very detailed accounts of the fate of some unlucky 
noblemen. In this fearful situation several noblemen and their ladies were forced to flee and an 
international force of noblemen was gathered in order to regain control of the situation.  
 
128 The Captal de Buch, relative of Gaston Fébus was a Gascon nobleman and thus, 'English'. 
But although the Captal was English, says Froissart, the truce between England and France 
made it possible for him to go wherever he wanted in France, and in order to ‘give proof of his 
knightly qualities’ he decided to join the Count in his fight against the ‘villains’. The Count and 
the Captal de Buch were bound together by kinship and by having fought together in Prussia, a 
fact attesting to the complex familiar and social connections between the Anglo-French nobility.  
 
129 SHF Livre I. Tome V. § 415 - 16. 'Si pooient estre de leur route environ quarante lances et non 
plus, car il venoient d´un pelerinage, ensi que je vous ay jà dit.' 
 
130 SHF Livre I. Tome V. § 415 - 16. 'Adonc issirent toutes manières de gens d'armes hors des 
barrières et gagnièrent tantost le place et se boutèrent entre ces meschans gens; si les abatoient 
à fous et à mons et les tuoient ensi que bestes, et les reboutèrent tout hors de le ville que onques 
nulz d´yaus n'i eut ordenance ne conroi. Et en tuèrent tant qu´il en estoient tout lassé et tout 
tané, et les fasoient sallir à mons en le rivière de Marne. Briefment, il en tuèrent ce jour que 
misent à fin plus de sept mil; ne jà n´en fust nulz escapés, se il les volsissent avoir caciés plus 
avant.' 
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Not one would have escaped if Gaston Fébus and his men had not grown tired of 
pursuing them, the author claims. 
 
In Froissart´s account, positively evaluated kings and magnates are all portrayed as 
being able to stand their ground in man-to-man combat. When describing the first 
battles of Edward III Froissart makes a point of describing him as a very competent 
warrior and a noble knight of his own hand,131 for instance in an attack upon Calais 
where the young English King fought incognito under the banner of Sir Walter 
Manny.132 In the fierce encounter Edward III singled out Eustache de Ribeaumont 
who, according to Froissart, was the ‘most formidable’ of the French knights. They 
fought together for a long time, he says, and although many knights proved 
themselves, Eustache was the best knight and twice struck the King to his knees. 
Finally the French were vanquished and the King captured Eustache who 
surrendered his sword and said: 'Knight, I give myself up to you'. Although 
Eustache finally had to give in, his honour was not diminished by his defeat. 
Apparently, in Froissart´s opinion, both men won symbolic capital by their actions, 
even the one who was defeated. 
 
Although Edward III and his son, Edward the Black Prince, are probably the men 
portrayed most in keeping with the traditional martial virtues of the time, the 
                                                 
 
131  SHF Livre I. Tome II. § 115: 'La fu li rois d’Engleterre, de sa main trés bons chevaliers, car il 
estoit adonc en le fleur de se jonéce.' 
 
132 SHF Livre I. Tome IV. § 319. 'Là eut grant estour et dur et bien combatu. Et y furent et 
François et Englès, cescuns en son couvenant, très bons chevaliers. Là eut fait plusieurs grans 
apertises d´armes. Et ne s´i espargna li rois d'Engleterre noient, mès estoit toutdis entre les plus 
drus; et eut de le main ce jour le plus à faire à monsigneur Ustasse de Ribeumont. Là fus ses 
filz, li jones princes de Galles, très bons chevaliers. Et fu li rois abatus en jenoulz, si com je fuis 
infourmés, par deux fois, dou dessus dit monsigneur Ustasse . . . La journée demora pour les 
Englès . . . Et bien veoit messires Ustasses ossi que rendre ou mourir le couvenoit. Si bailla au 
roy sen espée et li dist: “Chevaliers je me rens vostre prisonnier”. Et li rois le prist qui en eut 
grant joie.' 
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French king captured at Poitiers, John the Good, is also portrayed as possessing his 
fair share of martial abilities. According to Froissart the King of France never 
showed dismay at anything he saw or heard reported and remained on the field at 
Poitiers from beginning to end, like a brave knight and stout fighter. He had shown 
his determination never to retreat when he commanded his men to fight on foot, 
says Froissart, and having made them dismount, he did the same and stood in the 
forefront of them with a battle-axe in his hands, ordering forward his banners in the 
name of God and St. Denis.133 Although John was eventually vanquished, the author 
never reproaches him for the negative outcome of the battle. On the contrary, 
Froissart remarks that if a quarter of his men had resembled John the day would 
have been his. We will return to Froissart´s account of the campaign and battle of 
Poitiers in the next chapter. 
 
Froissart´s focus on prowess and lack of bias when relating deeds of war is also seen 
in his description of the battle of Najera in April 1367 where Pedro the Cruel of 
Castile, supported by the English and Gascon forces of the Black Prince, met the 
forces of Pedro's illegitimate half-brother Enrique of Trastamara, supported by the 
French.134 Although clearly impressed by the victorious Black Prince and the feats of 
arms performed by his men, Froissart also relates the courage of the opponent, 
                                                 
133 SHF Livre I. Tome V.  § 388. '. . . on ne poet pas dire ne presumer que li rois Jehans de France 
s´effreast onques pour cose que il oist ne veist; mès demora et fu toutdis bons chevaliers et bien 
combatants, et ne moustra pas samblant de fuir ne de reculer, quant il dist à ses hommes: A 
piet! A piet! et fist descendre tous chiaus qui à cheval estoient. Et il meismes se mist à piet 
devant tous les siens, une hace de guerre en ses mains, et fit passer avant ses banières ou nom 
de Dieu et de saint Denis, dont messires Joffrois de Chargni portoit la souverainne . . .' 
 
134 SHF Livre I. Tome VII. § 583. 'La bataille et la route, qui fu le mieulz combatue et plus 
entettement, ce fu ceste de monsigneur Bertran de Claiekin; car là estoient droites gens d'armes 
qui se combatoient et vendoient à leur loyal pooir, et là furent faites plusieurs grans apertises 
d'armes. Et par especial, messires Jehans Chandos y fu très bons chevaliers, et consilla et 
gouvrena ce jour le duch de Lancastre en tel manière comme il fist jadis son frère le prince de 
Galles, à le bataille de Poitiers, de quoi il fu moult honnourés et recommendés, ce fu bien 
raisons, car un vaillant homme et bon chevalier, qui ensi s'acquitte envers ses signeurs, on le 
doit moult recommender.' 
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Enrique of Trastamara, and his ability to spur the fighting spirit of his retinue. He 
also relates the great deeds performed by men fighting on Enrique's side, like 
Bértrand du Guesclin and Arnold d'Audrehem. The defeated French had performed 
nobly, says Froissart, for if the Spanish had done their part as well as the French, the 
English and Gascons should have suffered more pain than they did. However, 
according to Froissart, the fault was not Enrique's, for he had well admonished his 
forces and was able to install courage in his men and prevent them from fleeing 
three times. Enrique also fought very valiantly himself, did many fine feats of arms 
and ought to be greatly honoured and praised for his actions, the author says.135 The 
English on their part, won 'by noble chivalry and great prowess of arms' and as 
always, the Prince himself was the flower of all chivalry, states Froissart.136  
 
However, prowess was but one of the virtues associated with chivalry. From 
Froissart´s text we can discern that it was also important for a man of honour to be 
known for his excellence in manners - his courtesy. One of the best examples of this is 
of course the description of how the victorious Prince Edward received King John of 
France with great ceremony after the battle of Crécy, quoted at the beginning of this 
dissertation.137 As seen, King John was here served by the Prince in person who 
refused to sit at the King's table because he was by no means 'worthy to sit at the 
table of so mighty a prince and so brave a soldier as he [the King of France] had 
proved himself to be on that day'. 138 The Prince courteously consoled the King with 
                                                 
135 SHF Livre I. Tome VII. § 583. 'D'autre part, li rois Henris, en tous estas, se acquitta très 
vaillament, et recouvra et retourna ses gens par trois fois.' 
 
136 SHF Livre I. Tome VII. § 582. ' . . . par grant proece et vaillandise d'armes; car, au voir dire, 
avoech le prince estoit là toute la fleur de la chevalerie dou monde et li milleur combatant.' 
 
137 An event reported fully by Froissart and with less detail by Chandos' herald in La vie de 
Prince Noir. See the description in the translation of La Vie de Prince Noir in Life and Campaigns of 
the Black Prince, ed. and trans. Richard Barber. Woodbridge 1979. p. 103. 
 
138 SHF Livre I. Tome V. § 397.  'Quant ce vint au soir, li princes de Galles donna à souper en sa 
loge le roy de France, . . . Et assist li princes le roy Jehan . . . à une table moult haute et bien 
couverte; et tous les autres signeurs, barons et chevaliers, as aultres tables. Et toutdis servoit li 
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the thought that he would be well treated by his father, Edward III, and claimed that 
John of France through his valour had won the prize of chivalry that day. This, he 
said, was not to flatter the King, for everyone, both the English and French agreed 
on this. 
 
 It may of course be argued that the Prince was motivated by more rational 
considerations in his treatment of the French king. However, according to John 
Barnie, it would be an over-simplification to conclude from this passage that the 
Prince's behaviour was hypocritical or that it merely provides yet another example 
of chivalry as 'a splendid pageant, an elaborate game to mask the coarser aspects of 
existence'.139  Ritualistic courtesy of the kind performed by the Black Prince at 
Poitiers was an essential element in the ideal of the noble life which knights 
professed to follow, says Barnie. It is of course difficult to know what John felt after 
his unexpected defeat. He must obviously have felt humbled, and maybe even more 
so by the Prince’s extravagant behaviour towards him. Still, the account given by 
                                                                                                                                                        
princes audevant de la table dou roy et par toutes les aultres tables ossi, si humlement que il 
pooit; ne onques ne se volt seoir à le table dou roy, pour priière que li rois en fesist, ains disoit 
toutdis que il n'estoit mies encores si souffissans que il apertenist à lui de seoir à le table de si 
grant prince et de si vaillant homme que li corps de li estoit et que moustré avoit à le journée. Et 
toutdis s'engenilloit par devant le roy, et disoit bien: "Chiers sires, ne voelliés mies faire simple 
cière, pour tant se Diex n'i a hui volu consentir vostre voloir; car certainnement monsigneur 
mon père vous fera toute l'onneur et amisté qu'il pora, et se acordera à vous si raisonnablement 
que vous demorrés bon amit ensamble à tousjours. Et m'est avis que vous avés grant raison de 
vous esleecier, comment que la besongne ne soit tournée à vostre gret; car vous avés conquis au 
jour d'ui le haut nom de proèce, et avés passet tous le mieulz faisans de vostre costet. Je ne le di 
mies, ce saciés, chiers sires, pour vous lober; car tout cil de nostre partie, qui ont veu les uns et 
les aultres, se sont, par plainne sieute, à ce acordet, et vous en donnent le pris et le chapelet, se 
vous le volés porter." A ce point commença cescuns à murmurer, et disoient, entre yaus, 
Francois et Englès, que noblement et à point li prices avoit parlet. Si le prisoient durement et 
disoient communalment que en lui avoit et aroit encores gentil signeur, se il pooit longement 
durer ne vivre, et en tel fortune perseverer.' 
 
139 Barnie, J: War in Medieval Society: Social Values and the Hundred Years War. 1337 - 1399. London 
1974. pp. 80 - 81. It should be noted that courteous treatment of the most prominent members 
of the defeated party after a battle did not only occur in medival times, but is something which 
is also found much later in European history, even in descriptions of World War 1. However, 
the humility and servile attitude Froissart of the Prince is different. 
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Froissart shows that the French King's status within the aristocratic hierarchy was 
widely recognised. 'Edward's serving at King John's table acknowledged in symbolic 
form what was self-evident to all those present: the French king's superior status 
even in captivity', says Barnie. In this context the action was not hypocritical, but a 
meaningful ritual, Barnie states.  
 
In my opinion, Barnie is right to argue that the King of France possessed such 
amounts of social, cultural and symbolic capital that, although defeated, his status 
could not be disregarded. When relating the status of the French king in Book IV of 
his chronicles, Froissart says that 'the King of France is the most worthy, noble and 
powerful king in the world'.140 However, I believe that Froissart's account also 
demonstrates that it was the Black Prince - and not his defeated adversary - who 
gained the most by acting in such a servile or courteous manner. According to the 
chronicler, it was the Prince, not John, who in fact, won the approbation of the 
assembled company by acknowledging the prowess of his noble enemy. By showing 
his admiration for the feats of arms of his adversary, the Prince showed his own 
generous and chivalrous character, his eminence in social conduct, his courtesy, and 
was able to gain the recognition of his peers and establish himself as a 'primus inter 
pares' at a young age. 
 
A similar mechanism is also seen in Froissart´s account of the first meeting between 
the Black Prince and the King of Castile, Pedro, who by no means is a man 
celebrated by Froissart, but on the contrary portrayed as a cruel and cowardly king, 
                                                 
140 When lamenting the fate of Charles VI who became ill with a mental disorder, Froissart 
states: 'A considérer raison et ymaginer toutes choses en vérité, ce fut grant pitié de ce que le 
roy de France pour ce temps, qui est le plus digne, le plus noble et le plus puissant roy du 
monde, chéy en telle débilité que de perdre son sens tout soudainement.' See Kervyn von 
Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XV. p. 43. 
 
 43
failing to uphold his promises and financial obligations.141 When King Pedro of 
Castile came to Aquitaine to seek the help of the Prince in his struggle against his 
bastard brother, Enrique, Froissart describes how the Prince received the King with 
'honour and feast'.142 No prince knew better than him how to honour a guest, says 
Froissart, showing that the prince had gained great renown for his hospitality. When 
Pedro and the Prince rode together, the Prince let the King ride in front, says 
Froissart who clearly did not see this behaviour as strictly necessary. And again we 
see that it is the Prince who gained the most through his courteous actions. 
 
Edward the Black Prince is mainly shown as a man who knew how to act with 
honour in every situation, and on some occasions his wish to act with honour and 
courtesy was in contradiction to what one would generally consider the most 
'advantageous' course of action. After the battle of Najera Bértrand du Guesclin had 
been taken for ransom by Sir John Chandos, an English knight highly praised by 
Froissart.143 Being a worthy and noble enemy, du Guesclin was well treated in 
captivity, and is said to have praised his captors in a meeting with the Black Prince. 
However, Froissart also describes how du Guesclin, here defied the Prince: ' . . . it is 
said in the realm of France and in other places, that you fear me so much that you 
                                                 
141 History persists in calling Pedro 'the Cruel' although in reality he may not have been worse 
than for instance his Aragonese rival, Pedro IV of Aragon (also called Pere del Punyalet - Peter 
the Knife). Pedro the Cruel was accused of having poisoned his wife Blanche de Bourbon and is 
believed to have viewed killing as the solution to many of his problems. His enemies claimed 
that his relationship with the Jews had instigated Pedro's cruel actions. Whatever the extent of 
his character flaws, the troubles of Pedro I of Castile were due in no small part to his harsh 
treatment of the feudal nobility.  
 
142 SHF Livre I. Tome VI. § 550. 'Quant il l'encontra, il l'onnera de fait et de parolles moult 
grandement, car bien le savoit faire, nulz princes à son temps mieulz de lui. Et quant il se furent 
recueilliet et conjoy, ensi comme il apertenoit, il chevaucièrent vers Bordiaus. Et mist li dis 
princes le roy dan Piètre au dessus de lui, ne onques ne le volt faire ne consentir aultrement.' 
 
143 See for instance SHF Livre I. Tome IV. § 345 ' . . . messires Jehans Chandos, qui jà avoit le 
renommée d'estre li uns des milleurs chevaliers de toute Engleterre, de sens, de force, d'eur, de 
fortune, de haute emprise et de bon conseil; et par especial li rois avoit son fil le prince 
recommendé à lui et en sa garde.' 
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dare not let me out, something which is a great honour to me.'144  Understanding 
well the words of du Guesclin, and that his own council would not let du Guesclin 
go easily, says Froissart, the Black Prince stated that fear was by no means a 
motivation for keeping du Guesclin captured and offered du Guesclin his freedom 
for one hundred thousand franks.145  
 
The Prince, in Froissart´s account, could clearly not let du Guesclin's challenge pass 
for fear of loosing honour. However, as soon as he had spoken, says the author, the 
Prince regretted what he had said. But having agreed to the said terms, and being a 
'wise and loyal knight', the Prince would not go back on his word, says Froissart. 
'We should be widely reproached and shamed, if we should not have put him to 
ransom, seeing that he was willing to pay such a large sum as one hundred 
thousand francs,' the Prince is said to have replied to his council's reproaches.146 
Since du Guesclin was highly esteemed by the King of France and other noblemen of 
the realm, it took him less than a month to raise the sum of his ransom, says 
Froissart, thus indicating the great worth and valour of the Breton knight and the 
fact that the Prince had indeed let his prisoner go for a small ransom.  
 
                                                 
144 SHF Livre I. Tome VII. § 592. ' "Monsigneur, respondi messires Bertrans, il ne me fu, Dieu 
merci, onques mès mieulz, et c'est drois qu'il me soit bien, car je sui li plus honourés chevaliers 
dou monde, quoique je demeure en vo prison, et vous sarés pourquoi et comment. On dist, 
parmi le royaume de France et ailleurs ossi, que vous me doubtés et ressongniés tant que vous 
ne m'osés mettre hors de vostre prison." ' 
 
145 SHF Livre I. Tome VII. § 592. 'Li princes de Galles entendi ceste parolle et cuida bien que 
messires Bertrans le desist à bon sens. . . . Si respondi: "Voires, messire Bertran, pensés vous 
donc que pour vostre chevalerie nous vous retenons? Par saint Gorge! nennil; et, biau sire, 
paiiés cent mil frans, et vous serés delivrés." ' 
 
146 SHF Livre I. Tome VII. § 592. ' . . . ses consaulz  . . . li disent: "Monseigneur, vous avés trop 
mal fait, quant si legierment vous l'avés rançonné. . . . Mès li princes, qui fu sages et loyaus 
chevaliers toutdis, en respondi bien à point, et dist: "Puisque acordé li avons, nous li tenrons, ne 
ja n'en irons arrière. Blasmes et virgongne nous seroit, se reprocié nous estoit que nous ne le 
vosissions mettre à finance, quant, il s'i voet mettre si grossement que paiier cent mil frans." ' 
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Froissart clearly cherished these marvellous displays of courtoisie and often shows 
that noblemen of different nationality and allegiance held each other in mutual 
esteem.147 When the Black Prince heard that King Enrique was moving against him, 
during the Prince's invasion of Castile in 1367, he was right joyous, says Froissart, 
and praised his opponent for his valiant behaviour.148 Later, when the English knight 
Sir John Chandos died fighting, Froissart describes how his death was lamented 
amongst the noble and valiant knights of France.149 When relating the death of the 
Black Prince in 1376, Froissart says that King Charles of France held a mass in the 
Holy Chapel to honour his dead relative, 'who was the flower of chivalry of 
England'. The fact that the Prince had pillaged and ravaged great parts of the French 
countryside is not mentioned. 
 
Linked to courtesy in Froissart´s account, is the virtue generosity, and we find that 
Count Gaston Fébus of Foix was a man whose generosity was well known by all, a 
fact related in a discussion between Froissart and one of the Count's knights: 
 
                                                 
147 Words like 'English' or 'French' often denotes allegiance, rather than nationality, observes 
Brereton, in 'Notes in Form of Glossary' at the end of his translated edition of Froissart. 'The 
lord of Albret married into the French royal family and 'became French'. The inhabitants of La 
Rochelle were 'French' only after they had changed sides. English is used in the same way,' says 
Brereton. See Froissart, Jean: Chronicles. Trans. Geoffrey Brereton. London 1968. p. 475. 
 
148 SHF Livre I. Tome VII. § 568. ' Quant li princes, qui se tenoit encores à Sauveterre, entendi ce 
que li rois Henris avoit passet l'aigue et prendoit son chemin et ses adrèces pour venir vers lui, 
si en fu moult resjoïs, et dist si haut que tout l'oïrent cil qui estoient autour de lui: " Par ma foy, 
cils bastars Henris est uns vaillans et hardis chevaliers, et li vient de grant proèce et de grant 
hardement nous querre ensi." ' 
 
149 SHF Livre I. Tome VII. § 646. 'Partout deça et dela le mer, de ses amis et amies fu plains et 
regretés messires Jehans Chandos; et li rois de France et li signeur en France l'eurent tantost 
ploré. Ensi aviennent les besongnes. Li Englès l'amoient, pour tant qu'en li estoient toutes 
hautainnes emprises. Li François le haioient, pour ce qu'il ressongnoient. Si l'oy je bien, en ce 
temps, plaindre et regreter des bons chevaliers et des vaillans de France. Et disoient ensi que de 
lui estoit grans damages, et mieuls vausist qu'il euist esté pris que mors; car, se il euist esté pris, 
il estoit bien si sages et si imaginatis que il euist trouvé aucun moiien, par quoi pais euist esté 
entre France et Engleterre . . . .'  
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Lors lui demanday je: "Sire et a quelz gens donne il [Gaston 
Fébus] ces dons?" Il me respondi: "Aux estrangiers, aux 
chevaliers, aux escuiers qui vont et chevauchent par son 
païs, à heraulx, à menestrelz, à toutes gens qui parloient à 
lui. Nul ne se part sans ses dons, car qui les refuseroit, il se 
courrouceroit.150 
 
According to Froissart everyone who passed Fébus' court received a gift and the 
Count had a reputation for being an excellent gift-giver. The Count's generosity is 
also mentioned later in Froissart´s account, when he speaks of the chests where 
Gaston Fébus kept the money he liked to distribute to passing knights and squires. 
Gift giving (of money, land, valuables, but also of positions, heiresses and 
privileges) is sufficiently described in every aristocratic source from this epoch, often 
on a lavish scale, and was not only limited to the highest nobles and the king. As we 
may gather from the instructive texts of both Lulle and Charny, gift giving was 
expected of every member of the knightly class, even a young 'chevalier errant'. The 
apparently disinterested open-handedness so often described in medieval 
aristocratic literature has sometimes been perceived as ‘irrational’, because it is 
contrary to modern capitalistic beliefs in the maximisation of profit, investment and 
the accumulation of capital. In medieval aristocratic narratives we often hear of one 
fortune after another being made in war, but soon lost or spent. 'No hoarding, but 
tossing back the gains - from mercenary pay, royal gifts, ransoms, resale of fiefs etc. - 
onto the game board, in hope of greater gains, or for the sake of adventure, or 
simply in his lord's service,' says Richard Vernier of the financial dealings of 
Bértrand du Guesclin.151  
                                                 
150  Chroniques. Livres III et IV. § 9. pp. 140 - 141.  
 
151 Vernier, Richard: The Flower of Chivalry. Bértrand du Guesclin and the Hundred Years War. 
Woodbridge 2003. p. 160. 
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However, if one accepts that gift giving was an important element in the creation 
and consolidation of social, political and, as a result, economical power, one may see 
that generosity was all but irrational, even in an economical perspective. Through 
the gift a relation of mutual support and loyalty was established, thus, making it the 
foundation for future gains. In addition, to have a reputation as a good gift-giver 
enhanced the giver’s honour, thus leading to increased status and more political 
opportunities. In his book on chivalry, Charny advices on conduct towards both 
friends and enemies and says that the knight ' . . . should never regret any generosity  
. . . shown and any gifts well bestowed, for the above-mentioned men of worth tell 
you that a man of worth should not remember what he has given except when the 
recipient brings the gift back to mind for the good return he makes of it.' Also, he 
says, the knight should avoid acquiring a bad reputation for miserliness in his old 
age: ' for the more you have given, the more you should give.'152  
 
In the nature of the gift lies the obligation to give a counter-gift, says Marcel Mauss 
in his famous essay, Le Don.153 The counter-gift does not, however, have to be of the 
same kind as the first. Good counsels and military service could be exchanged for an 
heiress, an office or a piece of land. However, gift-giving implied a knowledge of the 
unwritten rules of society, a fact that Froissart seems highly aware of when he later 
tells us that ‘the Count [Gaston Fébus] knew exactly from whom it was proper to 
take and to whom to give’.154 This statement alludes to the symbolic importance of 
gift giving and the dual status of the nobleman who was both someone else’s subject 
                                                 
152 de Charny, Geoffroi: A Knight's own book of Chivalry. Introduction by Richard W. Kaeuper. 
Translation by Elspeth Kennedy. Philadelpia 2005. pp. 71 - 2. 
 
153 Mauss, Marcel: The Gift. London 1954. (reprint 1988) Initally published in French under the 
name Essay sur le Don - Forme achaîque de l'échange. Paris 1925. 
 
154 Chroniques. Livres III et IV. Livre III. § 13. p. 175. 'Il fu larges et courtois en dons, et trop bien 
savoit prendre où il appartenoit, et remettre où il afferoit.' 
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and a lord him-self who was supposed to be generous towards his own retinue and 
men.  
 
When John Audley (who had been the first to assault the enemy at Poitiers and 
fought in the front rank of the English army throughout the battle) was carried back 
on a stretcher at the end of the battle, the Black Prince, according to Froissart 
promised him a pension of 500 marks for his gallant conduct and brave fighting. But 
when Audley returned to his own retinue, he summoned his knights and formally 
gave the money to four of his men who had served as his bodyguards during the 
battle. The ‘rationale’ behind the gift giving is explained in the following passage: 
 
Et fist [Audley] venir avant les quatre escuiers que il avoit eu 
pour son corps, le journée, et dist ensi as chevaliers qui là 
estoient: "Signeur, il a pleu à monsigneur le prince qu il m´a 
donné cinq cens mars de revenue par an et en hyretage; pour 
lequel don je li ay encores fait petit service, et puis faire de mon 
corps tant seulement. Il est verités que veci quatre escuiers qui 
m´ont toutdis loyaument servi. Et par especial, à le journée d'ui, 
ce que j'ay d´onneur, c´est par leur emprise et leur hardement. 
Pour quoi, en le presense de vous qui estes de mon linage, je 
leur voel maintenant remunerer les grans et agreables services 
qu´il m´ont fait. C´est me intention que je leur donne et resi[-
g]ne en leur mains le don et le cinq cens mars que messires le 
princes m´a donnés et acordés, en tel fourme et manière que 
donnés le mes a; et m´en desherite et les en aherite purement et 
franchement, sans nul rappel." 155  
 
                                                 
155 SHF Livre I. Tome V.  § 396.  
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'The honour bestowed on me was won by their enterprise and daring' Audley is 
reported to have said, and he therefore wanted to give his men the gift he had 
received.  This was clearly an act applauded by Froissart, who proceeds to show 
how Audley was richly remunerated for his generosity. When the Black Prince 
heard of Audley's gift to his three squires, he summoned Audley to hear why he had 
done so, says Froissart. Audley answered that his men had served him well and 
loyally, and especially on the day when he received the gift. In fact, had his men not 
helped him, he would have been killed.  
 
'Monsigneur, respondi li chevaliers, par ma foy o il très 
grandement; et le raison qui me meut au faire, je le vous dirai.  . 
. ciers sires, je ne sui c'uns seulz homs et ne puis q'un homme; et 
sus le confort et ayde d'yaus, je empris à acomplir le veu que de 
lonch temps avoie voé . . . Dont, quant j'ai consideré le bonté et 
l'amour qu'il me moustrèrent, je n'euisse pas éste bien courtois 
et avisé, se je ne leur euisse guerredonné; car monsigneur, Dieu 
merci, tousjours ay je assés eu et arai tant com je vivrai, ne 
onques de chavance ne m'esbahi ne esbahirai.' 156 
 
Seeing that Audley had spoken honourably and reasonably, the Prince found that he 
could not blame him for what he had done, says Froissart, and gave him another gift 
of six hundred marks on the same conditions as the first gift. 
 
Gift giving ensured loyalty, and although glory was generally perceived as being 
more important than financial gain in the traditional chivalrous ethos, wealth could 
sometimes be of primary importance. This is clearly seen in Froissart´s description of 
the French king’s gifts of land to Bértrand du Guesclin, who already possessed an 
                                                 
156 SHF Livre I. Tome V. § 398. 
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ample amount of symbolic capital due to his martial exploits.157 Still, according to 
Froissart, the King found it necessary to bestow various gifts on the valiant, but 
relatively poor Breton knight, when he appointed him Constable of France, both 
'domains and rents for himself and his heirs in perpetuity'.158 From other sources we 
know that du Guesclin was made viscount of Pontorson, and was also given several 
manors and forests in Normandy.159 However, the gifts presented to du Guesclin 
were not merely payment for a job well done; they represented the foundation for a 
relationship of primary political and military importance.160 
 
In Froissart´s description, du Guesclin was a modest man who accepted the offer to 
become Constable of France, not out of personal ambition, but out of loyalty to the 
                                                 
157 The Breton knight, Bértrand du Guesclin, rose from provincial obscurity to the highest 
military office in France, constable, and to a dukedom in Spain. Du Guesclin was a knight of 
great professional ability and his life and deeds were celebrated by Cuvelier in La chanson du 
Bértrand du Guesclin. For a recent biography see Vernier, Richard: The Flower of Chivalry. 
Bértrand du Guesclin and the Hundred Years War. Woodbridge 2003.  
 
158 SHF Livre I. Tome VII. § 668. ‘ . . . Adonc s'escusa messires Bertrans moult grandement et 
très sagement, et dist qu'il n’en esoit mies dignes, et que c'estoit uns povres chevaliers et petis 
bacelers ou regard des grans signeurs et vaillans hommes de France, comment que fortune 
l'euist un petit avanciet. Là li dist li rois que il s'escusoit pour noient et qu'il couvenoit qu'il le 
fust, car il estoient ensi ordonné et determiné de tout le conseil de France, lequel il ne voloit 
mies brisier . . . Messires Bertrans cogneut bien que escusances, que il sceuist ne peuist faire ne 
moustrer, ne valoient riens: si s'accorda finablement à l'ordonance dou roy, mès ce fu à dur et 
moult envis. Là fu pourveus à grant joie messires Bertrans de Claiekin de l'office de le 
connestablie de France; et pour li plus exaucier, li rois l'assist dalés lui à sa table et li moustra 
tous les signes d'amour qu'il peut; et li donna en ce jour avoech l'offisce plus de quatre mils 
frans de revenue, en hiretage, lui et son hoir. A celle promotion mist grant painne et grant 
conseil li dus d'Ango.' 
 
159 Vernier, Richard: The Flower of Chivalry. Bértrand du Guesclin and the Hundred Years War. 
Woodbridge 2003. p. 177. 
 
160 The gift made to du Guesclin was indeed extraordinary although it received the unanimous 
support of the royal dukes. In fact, the author of the Grandes Chroniques de France felt compelled 
to justify this extraordinary promotion, noting that the Breton knight was chosen 'because of 
his valour, for he was of lesser lineage than other constables . . .  before him; but by his valour 
he had acquired several great estates and fiefs .  .  . ' says Vernier.  See Vernier, Richard: The 
Flower of Chivalry. Bértrand du Guesclin and the Hundred Years War. Woodbridge 2003. pp .157 - 
58. 
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King. Several noblemen described by Froissart are explicitly said to be loyal men, 
ready to support their king or lord. The most telling example is perhaps the often 
quoted and highly emotional portrayal of the blind King of Bohemia, John of 
Luxembourg, who in spite of his handicap wanted to participate in the battle at 
Crécy.161 Although his men must have known that this was highly dangerous and 
could mean the end to them all, they agreed because, according to Froissart, they 
‘cherished his honour and their own prowess’. Although the King and his men came 
so close to the enemy that the King was able to use his sword several times, they all 
died in the battle. Another example of this type of loyal behaviour is the description 
of the battle of Poitiers where John Audley is said to have approached the Black 
Prince urging him to let him go in the front. Audley claimed that he in the past had 
made a solemn vow to be amongst the fist attackers, in such an encounter as the 
battle of Poitiers.162 The Prince granted Audley's wish and Audley went to the 
forefront to fight only accompanied by four squires, says Froissart. As we saw 
above, Audley was richly rewarded for his 'loyal and courageous' behaviour.  
 
 However, it was not only the knight who was obligated to act with loyalty towards 
his lord. The lord had an obligation to treat his men in such a manner that he 
ensured their loyalty. This is a view Froissart seems to share with Geoffroy de 
Charny who in his text states that the ruler should 'love, honour and hold dear the 
good and wise and the men of worth, to pay heed to their words, to associate closely 
                                                 
161 SHF Livre I. Tome III. § 279. 'Li vaillans et gentilz rois de Behagne . . . entendi par ses gens 
que la bataille estoit commencie; car quoique il fust là armés et en grant arroy, il ne veoit goutes 
et estoit aveules . . . Adonc dist li vaillans rois à ses gens une grant vaillandise: "Signeur, vous 
estes mi homme et mi ami et mi compagnon. A le journée d´ui, je vous pri et requier très 
especialement que vous me menés si avant que je puisse ferir un cop d´espée." Et cil qui dalés 
lui estoient, et qui se honneur et leur avancement amoient, li acordèrent.' 
 
162 SHF Livre I. Tome V. § 384. 'Messires James d'Audelée . . . s' en vint devers le prince, et li 
dist: "Monsigneur, j'ai servi tousjours loyaument monsigneur votre père et vous ossi, et ferai 
tant com je vivrai . . . Si vous pri chierement, en guerredon que je fis onques de servicez au roy 
vostre père et vous ossi, que vous me donnés congiet que de vous, à me honneur, je me puisse 
partir et mettre en estat de acomplir mon veu.' 
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with them and enjoy their company.'163 In Froissart´s account magnates and kings 
would go to great lengths to ensure the loyalty of their men, and the ones that did 
not, like Pedro the Cruel, clearly suffered: 
 
En ce temps, y avoit un roy en Castile qui s'appeloit dan 
Pières, de merveilleuses opinions plains, et estoit durement 
rebelles à tous commandemens et ordnenances de l'Eglise, et 
voloit sousmettre tous ses voisins crestiiens . . . Avoech tout 
ce, cilz rois dans Piètres avoit trois frères bastars . . . Cils 
bastars Henris estoit et fu moult hardis et preus chevaliers . . 
Cilz rois dans Pières, si com fames couroit, avoit fait morir la 
mère de ces enfans moult diversement: de quoi il lor en 
desplaisoit, c'estoit bien raisons. Avoech tout ce, ossi [avoit] 
fait morir et exilliet plusieurs haus barons dou royaume de 
Castile, et estoit si crueulz et si plains d'erreur et de austerité 
que tout si homme le cremoient et ressongnoient et le 
haoient, se moustrer li osaissent. Et avoit fait morir une très 
bonne et sainte dame que il avoit eu à femme . . .'164 
 
When this despised King Pedro tried to summon the noblemen of Castille to help 
him defend his realm against the attack of his half-brother and his allies, too few 
men obeyed his command, says Froissart. Instead, they turned to his brother, who 
was able to rally both local and foreign men around his cause. Enrique rode from 
town to town, says Froissart, and was well received everywhere he went. He gave 
great gifts and gained renown for being a generous and honourable lord, 'worthy of 
                                                 
163 de Charny, Geoffroi: A Knight's own book of Chivalry. Introduction by Richard W. Kaeuper. 
Translation by Elspeth Kennedy. Philadelpia 2005. pp. 77 - 78. 
 
164 SHF Livre I. Tome VI. § 547. The differences in spelling of 'Pières' and `Piètres' are found in 
the SHF edition. 
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reigning'.165 Pedro, on the other hand, was deserted by his own nobility and had to 
plead his cause to the Black Prince who only accepted to support him, says Froissart, 
because he believed it to be against the right order of the world that an illegitimate 
son of a king should overthrow his legitimate elder brother.166 Loyalty as we may see 
above was ‘bought’ with gifts, and if the gifts were not adequate a lord could find 
that a former ‘friend’ or ally had sought his luck elsewhere. 167  
 
But in addition to the values mentioned above; prowess, courtesy, generosity and 
loyalty, the ideal knight should also be pious, and as we may see in the quotation 
above Froissart remarks that Gaston Fébus gave to the poor and said prayers several 
times a day. Although religion, at the end of the 14th century, seldom furnished the 
mainspring of action it remained the foremost article in the formal code of a knight. 
'Charny's tone is insistently religious, at times even puritanical', says Kaeuper of 
                                                 
165 SHF Livre I. Tome VI. § 548. 'Si chevauça li dis Henris de cité en cité et de ville en ville, et 
partout li fist on reverense et recueilloite de roy. Si donna li dis rois Henris au chevaliers 
estragniers, qui remis ens ou royaume de Castile l'avoient, grans dons et riches jeuiaus, tant et 
si largement que tout le recommandoient pour large et honnourable signeur. Et disoient 
communement Franchois, Normans et Bretons, que en lui avoit noble et vaillant signeur, et qu' 
il estoit dignes de vivre et de tenir terre et regneroit encores poissamment et en grant 
prosperité.' 
 
166 It is difficult to establish to what extent Froissart applauded the Prince's descision and the 
author consistingly seems to favour the bastard Enrique to his legitimate brother. Still, to place 
a bastard on a Christian throne went strongly against the political sensibilities of the time. It 
was also a dangerous precedent, undermining the sacrosanct principle of legitimate succession. 
Nevertheless, the overall impression is that Froissart was far more favourable towards Enrique 
who he perceived as more courteois and valiant than Pedro and later describes how Pedro 
refused to heed his promises to the Black Prince who expected to be well rewarded for his 
support. 
 
167 In Froissart´s account we find both Robert d´Artois and Geoffroi de Harcourt described as 
men of honour in spite of the fact that they were, in principle, ‘traitors to the French cause’. One 
of the most famous men who also shifted his allegiance was the Count of Hainault who was 
bound to the English crown by kinship. Because Hainault was in the Empire, the Count fought 
against Philippe de Valois at Cambray. However, when the fighting was on French soil he 
shifted sides and joined Philip. SHF Livre I. Tome III. § 259. p. 138.  
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Geoffroy de Charny's work on chivalry.168 Although Fortune may seem for a time 
rogue force, it has no permanent power, according to Charny. Instead Charny's view 
seems to be that God will distribute the real rewards to His warriors for their good 
deeds, says Kaeuper. However, Charny's view is also that daring and hardship will 
be rewarded by bliss, and earthly honour given as a reward from God. Asserting 
that knights suffer more than clergy, Charny also claims that 'the good order of 
knighthood . . . should be considered the most rigorous order of all, especially for 
those who uphold it well and conduct themselves in a way in keeping with the 
purpose for which the order was established.'169 Apparently there is no contradiction 
between a worthy knightly vocation and true religion. In this respect, Charny's 
viewpoint resembles the opinion attributed to William Marshal on his deathbed 
generations before Charny, when the formidable Marshal was asked to repent his 
sinful actions in war and tournament.170  
 
Froissart´s text resembles Charny's in that his religious mentality and piety appears 
to be as conventional as it is omnipresent. Still, we also find the same pragmatic and 
independent approach, especially concerning issues like sexual morality, 
tournament and violence. It should also be noted that in the description of how the 
King of Cyprus travelled around to the courts of Europe trying to persuade kings 
and princes to undertake a crusade, the chronicler's focus is on the great pomp with 
which the King was received, rather than his cause. He also states matter-of-factly 
                                                 
168 de Charny, Geoffroi: A Knight's own book of Chivalry. Introduction by Richard W. Kaeuper. 
Translation by Elspeth Kennedy. Philadelpia 2005. p. 26. 
 
169 de Charny, Geoffroi: A Knight's own book of Chivalry. Introduction by Richard W. Kaeuper. 
Translation by Elspeth Kennedy. Philadelpia 2005. p. 95 
 
170 HGM Verses 18478 - 500: 'The Marshal said: "Henry, listen to me, the prelats are too hard on 
us. They demand too much. I have taken 500 knights with weapons, horses and equipment. If 
the Kingdom of Heaven is thus, closed to me, I can do nothing. . . The prelats should ask no 
more of me. Either they are wrong, or nobody can be saved." ' (My translation) 
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that Edward III and his sons had better things to do than to go on a crusade.171 This 
should not, however, be seen as a sign of Froissart´s general lack of enthusiasm for 
crusading. When Gaston Fébus rescued the ladies of Meaux from the Jacques, he and 
his cousin Captal de Buch were returning from a crusade organised by the Teutonic 
knights against the unbelievers in Lithuania, an adventure the chronicler clearly 
found commendable.172  
 
However, the description of the rescuing of the ladies of Meaux also points to 
another aspect of the ideal knight, namely that he should also be a 'lover', capable of 
gallant and refined treatment of women.173 In the description of Gaston Fébus, we 
may notice that Froissart describes the Count to have taken great pleasure in ‘arms 
and love’ and appreciated Romance literature and minstrelsy, ‘of which he had an 
excellent knowledge’. He liked his clerks to sing songs, rondeaux and virelays to 
him and had travelling entertainers perform for him between courses at meals. 
Unlike many aristocratic authors from the earlier Middle Ages, (and even 
contemporary ones like Cuvelier in his celebration of the life and deeds of Bértrand 
du Guesclin) who hardly make any allusions to Romance at all, Froissart puts some 
emphasis on the relationship between men and women and occasionally describes 
                                                 
171 SHF Livre I. Tome VI.  § 503 - 8. 
 
172 According to Maurice Keen we must remember that chivalry was an ethic that was at once 
Christian and martial and aristocratic. 'Its elitist social and martial overtones undoubtedly 
contributed much to its enduring force, at least as much as the Christian sanction that it had 
aquired in and earlier age.' Thus, according to Keen, crusasing enthusiasm remained alive at 
the end of the 14th century and was still widely respected as the highest expression of 
chivalrous dedication. See Keen, Maurice: Nobles, knights and men-at-arms in the Middle Ages.  
London 1996. p. 117. 
 
173 By the time Froissart composed his Chronicles the word 'amoreux' had come to mean not 
only the lover, but also the general virtues of the knight, and the idea prevailed that no man 
could be a knight who was not a perfect lover. See the Conclusion in Leyerle, J. and Benson, 
Larry D. ed.: Chivalric literature. Essays on relations between literature and life in the later middle 
ages. Kalamazoo 1980. Richard Green, in an essay, also reminds us that in the later Middle Ages 
he who would be a courtier had to learn also to be a lover. See Richard Green, 'The Familia 
Regis and the Familia Cupidinis', in V.J. Sattergood and J.W. Sherbourne (eds), Court Culture in 
the Later Middle Ages. London 1983. pp. 87 - 108. 
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men fighting to win a lady’s favour. He also includes descriptions of knights and 
kings in love, like the Duke of Touraine’s infatuation with a young Parisienne and 
Edward III’s courting of the Countess of Salisbury, Alys, said to be one of the most 
beautiful women in England.174  
 
Froissart´s description of the siege of Rennes illustrates the relationship between 
arms and love very well. Here an English knight, carrying some partridges he has 
caught, approached the gates and asked to speak with Bértrand du Guesclin, who 
commanded the defence. Olivier de Mauni, one of the French knights, demanded if 
the Englishman was willing to sell or give the birds to the ladies of the town and the 
Englishman challenged de Mauni to fight for them. De Mauni accepted and Froissart 
describes how the ‘delighted’ ladies of the city observed the fight. When de Mauni 
had overcome his adversary he led him and the partridges into the town and 
presented them to the ladies who accepted the gift with great joy. When de Mauni 
later received a severe wound, which refused to heal, he begged for safe conduct 
through the English lines in order to get medical care. The English commander, the 
Duke of Lancaster, who did not want to be outdone in gallantry, had him treated by 
his own physicians and then sent him back to Rennes, entirely restored to health. 
Upon his departure the Duke loaded de Mauni with gifts saying. ‘Mauni, je vous 
prie que vous me recommendez aux dames et damoiselles, et leur dittes que nous 
leur avons souhiadé souvent perdriz’.175  
                                                 
174 Jean le Bel in his chronicles claims that Edward III actually raped the young countess when 
he passed through her domains on her way to Scotland. The events are somewhat differently 
described in the Chroniques, and there are also differences between the events portrayed in 
Froissart's different redactions. For a discussion of this see Diller, G.T.: Attitudes chevaleresques et 
réalités politiques chez Froissart. Microlectures du premier livre de Chroniques. Genève 1984. pp. 77 - 
138. Froissart however claims the King to have behaved respectably.  See SHF Livre I. Tome II. 
§ 157 - 160. 'Aucune fois il se ravisoit, car honneurs et loyautés le reprendoit de mettre son coer 
en tèle fausseté, pour deshonnorer si vaillant dame, et si loyal chevalier comme ses maris estoit, 
qui si loyaument l'avoit toutdis servi. D'autre part, amours le constraindoit si fort que elle 
vaincoit et surmontoit honneur et loyauté. Ensi se debatoit li rois en lui, tout le jour et toute le 
nuit.' 
 
175 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome VI. pp. 23 - 26. 
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Based on the findings related above, (and numerous other similar examples in the 
Chroniques) there can be no doubt that Froissart´s ideal nobleman should be 
handsome, courteous, generous, loyal, pious, bold, courageous and gallant towards 
women.176 Thus, the ideal he propagates seems very similar to the ideal we find 
described in the works of for instance Lulle and de Charny. However, Froissart´s 
account also contains more information about the noble Count of Foix, information 
about events and actions that are not so easily fitted into a rigid chivalrous ideal. 
 
2. 2. 'A demander et à savoir'177 - a more complex or eclectic ideal? 
 
As we may see in the quote above, Froissart was deeply taken in by both the Count 
and his court, and he continued to show his enthusiasm in the poem Dit du Florin, 
which he composed after the money he received from Gaston Fébus as a reward for 
his services at Orthez, was stolen.178 However, in spite of being favourable to the 
Count and his deeds, Froissart's account of what he learned about the Count at his 
court also contains the dramatic account of the events leading to the death of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
176 Froissart also mentions that Gaston Fébus was a great hunter and loved dogs more than any 
other beasts. The Count himself had written a book, Les déduits de la chasse, not mentioned by 
Froissart, on the pleasures of hunting, an activity in which he believed nobody was more 
skilled than himself. Hunting kept the nobleman occupied and kept him from doing evil deeds. 
In turn this meant that the huntsman would 'go straight to Paradise', according to Gaston 
Fébus. 
 
177 Chroniques. Livres III et IV. Livre III. § 13. pp. 177 - 78. Froissart states: 'Je tendoie trop fort à 
demander et à savoir, pour tant que je veoie l'ostel du conte de Fois si large et plantureux, que 
Gaston le filz du conte estoit devenus, ne par quel accident il estoit mort . . . ' The phrase 
highlights the inquisitive mind of Froissart and that he was obviously set on getting to know 
the causes of events. 
 
178 See the discussion of Dit du Florin in Zink, Michel: Froissart et le temps. Paris 1998. pp. 181 - 83 
and pp. 189 - 92, in Ainsworth, Peter: Jean Froissart and the Fabric of History. Truth, Myth and 
Fiction in the Chroniques. Oxford 1990. pp. 154 - 55 and in Tucoo-Chala, Pierre: Gaston Febus. Un 
grand prince d'Occident au XiVe siecle. Pau 1976. pp. 124 - 27. Tucoo-Chala also cites part of Dit 
du Florin in his book. 
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Count’s only legitimate son, Gaston, an account that goes far beyond the celebration 
of traditional chivalrous virtues. 'S'il admire le "gentil comte de Foix", le chroniqueur 
ne fait pas silence sur ses défauts . . . ,' says Pierre Tucoo-Chala,179 a view in 
opposition to the view of William Brandt who stated that the aristocratic author, 
including Froissart, only fully perceived human beings insofar as they fell within a 
strict aristocratic value system.180  
 
Froissart says that he was very eager to know the cause for the death of the young 
Gaston, and he obtained information about these events from an 'old and 
distinguished' squire, because his former informant, Espan de Lyon, had been 
unwilling to disclose the details of what happened, thereby indicating that the 
account contains information about events that were not necessarily favourable to 
the Count.181 To have an anonymous squire relate the events also gave the author the 
opportunity to be somewhat neutral in relation to the events he describes.182 
 
Gaston Fébus, the old squire told Froissart, was married to the sister of the King of 
Navarre who at some point had given surety for the Lord of Albret whom the Count 
of Foix was holding ransom for fifty thousand francs. Knowing his brother-in-law to 
be both ‘cunning and deceitful’, Gaston Fébus would not allow him credit for that 
sum, something that displeased his wife who felt that her brother’s word ought to 
satisfy her husband. Persuaded by his wife, the Count agreed to let the Lord of 
                                                 
179Tucoo-Chala, Pierre: Gaston Febus. Un grand prince d'Occident au XiVe siecle. Pau 1976. p. 127. 
'Froissart . . . cherche la vérite sur le drame d'Orthez et tout en essayant d'innocenter le comte, il 
ne cache pas l'essentiel.' 
 
180 Brandt, William, The Shape of Medieval History, p.130. In fact, he says, there was no aristocratic 
idea of human nature. ‘What functioned in its place was the aristocratic idea of good.' 
 
181 Chroniques. Livres III et IV. Livre III. § 13. p. 178. ' . . . car messire Espaeng de Lion ne le 
m'avoit voulu dire. Et tant en enquis que un escuier ancien et moult notable homme le me dist.'  
 
182 Chroniques. Livres III et IV. Livre III. § 13. p. 178. This is a point noted in note 2 on p. 178. 
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Albret go, but although the Lord paid his ransom to the King of Navarre, Gaston 
Fébus never saw any of the money. Enraged by the deceit of his brother-in-law, he 
urged his wife to go to Navarre to obtain the money. However, the lady of Foix was 
not lucky, and her brother refused to part with the money. Seeing that she could not 
make her brother budge in this matter, the lady of Foix did not dare to return to her 
husband. ‘It was more than she could risk, for she knew how harsh her husband 
could be when a thing displeased him’; the squire is reported to have said, a 
comment that gives us an indication of the more cruel and vindictive sides of the 
Count's personality.183 
 
Gaston the younger, who at this point was aged fifteen or sixteen, wanted to visit his 
mother and went to stay for a while at his uncle’s court. However, on his departure 
from Navarre, explained the squire, Gaston received a gift from his uncle, a small 
purse containing a powder which his uncle claimed would make his father’s 
affections for his mother grow back. In reality, however, the purse contained a lethal 
poison. When this was discovered by the count, the boy was jailed and several 
knights of the retinue that had accompanied the young Gaston to Spain were killed, 
according to Froissart´s informant.184 The Count also wanted to have his son put to 
death, but after having summoned all the nobles and prelates of Foix and Béarn who 
unanimously begged the Count to have mercy on his son, he decided to keep the 
young Gaston in prison for a few months and then perhaps send him on a journey 
                                                 
183 Chroniques. Livres III et IV. § 13 p. 180. 'La contesse de Fois n'en pot avoir autre chose, si se 
tint en Navarre et n'osoit retourner. Le conte de Fois, qui veoit le malice du roy de Navarre, 
commença sa femme grandement à enhaïr et à estre mal content d'elle, ja n'y eust elle coulpe, 
que tantost son message fait, elle n'estoit retournee. La dame n'osoit, qui sentoit son mari cruel 
là où il prenoit la chose à desplaisance.' 
 
184 Chroniques. Livres III et IV. § 13 pp. 184 -5. ' . . . il (Fébus) en fist mourir jusques à quinze tres 
horriblement, et la raison que il y mettoit estoit tele, que il ne sceussent de ses secrez, et li 
deussent avoir signifié. . . ' 
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for two or three years until he had ‘forgotten his anger’.185 However, the son did not 
take well to his imprisonment and refused food.186 This further enraged the Count 
who decided to visit his son in prison. Holding a little knife the Count tried 
threatening his son to eat and wounded him in some vein.187 Gaston subsequently 
died, to the great distress of his father who had his head shaved to the skin, put on 
black and ordered all the members of his household to do the same.188 
 
The harshness of the Count towards his wife, son and retinue is apparent in the 
description of these events, and we are left to ponder why Froissart found it 
necessary to make an anonymous informant be the one who relates the events 
above. Although clearly of great interest to the author, the actions of Gaston Fébus 
are not directly questioned on a moral level. Instead, Froissart has chosen to portray 
the death of the young boy as a mishap, one of Fortune’s strange turnings and puts 
the blame for the events elsewhere: 'Although his father clearly killed him, it was the 
King of Navarre who gave him the mortal wound’, explains the author.189  
                                                 
185 Chroniques. Livres III et IV. § 13 p. 185. ' Quant le conte oÿ son peuple qui prioit pour son filz, 
si se refraigny un petit et se pour pensa que il le chastieroit par prison, et le tendroit en prison 
deux ou trois mois. Et puis l'envoieroit en quelque voyage deux ou trois ans demourer, tant que 
il aroit oublié son mautalent et que li enfent, par avoir plus d'aage, seroit en meilleur et plus 
vive congnoissance.' 
 
186 Chroniques. Livres III et IV. § 13 p. 186. 'Le conte de Foix le fasoit tenir en une chambre en la 
tour d'Ortais où petit avoit de lumiere, et fu là .x. jours. Petit y but et mengea . . . Le conte le 
faisoit là tenir sans nulle garde qui feust en la chambre avecques li, ne qui le conseillast ne 
confortast, et fu li enfes tousjours en ses draps, ainsi comme il y entra. Et si se merancolia et 
argua grandement, car il n'avoit pas cela aprins.'  
 
187 Chroniques. Livres III et IV. § 13.  p. 187. 'Il (Fébus)  . . . tenoit la lamelle de son coustel par la 
pointe et si pres de la pointe que il n'en y avoit pas hors de ses dois la longueur de l'espesseur 
d'un gros tournois. Par mautalent, en boutant ce tant de pointe en la gorge de son filz il 
l'assena, ne sçay en quele vaine. . . ' 
 
188 Chroniques. Livres III et IV. § 13.  p. 188. 'Lors fist il venir son berbier et se fist rere tout jus, et 
se mist moult bas et se vesti de noir, et tous ceulx de son hostel' 
 
189 Chroniques. Livres III et IV. § 13.  p. 188. 'Son père l'occist voirement, mais le roy de Navarre 
lui donna le coup de la mort.' 
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However, although this remark shows that Froissart was not willing to directly 
blame his host and patron, the events related above also support Tucoo-Chala's 
opinion that the author was not silent about the Count's shortcomings. Froissart was 
clearly not satisfied with a superfluous description of the Count where only the 
more traditional chivalrous virtues were celebrated. On the contrary, the description 
of the events leading to the death of Gaston reveals the author’s desire to disclose 
what he perceived to be the ‘truth’ and to analyse people and events - 'to ask and to 
know'. Froissart ‘simultaneously veils and unmasks’ the character of Gaston Fébus, 
says Peter Ainsworth,190 a comment pointing to the complexity of Froissart´s 
portrayal of the Count.  
 
Froissart returns to the fate of the Count and his realm at a later stage when he 
relates how in 1391, while preparing for a new trip to Orthez, he heard about the 
death of the noble Count of Foix and had to change his plans. The Count had 
suffered a fit and died while out hunting with his dogs. Although the Count’s 
illegitimate son, Yvain the Foix, tried to obtain access to the castle after his father's 
death, he was forced to resign. Having no legitimate heir, the county of Foix was 
claimed by the French king who later resigned his claim and let the Viscount of 
Castelbon inherit both Béarn and Foix, says Froissart.191 Yvain the Foix, who in 
Froissart´s account was the first to notice the little purse of poison around his half-
brother's neck, is later reported to have died of burns after a fire at a party given by 
                                                 
190 Ainsworth, Peter: Jean Froissart and the Fabric of History. Truth, Myth and Fiction in the 
Chroniques. Oxford 1990. p. 303. 
 
191 In fact, Froissart provides us with valueable information when he tells us that the viscount of 
Castlebon would only pay homage to the county of Foix, but not to Bearn: 'car le pays de Berne 
est de si noble condition que les seigneurs qui par heritage le tiennent, ne’en doivent a nul roy, 
ne autre seigneur service fors a Dieu.' Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XV. p. 
83. 
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King Charles.192 Froissart vividly records the party and the incident, an account that 
bears witness to the intricate and detailed web of the Chroniques and the numerous 
amounts of singular fates and events recorded. 
 
But Froissart is not only frank about the Count's bad temper, the murder of his 
young son and later on in his chronicles, the fate of his illegitimate son and the 
Count's unexpected death leading to the loss of the realm for his lineage. Somewhat 
unexpectedly, Froissart also presents us with a glimpse of the administration and 
the financial dealings of the Count: 
 
Onques fol oultraige ne fole largesce n'aima, et vouloit savoir 
tous les mois que le sien devenoit. Il prenoit en son païs pour sa 
recepte recevoir, à ses gens servir et administrer, .xij. hommes 
notables, et de deux mois en deux mois estoit de deux servy en 
sa dicte recepte, et au chief des deux moys ilz se changoient, et 
deux autres en l'office retournoirent. Il faisoit du plus especial 
homme au quel il se confioit le plus son contreroleur, et à cellui 
tous les autres comptoient et rendoient leurs comptes de leur 
receptes. Et cil contreroleur comptoit au conte de Fois par 
roulles ou par livres escrips, et ses comptes laissoit par devers le 
dit conte. Il avoit certains coffres en sa chambre où aucune foiz 
il faisoit prendre de l'argent pour donner à au[cun] seigneur, 
chevalier ou escuier quant ilz venoient par devers lui, car 
onques nul sans don ne se departi de li. Et tousjours multiplioit 
son tresor pour les aventures et les fortunes attendre que il 
doubtoit.193 
                                                 
192 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart . Tome XV. pp. 84 – 91.  
 
193 Chroniques. Livres III et IV. § 13. p. 175. 
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In this part of the portrayal of Count, Froissart stresses values that are rarely 
mentioned in chivalric narratives and celebrations of perfect knights - Fébus' 
preoccupancy with money and his cautious estate management. Although generous, 
the count disliked excessive extravagance, the chronicler says, and required an 
account of his wealth once every month. To administer his wealth, Gaston Fébus 
had made a bureaucracy, and expected to be given accounts that he later checked. 
The Count also hoarded gold in his chambers, and had chests from which he took 
money to give to passing lords, knights and squires, says Froissart.194 
 
From other sources we know that the Count was indeed very occupied by the 
prosperity of himself and his realm. 'Le compte de Foix avait . . . compris que ses 
entreprises n'avaient chance de durer qu' à condition de reposer sur une économie 
prospère,' says Pierre Tucco-Chala in his analysis of the economical basis of the 
county of Foix and Béarn.195 Tucoo-Chala's analysis relies on numerous sources from 
Béarn, amongst them the 'oraison funèbre' written by Aymeric de Peyrac, abbé de 
Moissac around 1399 - 1400, some years after the death of the Count. Here, de 
Peyrac celebrates the martial exploits of the Count as well as his hunting skills. Still, 
he also relates what he sees as less appealing traits: 'Il [Gaston Fébus] se livrait à 
l'hydromancie et l'on disait communément qu'il possedait de l'or pour un poids de 
mille livres en espèces, de sorte qu'il etait le comte le plus riche de tout le royaume, 
richesse qu'il dépensa largement pour sa gloire en de somptueuses constructions, 
alors qu'il viola les droits des prélats, chargea son peuple d'impôts et tua son fils de 
sa propre main, son seul fils légitime!'196  
                                                 
194 Chroniques. Livres III et IV. § 13. p. 176. See note 1. 
 
195 Tucoo-Chala, P.: Gaston Febus. Un grand prince d'Occident au XiVe siecle. Pau 1976. pp. 216  -  
17. 
 
196 Tucoo-Chala, P.: Gaston Fébus. Prince des Pyrénées ( 1331 - 1391). Anglet 1993. p. 381. 
'Disposant de régions dotées d'une agriculture de subsistance assez médiocre, il profita de la 
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As we may see from de Peyrac's evaluation, Froissart´s account of the Count's 
preoccupancy with money was probably rooted in real-life observations. However, 
the most interesting aspect of Froissart´s portrayal, at this point, is not that it is in 
keeping with what we know to be true, but that the chronicler has chosen to include 
the detailed description of the Count's administration and estate-management in his 
chronicles. In Froissart's opinion, the Count’s pre-occupation with money and 
estate-management was clearly admirable and not something that detracted from 
his honour. The passage also shows the level of detail in Froissart´s account. The 
administrative machinery of Foix described is both elaborate and effective, maybe 
bearing witness to the development in the administration of royal and baronial 
courts.197 Acknowledging the need for a precise overview of his income and 
expenditure, and an apparatus with which to administer his retainers, the Count, 
according to Froissart, established an administration of twelve men and kept a keen 
eye on his estate-management. Although the Count was as generous as every 
nobleman should be, he is also described as a very cautious man, fearing the 
‘changing fortunes’ of the world.   
 
The Count's interest in ensuring the prosperity of him-self and his realm, could, 
according to Tucoo-Chala, be due to changes in the chivalrous mentality of the later 
                                                                                                                                                        
guerre de Cent ans pour faire comprendre à ses sujets d'où pouvait venir la prospérité: seul un 
commerce de transit, portant par charrettes ou à dos de mulets apporterait les ressources 
complémentaires indispensables . . . Ces progès économiques furent les seuls fruits durables de 
sa politique intérieure', says Tucco- Chala. 
 
197 However, it should be noted that there is nothing in Froissart's account that indicates that 
Fébus' bookkeeping was much more than a charge and discharge system designed to calculate 
what was nominally due by the accountant. The object was most likely to prevent fraud, not 
the calculation of profit and losses, although this may have been a side benefit, which would 
gradually gain more importance. Still, Froissart's account indicates that there may have been a 
real need for an effective administration. A man like Gaston Fébus most certainly found 
himself faced with considerable expenses connected to the maintenance and upkeep of his 
estate and houses and the salary and equipment of his retinue, and would need to manage his 
estate wisely in order to uphold the standard of living that befitted a man of his status. 
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middle ages. 'Par sa mentalité Fébus appartient à la génération de ces hommes de la 
deuxième moitié du XIVe siècle avec toutes les contradictions imposées par une 
époque où le moyen age commençait à se défaire et où les Temps Modernes 
commençaient à apparaitre,' he says.198 A hundred years after Froissart another 
aristocratic writer,199 Commynes, wrote, ‘where the profit lies, there too is the 
honour’200 a comment which has been seen as an indication of the death of chivalry 
and the advent of a new era marked by the quest for material gain and increased 
focus on the importance of wealth, landed property and profitable investment. 
Froissart´s perception of the importance of gain and profit might not be as strong as 
Commynes’, but he clearly sees no opposition between the two when judging the 
actions of Gaston Fébus. Nor does he see a conflict between the noble quest for 
honour and professional estate management, and here he is supported by the words 
of his contemporary, Chastellain, who despite his focus on martial exploits says, 
‘After the deeds and exploits of war, which are claims to glory, the household is the 
first thing which strikes the eye, and that which it is, therefore, most necessary to 
conduct and arrange well’.201 To Froissart, the success of Gaston Fébus in attending 
to the serious business of governing his estate and his realm added to his symbolic 
capital. 
 
                                                 
198 Tucoo-Chala, Pierre: Gaston Febus. Un grand prince d'Occident au XIVe siecle. Pau 1976. p. 218. 
'Fastueux comme les autre grands princes d'Occident il n'en gérait pas moins avec parcimonie 
son trésor, pierre angulaire de sa politique et n'hésita pas à faire preuve d'une avarice sordide 
pour le maintenir à un niveau très élevé. Issu d'une famille pyrénénne relativement pauvre, il 
savait comme tous les montagnards que l'argent était dur à gagner, qu´il ne fallait pas le jeter 
par les fenêtres.' 
 
199 Stone, Lawrence: The Crisis of the Aristocracy. Princeton 1965. p. 160. 
 
200 Commynes; Philippe de: Memoires. ed. Joel Blanchard. Paris 2001. V, 9. 'Car ceulx qui 
gaignent en ont tousjours l'honneur.' 
 
201 This reference is from Maurice Keen’s book, English Society in the Later Middle Ages. London 
1990. p. 160. 
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Froissart´s description of Gaston Fébus’ cautious overlooking of his estate and 
bookkeeping has similarities to a different kind of historical writing in late medieval 
society: the merchant chronicle. In the Ricordi of Giovanni de Pagolo Morelli (1371-
1441), Morelli says that he considers rigorous bookkeeping of prime importance, in 
addition to learning grammar and reading. When it comes to money and 
possessions, no one can take better care of one’s own interests than oneself, states 
Morelli, thus revoking Gaston Fébus’ personal engagement in his affairs. Morelli’s 
text has been dealt with in Aron Gurevitch essay on the merchant. ‘For Morelli’, says 
Gurevitch, ‘good was identified with profit, virtue was represented by balanced 
books, and evil by losses’.202 Gurevitch also points out that Morelli possessed a 
profound ‘awareness of the instability and the vulnerability of human life’ and was 
an extremely cautious and prudent man in his business affairs.  
 
According to Gurevitch this differed from the attitudes of the noble class: ‘In spite of 
all his efforts to root himself in the structure of feudalism and adapt himself to it, the 
great merchant was a totally different psychological and social type from the feudal 
lord . . . ’203 Judging from Froissart´s portrayal of the Count, we might suspect that 
the two world-views were not as different as Gurevitch believed. Although the sum 
of the ideal qualities of a knight included courtesy, generosity, piety, valour and 
dexterity in arms, the ideal nobleman as Froissart describes him also possessed an 
awareness of the instability of human life and was eager to keep a cautious eye on 
the management of his estate.  
 
Summing up the achievements of the Count, Tucoo-Chala states: 'Fébus fut pendant 
près de cinquante ans une sorte de prestidigitateur politique, d' une opportunisme 
                                                 
 
202 Gurevich, A.: ‘The Merchant’ in Le Goff, J. ed:  The Medieval World. London 1990. p. 269. 
 
203 Gurevich, A.: ‘The Merchant’ in Le Goff, J., ed:  The Medieval World. London 1990. p. 281. 
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redoubtable, profitant de la moindre faute adverse. En même temps il était animé 
par le souci constant de consolider ses moyens matériels, c'est-à-dire sa richesse car 
il avait compris que l'argent était devenu la base de tout pouvoir.'204 In a rapidly 
changing world, states Tucoo-Chala, Fébus had to find his place.205 Based on the 
findings above, we might argue that it was not only Gaston Fébus, who seems to 
have adapted to a changing world. In fact, it may seem as Froissart too, adjusted his 
portrayal of the ideal knight to an ethos that no longer perceived preoccupancy with 
money and profit to be beneath the dignity of a knight or king.  
 
This might lead us to suspect that we ought to be cautious of believing that Froissart 
only celebrated actions in accordance with the traditional virtues associated with 
chivalry and that 'all which is not brilliance, light or exterior life escape him . . . ‘.206 
This will further investigated in the following chapter.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
204Tucoo-Chala, P.: Gaston Fébus. Un grand prince d'Occident au XIVe siecle. Pau 1976. p. 36. 
 
205Tucoo-Chala, P.: Gaston Fébus. Un grand prince d'Occident au XIVe siecle. Pau 1976. p. 35. 
 
206 Paris, Gaston and Jeanroy, Alfred: Extraits des chroniqueurs francais, 12e édition, Paris 1927. p. 
186. See note 14. p. 4. for a full quotation. 
 
 68
3. Chivalry and warfare 
 
Large parts of the Chroniques are devoted to describing the warfare of the first 
phases of the war that has later been called the Hundred Years War, fought 
intermittently by France and England between 1337 and 1453. Although the 
background for the hostilities was primarily the struggle over the lands in Aquitaine 
which Philippe VI of France refused to return to Plantagenet rule and Edward III's 
later claim to the French throne, the importance of the Hundred Years War extended 
far beyond strictly military developments.207 Froissart´s account contains 
descriptions of for instance the campaigns leading up to the battle of Sluys, Crécy, 
the sieges of Calais and Breteuil, the battle of Poitiers as well as numerous other acts 
of war. As we have already touched upon, the Chroniques also covers the warfare on 
the Iberian peninsula, in Flanders, Scotland and elsewhere. 208 
 
                                                 
207 The Hundred Years War was perhaps the most important war in European history, says 
Clifford. J. Rogers. It was amongst other things the midwife of the European "nation state", 
which would eventually become the dominant form of political organization over the entire 
world. The devastation which the chevauchées of  Edward III and his lieutenants inflicted on 
France had the effect of putting that state on a new course towards absolutist centralism. The 
ransom of £500 000 for King Jean, captured at Poitiers in 1356 did more than any other single 
event to establish regular, national taxation in France, says Rogers, and the virtual collapse of 
the Valois royal government in 1358-60 cleared the ground for the construction of a new, 
stronger monarchical state in the reign of Charles the Wise. In England, the pressures of the 
Hundred Years war had an opposite effect on the political development, and during the reign 
of Edward III the English parliament became a truly powerful political body. Due to the 
extraordinarily expensive campaigns of Edward III, the Commons in particular gained 
parlimentary power. They granted him the tax he needed to uphold his warfare, but only on 
conditions. Edward had to renounce the king's old right to levy arbitrary tallages on his 
demesne lands and the royal boroughs, an example of how Edward III's conduct of the 
Hundred years War propelled the evolution of parliament into the first really powerful 
national representative assembly since classical times, says Rogers. See Rogers Clifford J.: War 
cruel and Sharp. English strategy under Edward III, 1327 - 1360. Woodbridge 2000. pp. 1- 5. 
 
208 For an overview of the real events and phases of the Hundred Years War, see Curry, Anne: 
The Hundred Years War. New York. 2003. 
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The characteristic strategic feature of the war was the cavalry raid - chevauchée - 
launched by the English from territory favourable to the English cause across France 
and the phase of the war that opened in 1337 and concluded in 1361 with the Treaty 
of Bretigny was marked by two disastrous French defeats at Crécy (1346) and 
Poitiers (1356) as well as the siege and capture of Calais by the English (1346 - 7). 
Froissart, who based his account of these events partially on Jean le Bel's Chronique, 
describes the battles, the siege and the events that led up to them, amply. Still, 
Froissart´s account, especially of the battle of Poitiers is distinctly more elaborate 
than le Bel's, which makes up no more than 13 small pages in the SHF edition and 
contains little information about the battle itself.209 In comparison, Froissart's account 
covering approximately the same events makes up more than 80 full pages in the 
SHF edition of his work. Le Bel's account is also more directly favourable to the 
English King, which he claims was 'he who in this story had acted most nobly'.210 In 
fact, le Bel in his evaluation of the French King, Philippe VI, states that the King 
acted cowardly on the advice of clerks and priests.211 Seemingly, this is an opinion 
Froissart did not share. 
                                                 
209 Jean le Bel: Chronique. SHF. Tome II. Chapitre XCIV. 
 
210 Jean le Bel: Chronique. SHF. Tome II. Chapitre LXX. 'Aucunes gens qui orront lire ceste 
hystoire se pourront esmerveillier pourquoy je appelle le roy d' Angleterre le noble roy 
Edowart et tout simplement je nomme le roy Philippe de France; si cuideroient et pourroient 
penser que je tendisse bende et partie. Sauve la grasce de chascun, je ne le fais pas porter partie, 
ains le fais pour honnourer celluy qui en ceste hystoire s'est porté le plus noblement; c'est le 
noble roy Edowart que on ne pourroit trop honnourer, car tousjours a creu bon conseil en ses 
besongnes, et ses gens, chevaliers et escuiers amé, et chascun selonc son estat honnouré, et bien 
deffendu son royaume contre ses anemis, et sur eulx conquesté assez, et son propre corps 
dedens son pays et dehors sans faintise avecq ses gens aventuré, et ses souldoiers et alliez bien 
payé et du syen largement donné; sy en doibt estre de tous moult voulentiers servi et partout 
noble roy clamé.'  
 
211 Jean le Bel: Chronique. SHF. Tome II. Chapitre LXX. ' Ce n'a pas fait le roy Philippe de France, 
ains a laissié son pays en pluseurs marches excillier et waster et s'est toutdis tenu entour Parys 
pour son corps aisier et de peril garder, et a tousjours creu povre conseil de clercs et de prelats, 
et mesmement ceulx qui luy disoient: "Cher sire, ne vous vueillez effreer, ne vostre personne 
aventurer, car à mesais vous pourrie de trahyson garder, on ne se scet en cui fier, mais laissiez 
ce joeune roy d' Angleterre en folie son temps user et son avoir despendre; il ne vous poeut, 
pour faire fumiere, desheriter, et quant il avra tout despendu, il luy en convendra retourner . . .' 
 70
 
Several historians have argued that the battle of Crécy and later the battle of Poitiers 
mark a break with previous chivalrous attitudes in war and pitched battles. While 
the French still upheld the chivalrous code of correct behaviour in war and would 
give their noble horsemen the most prominent place in the two battles, the English 
opted for what has been described as a far more rational and pragmatic approach, 
relying on their archers. This has led some researchers to conclude that Crécy and 
Poitiers mark the point where chivalry gave way to the ‘cold practical spirit’ of a 
more modern age. The feudal knight/warrior who genuinely was ‘but an imitation of 
the host of angels around God’s throne’212 had lost his position and was ‘merging 
into the soldier of modern times’.213 A ‘gap’ is said to have opened up between 
chivalrous ideal and military practice, a gap chroniclers like Froissart were unable to 
hide in their accounts. 
 
Opinions like these are based on the general assumption that strategy and tactics 
were of little importance in traditional medieval warfare. Georges Duby, for instance 
in his famous book Guillaume le Maréchal ou le meilleur chevalier du monde, claimed that 
the Marshal and other knights of his age were ‘ . . . to meet the opponent, not like 
foxes, but as lions, in the open field, without laying traps, openly arranged for 
battle.'214 William Marshal was driven by the quest for honour, says Duby, a quest 
that obliged him to an audacity verging on insanity. In one of the first larger works 
on medieval warfare, History of the Art of War, Hans Delbrück claimed that unlike 
their Roman predecessors, medieval warriors had neither interest nor skill when it 
                                                 
 
212 Huizinga, Johan: The Waning of the Middle Ages. Harmondsworth 1965. p. 65. 
 
213 Huizinga, Johan: The Waning of the Middle Ages. Harmondsworth 1965. p. 73. 
 
214 Duby, Georges: Verdens beste ridder. Historien om William Marskalken. Oslo 1985. p. 80. 
Published first in France as Guillaume le Maréchal ou le meilleur chevalier du monde. Paris 1984.  
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came to tactical warfare.215 Instead, the medieval knight wanted to gain personal 
acclaim and honour. This is a view shared by John Keegan who in The Face of Battle 
says that he doubts that military planning and strategic leadership were present in 
medieval warfare.216 Similarly, Michael Howard in War in European History argued 
that professional military competence became part of warfare again for the first time 
after the fall of the Roman Empire in the fifteenth and sixteenth century.217 The 
medieval warrior - the knight - focused primarily on chivalrous display, not the 
outcome of a siege or a battle.218 
 
Other researchers have voiced more nuanced views. In War in the Middle Ages, 
published in 1984, Philippe Contamine shares the view that the warfare of the 
middle ages was essentially marked by individual prowess, the anarchistic sense of 
honour and the private pursuit for booty and ransoms.  Most often the warriors’ 
chief concern was to find an adversary worthy of their rank of valour without any 
concern for their companions in arms. Still, says Contamine, we cannot leave a 
medieval gap in a list of military talents from Caesar to the sixteenth century.219 
Contamine also argues that war changed considerably in the second half of the 
                                                 
215 Delbrück, Hans: History of the Art of War. Vol. III. 
 
216 Keegan, John: The Face of Battle. Harmondsworth 1978. p. 336. 
 
217 Howard, Michael: War in European History. London 1976. p. 29. 
 
218 Views like these were based on the work by for instance B. H. Liddell Hart who claimed that 
the military spirit of the feudal chivalry to be inimical to art, ‘although the drab stupidity of its 
military course is lightened by a few bright gleams’. In his book Des principes de la guerre a 
travers les ages Van Overstraeten wrote that ‘never was the art of war so imperfect or primitive, 
startling proof that a martial spirit and individual valour can achieve nothing without good 
organization and solid discipline”, while Muraise claimed the arrangements for battles to be 
‘gross, the sequence of action very clumsy, the manoeuvres summary, the co-operation 
between units limited or non-existent’. See B. H. Liddell Hart in Encyclopedia Britannica, 
Coronation edn. 1937, xxi. 456, cf. 16th edn. 1948, xxi. 456. Van Overstraeten, R.: Des principes de 
la guerre à travers les ages. Brussels 1926, i. 30. Muraise, E.: Introduction à l’histoire militaire. Paris 
1964, pp.254 and 257-8. For a more extensive overview of this discussion see Contamine, 
Philippe: War in the Middle Ages. Oxford 1996 (1986). pp 208 - 9.  
 
219 Contamine, Philippe: War in the Middle Ages. Oxford 1996 (1986). p. 237. 
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fourteenth century in the sense that we see more military discipline and a sense of 
duty and obedience to higher-ranking officers. To be chivalrous was to be 
unprofessional in the quest for victory, and thus to be handicapped, says Contamine. 
In the fifteenth century, however, one could no longer afford to be unprofessional.220  
 
As already mentioned in the Introduction, Pierre Tucoo-Chala in his book on Gaston 
Fébus states that the change in attitudes towards war took place even earlier than the 
second half of the fourteenth century, and by the time of the two great pitched 
battles at Crécy and Poitiers the chivalrous world was dominated by men who 
operated in different mental universes. While John the Good of France was an 
idealist, who like his predecessors would go to any length to act in accordance with 
the chivalrous code of honour, disregarding strategic consideration, Edward III of 
England and his son were pragmatists who would try to combine chivalry and 
strategy. As a result, the outcome of the encounters between the English and the 
French was given in advance, says Tucoo-Chala. 221 
 
In his book War Cruel and Sharp from 2000, Clifford J. Rogers goes against the view 
that rulers and commanders during the Hundred Years War had no concept of 
strategy; that they were driven solely by misplaced chivalric ideals; that they thought 
of little except displaying their knightly skills and personal bravery in the mêlée. 
'Historians in the first two-thirds of the twentieth century, men like Sir Charles 
Oman, J. M. Tourneur-Aumont, and Sir Basil Liddell-Hart, concluded that the 
                                                 
 
220 Contamine, Philippe: War in the Middle Ages. Oxford 1996 (1986) p. 209. Nevertheless, in War 
in the Middle Ages Contamine argues that it is not impossible (a) to gather some of the very 
general principles of medieval tactics; (b) to examine campaigns whose progress implies certain 
directional ideas, or a strategy; (c) to list a fairly extensive series of responses and procedures 
used, according to circumstance during pitched battles; and (d) to admit that with regard to 
mental attitudes, medieval soldiers had a clear idea of the advantages of having recourse to a 
fund of practical experiences and theoretical reflections as complete and varied as possible. 
 
221 Tucoo-Chala, Pierre: Gaston Fébus - Un grand prince d'Occident au XIVe siecle. Pau 1976. p. 35. 
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chevauchées of the fourteenth century were nothing but "purposeless parades" 
displaying an "absence of strategy of policy, of any thought at all," and that "in the 
Hundred Years' War there is nothing to learn, save negatively," from the strategy of 
Edward III and the Black Prince,' says Rogers.222 In fact, he says, views diminishing 
the strategic skills and ambitions of Edward III and his son appear regularly in the 
works of military historians not specializing in the middle ages.223 However, what 
these researchers disregard, according to Rogers, is that the Treaty of Brétigny, 
which ceded a third of France to be ruled by Edward III in full sovereignty, was 
unquestionable one of the greatest strategic victories of the age. 
  
Rogers also opposes another persistent view amongst military historians, namely 
that war in the middle ages was primarily an affair of sieges and devastating raids, 
not battles, and that Edward III and his son, almost cowardly, did not actively seek 
battle when ravaging enemy territory. Although historians are right not to focus too 
narrowly on the clash of armies in open battle, prominent researchers have seriously 
overreacted to previous research when they removed the quest for decisive battle 
from medieval strategy, argues Rogers, who in his analysis wants to show that the 
chevauchées of Edward III and his son were meant as provocations intended to force 
the Valois into attacking the English army in the field. Indeed, says Rogers, even the 
major sieges of Edward III' s reign were intended to accomplish this goal of bringing 
his enemies to battle, more than capture strategic strongholds. However, this 
eagerness to bring his enemies to battle, often overlooked by historians, should not 
be seen as the result of wanting to adhere to a chivalrous ideal, but as being 
strategically founded on the belief that only by meeting the French face to face could 
decisive victory be won. Some of Edward's manoeuvres, which have been judged 
                                                 
222 Rogers Clifford J.: War cruel and Sharp. English strategy under Edward III, 1327 - 1360. 
Woodbridge 2000. pp. 7 - 8.  
 
223 For an overview of this debate as well as references to their works see Rogers Clifford J.: War 
cruel and Sharp. English strategy under Edward III, 1327 - 1360. Woodbridge 2000. pp. 230 - 34. 
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evasive, illogical, "obscure" or "surprising"224 by modern historians, and thus, seen as 
testimonies of the lack of strategic and tactical skills of the men involved, were in fact 
intended to control where and when a battle took place, says Rogers.225 
 
In The Battle of Poitiers 1356, David Green argues that the battle of Crécy marked a 
change in European strategic and tactical decision-making, and although it was not 
the first campaign to put into practice the developments described as the 
'Edwardian revolution', it established the chevauchée as the predominant means of 
waging war in France and proved the advantage of mixed retinues of men-at-arms, 
infantry and archers fighting in a defensive formation and situation, says Green.226 
According to Green, the war itself encouraged change both on the battlefield and the 
means by which troops were supplied, armed and recruited, a development that 
gathered further momentum with the development of effective artillery in the 
fifteenth century.  
 
Thus, as we may see, recent work by military historians suggests that the warfare of 
the Hundred years war was by no means hasty, instinctive and confused 
confrontations in which captains played the role of simple leaders of men, and 
where the combatants chief concern was to get the possibility to show their valour. 
On the contrary, it is possible to examine campaigns whose progress implies certain 
directional ideas, or a strategy and tactical consideration and dispositions. 
                                                 
224 Barber, Richard: Edward, Prince of Wales and Aquitaine. New York 1978. pp. 7 - 8. 
 
225 Rogers Clifford J.: War cruel and Sharp. English strategy under Edward III, 1327 - 1360. 
Woodbridge 2000. pp.  230 - 34. 'Considering that . . . most of the contemporary sources claim 
that the English did everything they could to provoke the French into giving battle, it may 
seem puzzling that so many historians hold the opposite view,' says Rogers. Although the 
English army before Crécy was deficient in numbers, this could be compensated for by 
superiority in tactics, equipment, discipline, leadership and morale. In Rogers opinion, there 
can be no doubt that Edward III in addition to being able to encourage his men to brave battle, 
was an outstanding strategist capable of tactical judgement and leadership which surpassed his 
oponent. 
 
226 Green, David: The Battle of Poitiers. 1356. Stroud 2002. pp. 79 - 80. 
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According to Clifford Rogers, evidence for this is found in letters, diaries and 
petitions to parliament but also to some extent in the narrative sources of the age. In 
the following I will take a closer look on Froissart´s description of war and warfare, 
especially the campaigns that led up to the two famous battles at Crécy and Poitiers, 
the battles themselves and the siege of Calais. My aim will not be to study to what 
extent strategic consideration and tactics in reality was part of the warfare. The goal 
of my examination will be to see to what extent Froissart has described strategy and 
tactics in his account and what values and actions he admired and described in 
connection to warfare. Is his perspective essentially chivalrous in the sense that he 
mainly describes actions and events that celebrate individual prowess and 
behaviour in accordance with the traditional chivalrous virtues - the behaviour of 
the 'idealists' as Tucoo-Chala calls them? 
 
3.1. The campaign of Crécy - the chevauchée and the battle 
 
One of the lengthiest accounts of warfare in the Chroniques is the description of 
Edward III's invasion of France in 1346 and the battle of Crécy. However, before I 
start examining the description of the events in the Chroniques, it may be useful to 
give a short overview of what modern historians say were the reasons for Edward's 
invasion in 1346.  
 
Edward III and Philippe VI of France had been at war since 1337, and according to 
Anne Curry the origins of the conflict were both feudal and dynastic.227 In 1337 
Edward held the county of Ponthieu and also bore the title Duke of Aquitaine. Still, 
the English holdings in France were considerably smaller than they had been at the 
end of the twelfth century, when Henry II held the whole of western France. But 
although things had changed, two basic issues of English royal lands in France 
                                                 
227 Curry, Anne: The Hundred Years War. New York. 2003. p. 40. 
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remained the same, says Curry: the relationship between the kings of England and 
France that their tenure generated, and their rightful extent. By 1337 the issues had 
been so long running and had repeatedly proved themselves incapable of lasting 
settlement that an escalation of the conflict seemed inevitable. However, there was 
also another issue - the right to the throne of France.  
 
When Charles IV, last of the direct line of Capetian kings of France, died, his cousin, 
Philippe, Count of Valois, followed him. But Philippe was not the only male with a 
claim to the throne. Also Edward III, nephew of Charles IV through his mother 
Isabella, had a claim worth advancing, seeing that a nephew was nearer in blood 
than a cousin. Although women had been excluded from the succession in 1317 
when Philippe V was crowned after the death of his brother Louis X, nothing had 
been said about their right to transmit a claim to their male heirs.228 However, at the 
time of the coronation of Philippe VI, the English were unable to advance this claim 
properly.229 'The failure on the part of the English to press Edward's claim was a 
notable factor in Philippe's favour', says Curry, and Philippe pressed forward in 
order to get Edward III to do homage for the land held on the continent.  
 
Edward did pay simple homage for Aquitaine and Ponthieu on the 6th of June 1329, 
an event related by Froissart who says that Philippe received the young King of 
England with all honour and dignity.230 However, says Froissart, he believed that the 
                                                 
228 According to Anne Curry, there is no proof that the French were at this time consciously 
following Salic Law: ' The idea that Salic Law prevented women even transmitting claims was, 
largely invented by the French in late fourteenth and early fifteenth century as restrospective 
justification for Valois tenure of the throne', says Curry. See Curry, Anne: The Hundred Years 
War. New York. 2003. p. 40. 
 
229 If the claim was seriously entertained by Isabella and her party why was it not followed up? 
asks Curry, who points out both the uncertainty of support in the Low Countries and the 
situation in Scotland as important factors. See Curry, Anne: The Hundred Years War. New York. 
2003. p. 41. 
 
230 Chroniques Livre I et II. Livre I. § 45. 'Se li rois Phelippes reçut honnourablement et 
grandement le jone roy d' Engleterre, son cousin, ce ne fait mies à demander.' 
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English king paid homage with words and a kiss only, without putting his hands 
between the hands of the King of France.231 Wanting to see and study earlier charters 
that would throw light on the matter, and gain a better understanding of how and in 
what respect the King of England should declare himself the man of the King of 
France, Edward refused to proceed any further. The King of France accepted this, 
says Froissart, because the King saw that his cousin of England was 'young', a 
comment indicating that the French king in the beginning, at least, was willing to be 
lenient with his young cousin.232  
 
Some time after this, Edward did liege homage in a letter to Philippe, an event also 
reported by Froissart.233 But in spite of this apparent agreement there was war once 
again in 1337, and according to Anne Curry this was due to four factors. One of them 
was that French officials continued to act aggressively in Gascony, another that the 
Anglo-Scottish war had reopened. Another catalyst, according to Curry, was papal 
policy. Benedict XII wanted to facilitate plans of a crusade, but when these plans fell 
through, Philippe moved his crusading fleet to the Channel ports, presumably in the 
aid of the Scots. Finally came the case of Robert of Artois, she says, an affair also 
related by Froissart.  
 
Robert was Philippe's cousin and had been a vital supporter for Philippe at the 
beginning of his reign. In fact, according to Froissart, he was the man who had 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
231 Chroniques Livre I et II. Livre I. § 45. 'Là en dedens eut ça mainte parolle et ordenance faite et 
devisée. Et me samble que li rois Edouwars d' Engleterre fist adonc hommage, de bouce et de 
parolle tant seulement, sans les mains mettre entre les mains dou roy de France, ou prince ou 
prelat deputé de par lui.' 
 
232 Chroniques Livre I et II. Livre I. § 45. 'Li rois de France, qui veoit le roy d' Engleterre son 
cousin jone, entendi bien toutes ces parolles, et le volt adonc de riens presser, car bien savoit 
assés que bien y recouveroit, quant il vorroit . . . ' 
 
233. Chroniques Livre I et II. Livre I. § 46. 
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helped Philippe most in gaining the French throne.234 Without him, nothing was 
done, states the chronicler who says little of the causes of the discord except for the 
fact that Robert had put forward a letter, which was proved false.235 According to 
Curry, Robert had tried to secure himself the inheritance of the county of Artois, 
which had been given to his aunt, and was later accused of his aunt's murder. Robert 
was condemned to death, but managed to escape to the Low Countries and later to 
England where he was well received by Edward. This further enraged Philippe who 
sent a summons to Edward to surrender Robert to French justice. On the grounds 
that Edward was harbouring Robert, Philippe confiscated the duchy of Aquitaine.236 
 
According to Clifford Rogers, the fact that the demand to surrender Robert of Artois 
had been addressed to the seneschal of Gascony, signified that this was not a request 
of a king to king, but an order of liege-lord to vassal. Since Robert was in England 
and not in Guyenne or Aquitaine, the action was highly symbolic. To surrender 
Robert of Artois would be a full admission that the consequences of Edward's 
homage to Philippe extended even into his own realm, a principle that Edward could 
by no means afford to concede, says Rogers.237 War could no longer be prevented. 
However, according to Curry, Edward remained reluctant to go very far in his claim 
to the throne for a long time after this, and still stressed Philippe's usurpation of his 
rights in Gascony and interference in Scottish affairs as the main reasons for the war.  
 
Froissart´s account of the events that lead up to the campaign in 1346 is far less clear 
and the intentions of the two kings remain somewhat obscure. This is also the case 
                                                 
234 Chroniques Livre I et II. Livre I. § 48. 
 
235 Chroniques Livre I et II. Livre I. § 48. 'Et fu, bien l'espasse de trois ans, que en France estoit 
tout fait par lui [Robert d'Artois] et sans lui n'estoit rien fait.' 
 
236 Curry, Anne: The Hundred Years War. New York. 2003. pp. 44 -45. 
 
237 Rogers Clifford J.: War cruel and Sharp. English strategy under Edward III, 1327 - 1360. 
Woodbridge 2000. pp. 123  - 24. 
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when it comes to Edward's claim to the French throne, although he mentions at an 
early stage that many English noblemen murmured that their king was closer to 
'l'iretage de France' than Philippe.238 According to Froissart, Edward adopted the title 
King of France rather reluctantly, pushed by Jean van Artevelde, the burgher's leader 
who led a strong force of Flemings willing to support Edward. However, they could 
not do so, van Artevelde explained, before Edward had agreed to claim himself the 
rightful heir to the French throne.239 According to Clifford Rogers, Edward had 
seriously considered making the claim as early as 1337, and was in fact eager to do 
so.240 The reason why Froissart has chosen to show Edward as virtually being pushed 
into making his claim is unclear although it could be that the author may have felt 
reluctant to disclose the ambitions of the English king. As we will see later, Froissart 
also portrays Henry of Derby, who should become Henry IV, as rather unwilling to 
accept the English crown and instead shows Henry as being virtually forced to action 
by the mighty burghers of London.  
 
However, in spite of the differences between the description of the intentions and 
motives of Edward III, both the modern historians, Rogers and Curry, and Froissart 
make the same point; namely that the main reason he took this major step was the 
chance to secure an alliance with the people of Flanders. Having been able to secure 
the aid of several prominent rulers in the Low Countries, amongst them the duke of 
                                                 
238 Chroniques. Livres I et II. Livre I.  § 46. 
 
239 Chroniques. Livres I et II. Livre I.  § 88. 'Ceste parolle entendirent li Flamench volentiers . . . il 
respondirent et disent: "  . . . nous ne poons esmovoir guerre au roy de France, quiconques le 
soit, car nous sommes obligiet à çou, par foy et par sierement, et sus deus millions de florins à 
le cambre dou pape, . . . Mais se vous voliés faire une cose que nous vous dirons, vous y 
pourveriés bien de remède et de conseil. C'est que vous voelliés enchargier les armes de France 
et esquarteler d'Engleterre, et vous appellés rois de France. . .  Par ensi serons nous absolz et 
dispensés, et irons partout là où vous vorrés et ordonnerés.' 
  
240 Rogers Clifford J.: War cruel and Sharp. English strategy under Edward III, 1327 - 1360. 
Woodbridge 2000. pp. 179 - 82. 
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Brabant, the margrave of Juliers and the count of Hainault,241 Edward could start 
planning how to bring his challenge to conclusion.242  
 
In keeping with his description of the ambitions of Edward being slightly more 
modest than might have been the case, Froissart describes the campaign leading up 
to the battle of Crécy, not as a direct attack on the French king, but originally 
planned as a relief expedition to Gascony where for some time Henry of Derby (not 
to be confused with the later Henry of Derby who was to become Henry IV) had 
tried to repel French encroachments in Aquitaine.243 King Philippe, furious after 
Edward’s retraction of his homage, had declared the duchy confiscated and had laid 
siege to the castle of Aigullon, a siege the Count of Derby was not able to raise. When 
the King of England heard how hard pressed his men were in Aiguillon, he decided 
to assemble a large army and lead it to Gascony. But the winds were not favourable 
and prevented Edward and his army from going to Gascony, says Froissart, whose 
description at this point differs from the account given by Jean le Bel.244 Instead, 
Edward received advice from Sir Godfrey of Harcourt, an exiled Norman lord, that 
he should change his plans and land in Normandy where the English army began 
what cannot be described in terms other than a huge pillaging raid. 
 
                                                 
241 Clifford Rogers outlines the arrangements made with these in the chapter ‘Strategy and 
Edward III's Diplomacy’ in Rogers Clifford J.: War cruel and Sharp. English strategy under 
Edward III, 1327 - 1360. Woodbridge 2000. pp. 129 - 56. 
 
242 However it took some time before Edward was able to raise an army. In fact, according to 
Rogers, it took so long that his allies and well-wishers on the Continent became upset and on 
the point of giving up the whole business. Rogers Clifford J.: War cruel and Sharp. English 
strategy under Edward III, 1327 - 1360. Woodbridge 2000. p. 145. 
 
243 For a modern overview of the chevauchée, see Plaisse, André: À Travers le Cotentin. La Grande 
chevauchée guerrière d'Edouard III en 1346. Cherbourg. 1994. 
 
244 Jean le Bel says that Edward first landed on Guernsey where he took the castle and found a 
‘tres grand tresor’.  See Jean le Bel: Chronique. SHF. Tome I. XIII. pp. 69 - 71. 
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The army moved forward by land and sea until they reached Barfleur, says Froissart, 
a seaport and fortified town, which they took immediately because the inhabitants 
surrendered in the hope of saving their lives.245 The town was emptied of gold, silver 
and jewellery, of which the army found so much 'that even servants turned up their 
noses at fur-lined gowns,' says the author. Thereafter, all the men in the town were 
taken and put on board the English ships, so that they could not attack the army in 
the rear. According to Froissart, the plundering army spread out over the country 
and did whatever they pleased, until they reached Cherbourg, a large wealthy town 
and port.246 This was attacked and burnt, but having found the citadel too strongly 
defended to be taken, the army continued towards Montbourg and Valogne. This 
last town they sacked completely and then set fire to it, states Froissart who also says 
that the army did the same to a number of other towns in the region, continuing to 
take so much valuable booty 'that no man alive can imagine the great riches taken.’247  
 
Froissart also relates how Edward had disposed his troops so that one of his 
marshals, the Earl of Warvick, lead a column that rode along the sea-side, while 
Godfrey of Harcourt, who knew the country well, lead the host on the left hand. 
They found riches everywhere, granges full of corn, houses full of all riches, rich 
burgesses, carts, chariots and animals that were brought to the king. However, 'the 
men said nothing of all the gold and silver they found', states the author laconically 
                                                 
245 SHF Livre I. Tome III. § 256. 'Arcier et gens de piet aloient de costet selonch le marine, et 
reuboient, pilloient et prendoient tout che qu’il trouvoient. Et tant alerènt et cil de mer et cil de 
terre qu’il vinrent à un port de mer et une forte ville que on claime Barflues; et le conquisent 
tantost, car li bourgeois se rendirent pour le doubtance de mort. Mès pour ce, ne demora mies 
que toute la ville ne fust reubée, et pris or et argent et chiers jeuiaulz car il en trouvèrent si 
grant fusion, que garçon n’avoient cure de draps fourés de vair.' 
 
246 SHF Livre I. Tome III. § 256 - 57. 'Apriès ce que la ville de Barflues fu prise et reubée sans 
ardoir, il s’espardirent parmi le pays selonch la marine. Si y fist une grant part de leurs 
volontés, car il ne trouvèrent homme qui leur deveast. Et alèrent tant qu’ il vinrent jusques à 
une bonne ville grosse et riche et port de mer, qui s’appelle Chierebourch’. 
 
247 SHF Livre I. Tome III. § 260. ' . . . il n'est homs vivans qui poroit croire ne penser le grant 
avoir qui là fu gaagniés et robés, et le grant fuison de bons draps qu'il y trouvèrent.' 
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thus, indicating that in an army such as Edward's not every soldier was as 
honourable and loyal as one should hope.248 In this way, was the good and rich land 
of Normandy burnt and pillaged, he says, until news of the devastation of the 
English army reached the King of France who was highly displeased and 'swore to 
bring the English king to battle'.249 
 
Philippe urgently had letters sent to his allies requesting them to join him with all 
their available forces in the campaign he was preparing against the English, says 
Froissart, who continues to list the names of many of Philippe's allies and the 
splendid forces they turned up with.250 Especially Sir John of Hainault who had 
recently become Philippe’s ally through the influence of his son-in-law, Count Louis 
of Blois, responded by bringing a large and well equipped force, states the author 
who does not question the actions of John who had helped Queen Isabella in 
overthrowing her husband Edward II and installing her young son, Edward III, on 
the throne of England, an affair related at the beginning of Froissart´s chronicles.251 
                                                 
248 SHF Livre I. Tome III. § 258. 'Si trouvèrent le pays gras et plentives de toutes coses, les 
gragnes plainnes de blés, les maisons plainnes de toutes rikèces, riches bourgois, chars, 
charètes, et chevaus, pourciaus, brebis et moutons et les plus biaus bues dou monde que on 
nourist ens ou pays. Mais li varlet ne donnoient point, ne rendoient as gens le roy l'or et l'argent 
qu'il trouvoient; ançois le retenoient pour yaus.' 
 
249 SHF Livre I. Tome III. § 259. 'Dont les plaintes et les nouvelles vinrent au roy de France, qui 
se tenoit en le cité de Paris, comment li rois d' Engleterre estoit arrivés en Constentin et gastoit 
tout devant lui, à destre et à senestre. Dont dist li rois Phelippes et jura que jamais ne 
retourroient li Englès si aroient esté combatu, et les destourbiers et anois qu'il faisoient à [ses] 
gens leur seroient chier vendu.' 
 
250 SHF Livre I. Tome III. § 259. 'Si fist tantost et sans delay li dis roy lettres escrire à grant 
fuison. Et envoia premierement devers ses bons amis de l'Empire, pour tant qu'il li estoient 
plus lontain: premierement au gentil roy de Behagne que moult amoit . . . Li dessus nommet 
signeur ne se veurent mies escuser, mès fisent leur amas de gens d'armes, d'Alemans et de 
Behagnons et de Lussemboursins, et s'en vinrent en France devers le roy efforciement.' 
 
251 SHF Livre I. Tome III. § 259: 'Encores escrisi li rois et manda especialement monsigneur 
Jehan de Hayneu, qui nouvellement s'estoit alliées à lui . . . Si vint li gentilz sires de Byaumont, 
messires Jehans de Haynau, servir le roy de France moult estoffement et à grant fuision de 
bonne bacelerie de le conté de Haynau et d'ailleurs: dont li rois eut grant joie de sa venue, et le 
retint pour son corps et de son plus privet et especial conseil.' 
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On the contrary, John of Hainault is a man Froissart clearly admired. But although 
Philippe's allies readily agreed to help him, it took a long time for the French to 
gather their forces and in the meantime the English continued their ravaging, says 
Froissart, who is far less negative in his judgement of how long it took Philippe to 
gather an army to go against the pillaging English force than le Bel who consistently 
describes Philippe as irresolute and slow to move.252 
 
Especially brutal was the sack of Caen, where the Count of Eu and Guines, who was 
Constable of France, and the Count of Tancarville were waiting with their troops. 
Edward advanced cautiously, according to the author, and ordered his columns to 
join up. He also kept his fleet close to him.253 Knowing that the English were 
approaching, says Froissart, the Constable and the Count of Tancarville got armed 
and ordered their men and the townspeople to do the same. They also held a council 
to decide their plan of action, and according to Froissart, the two noblemen proposed 
to abandon the outskirts of the town to the English and concentrate their forces in the 
town to hold the gates. This was not accepted by the townspeople who would rather 
meet the English face to face in the fields.254 This reluctance to heed the noblemen's 
advice should cost them dearly, as Froissart´s following account shows. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
252 Le Bel describes Philip's reaction to the ravaging of Normandy in this manner: 'L'aultre 
merveille, sy est quant le pont fut refait, comment le roy Philippe, qui estoit à Parys, à VII 
petites lyewes prez, à tout son plus gran pouoir de seigneurs et de gens d'armes, et qu'il avoit 
mandé pour deffendre son pays, comment fut ce qu'il n'ala courir sus ces anemis qui luy 
faisoient voler la fumiere et les flamesches par dessus sa teste à Parys, ou au mains qu'il fust 
venu deffendre le passage.' Jean le Bel: Chronique. SHF. Chapitre LXXI. p. 86.  
 
253 SHF Livre I. Tome III. § 261. 'Si chevauça elle part tout sagement, et remist ses batailles 
ensamble . . . Et tousjours le suivoit et costioit sa navire . . .' 
 
254 SHF Livre I. Tome III. § 261. 'Li connestables de France et li aultre signeur, qui là estoient 
assamblé . . . s' armèrent et fisent armer leurs gens et tous les bourgois de le ville, et puis se 
traisent en conseil ensamble pour savoir comment il se maintenroient. Si fu donc li intention et 
ordenance dou connestable de France et dou conte de Tankarville, que nulz ne vuidast le ville, 
mais gardaissent les portes et le pont et le rivière . . . Chil de le ville respondirent qu'il ne 
feroient mies ensi, et qu'il se trairoient sus les camps et attendroient la poissance dou roy d' 
Engleterre, car il estoit gens et fors assés pour le combatre.' 
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When the townsmen saw the English drawn up in three solid, close-ordered 
divisions and all the banners and pennons fluttering in the wind, their courage 
forsook them, says Froissart.255 The townspeople fled, and a truly horrible carnage 
began. The Constable and the Count who barely escaped to safety, could do nothing 
but watch the massacre, and began to fear that they might fall into the hands of 
archers 'who did not know who they were'.256  Luckily, says Froissart, they spotted a 
gallant English knight, Sir Thomas Holland who they recognized because they had 
campaigned together in Granada and Prussia 'in the way in which knight meet each 
other.'257 The French noblemen called out to Holland and proposed that he make 
them his prisoners, a proposition he readily accepted. Not only because he could 
save their lives, says the author, but also because they were valuable prisoners, 
'enough to bring in a hundred thousand gold moutons.'258 The fact that Thomas 
Holland was able to make a good profit from his noble prisoners is however, not 
condemned by the chronicler, who later says that Thomas Holland was able to 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
255 SHF Livre I. Tome III. § 262. 'Si trestost que chil bourgois de le ville de Kem veirent approcier 
ces Englès qui venoient en trois batailles drut et sieret, et perchurent ces banières et ces 
pennons à grant fuison bauloiier et venteler, et oïrent ces arciers ruire qu'il n'avoient point 
acoustumé de veir ne de sentir, si furent si effraet et si desconfi d'yaus meismes, que tout cil 
dou monde ne les euissent mies retenus qu'il ne se fuissent mis à la fuite.' 
 
256 SHF Livre I. Tome III. § 262. 'Dont il avint que li connestables de France et li contes de 
Tankarville, qui estoient monté en celle porte au piet dou pont à sauveté, regardoient au lonch 
et amont le rue, et veioient si grant pestilence et tribulation que grans hideurs estoit à 
considerer et imaginer. Si se doubtèrent d'eulz meismes que il n'escheissent en ce partie et entre 
mains d'arciers, qui point ne les cognussent.' 
 
257 SHF Livre I. Tome III. § 262. 'Ensi que il regardoient aval en grant doubte ces gens tuer, il 
perçurent un gentil chevalier englès, qui n' avoit c'un oel, que on clamoit monsigneur Thumas 
de Hollandes . . . : lequel Thumas raviserent bien, car il s'estoient aultre fois veu et compagniet 
l'un l'autre à Grenade en en Prusse et en aultres voiages, ensi que chevalier se truevent.' 
 
258 SHF Livre I. Tome III. § 262. 'Quant li dis messires Thomas oy ceste parolle, si fu tous joians, 
tant pour ce que il les pooit sauver que pour ce qu'il avoit, en yaus prendre, une belle aventure 
de bons prisonniers, pour avoir cent mil moutons.' According to Clifford J. Rogers, Sir Thomas 
Holland gained 80 000 florins for the ransom of the Count of Eu. Rogers Clifford J.: War cruel 
and Sharp. English strategy under Edward III, 1327 - 1360. Woodbridge 2000. p. 284. 
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prevent many cruel and horrible acts which would otherwise have been committed, 
'giving proof of his nobleness'.259 Also other English noblemen showed clemency and 
were able to prevent 'a number of evil deeds and rescued many pretty women and 
nuns from rape'.260  
 
However, in spite of their initial fear and flight, the townspeople also made the 
English suffer, and King Edward, according to Froissart (and not le Bel) was enraged 
when his losses were reported to him. Wanting to put all the townspeople to the 
sword, the King was only appeased when Sir Godfrey of Harcourt pointed out that 
such actions would be detrimental to the King's expedition. 'You have still a great 
voyage to make before you reach Calais . . . there is still plenty of fighting before you, 
and you will need all the forces you have', Harcourt is reported to have said.261 
Seeing that Harcourt was right, Edward abandoned his intention, and was well 
rewarded. The townspeople opened their chests, many gave up everything they had, 
and Edward was able to send back his fleet full of conquered spoils and of good 
prisoners, 'including more than sixty knights and three hundred wealthy citizens, 
                                                 
259 SHF Livre I. Tome III. § 262.' Et destourna ce jour à faire mainte cruaulté et plusieurs 
horribles fais qui euissent estet fait, se il ne fust alés au devant: dont il fist aumosne et 
gentillèce.' 
 
260 SHF Livre I. Tome III. § 262. 'Avoecques le dit monsigneur Thumas de Hollandes avoit 
plusieurs gentilz chevalier d' Engleterre qui gardèrent et esconsèrent tamaint meschief à faire, 
et mainte belle bourgoise et tamainte dame d'enclostre à violer.' 
 
261 SHF Livre I. Tome III.  § 262. ' . . . li rois d'Engleterre fu trop durement courociés au soir, 
quant on l'en dist le verité. Et ordonna et commanda que, à l'endemain, on parmesist tout à 
l'espée, et le ditte ville en feu et en flame. Mès messires Godefrois de Harcourt ala au devant de 
ceste ordenance et dist: "Chiers sires, voelliés affrener un petit vostre corage, et vous souffise ce 
que vous en avés fait. Vous avez encores à faire un moult grant voiage, ançois que vous soiiés 
devant Calais, où vous tirés à venir . . . Car il ne poet estre que vos adversaires li rois Phelippes 
ne doie chevaucier contre vous à tout son effort, et combatre à quel fin que soit. Et trouverés 
encores des destrois, des passages, des assaus et des rencontres plusieurs, par quoi les gens que 
vous avés et plus encores vous feront bien mestier."' 
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with a host of loving greetings to his wife, my lady Philippa', says Froissart who at 
no point indicates that he found the pillaging in opposition to the rules of chivalry.262 
 
The description of Edward's chevauchée in Normandy and the sack of Caen give vital 
information about the author's perception of the events and actions of one of the men 
he praises the most, Edward III. First of all, we may notice that although the author 
relates that Edward was in his prime and desired to meet his enemy in battle, he also 
planned his expedition carefully with the help of his trusted men and especially 
Godfrey of Harcourt. According to Clifford Rogers, the campaign was probably 
intended to provoke Philippe to battle, and this could very well be true. However, 
Froissart does not mention such a clear intention. Instead the author's focus when 
relating Harcourt's motivation for landing in Normandy, seems to be the rich 
plunder that could be won. Pointing out that the towns of Normandy would be 
virtually undefended and full of wealth and riches - 'enough to make Edward and 
his men rich for twenty years to come' - Harcourt was able to persuade Edward to 
change his course from Gascony to Normandy, a decision not questioned or 
condemned by the author. To seek gain and plunder was clearly not in opposition to 
the chivalrous code as he saw it. On the contrary, Froissart relates the ravaging and 
pillaging of Normandy without a word of condemnation and seems to admire the 
effectiveness of the army and how well Edward administered his forces.  
 
Contrary to what we might have expected there is little focus on prowess and 
chivalrous fighting in Froissart´s account at this point. Although the brave actions of 
some of the chevaliers on both sides are mentioned, the bravery shown by the 
knights was clearly not the main theme of his account as this point. Instead, we hear 
of pillaging and arson. Thus, Froissart´s description of the chevauchée shows that we 
                                                 
262 SHF Livre I. Tome III. § 263. 'Ensi ordonna li rois d' Engleterre ses besongnes, estans en le 
ville de Kem, et renvoia se navie cargie d'or et d'avoir conquis et de bons prisonniers, dont il y 
avoit jà plus de soissante chevaliers, et trois cens riches bourgois, et avoech ce grant fuison de 
salus et d'amistés à sa femme, la gentilz royne d' Engleterre, madame Phelippe.' 
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ought to be cautious of believing that the author only described noblemen in 
accordance with a very rigid definition of the chivalrous ideal.  
 
This is also seen in the rest of Froissart´s account of the campaign leading up to the 
battle of Crécy. According to the author, Edward and his army ravaged the country 
west of the Seine and struck south as far as the walls of Paris, then turned 
northeast.263 This spurred Philippe to come after him, and Froissart describes how the 
King of France openly proclaimed his willingness to fight in a speech to the people of 
Paris.264 In the meantime, Edward 'well aware that the King of France was following 
him' wanted to find a way to cross the River Somme, says Froissart.265 Having 
received advice from a young groom, the English army crossed the river at Abbeville 
where they also defeated a notable French knight, Sir Godemar du Fay, who had 
been sent by Philippe to guard the crossing. When news reached Philippe that the 
English army had been able to cross the river, he got extremely angry, says Froissart, 
because he had expected to find his opponent on the bank of the Somme and fight 
them there.266 
 
The English on their side was full of confidence, says the chronicler, and the King of 
England thanked and praised God many times that day for bringing him safely 
                                                 
263 SHF Livre I. Tome III. § 263 - 270. 
 
264 SHF Livre I. Tome III. § 263: ' Donc respondi li rois et dist: "Ma bonne gent, ne vous doubtés 
de riens. Jà li Englès ne vous approceront de plus priès.  Je m'en vois jusques à Saint Denis 
devers mes gens d'armes, car je voel chevaucier contre les Englès et les combaterai, comment 
qu'il soit." ' Not surprisingly, this is a passage not found in le Bel's account where the author 
seems more determined to portray Philippe in a less favourable light. 
 
265 SHF Livre I. Tome III. § 272. 'Or parlerons dou roy d' Engleterre qui estoit arrestés à 
Arainnes, si com vous avés oy, et avoit moult bien entendu que li rois de France le sievoit o tout 
son effort; et si ne savoit encores là où il poroit passe le rivière de Somme. . . ' 
 
266 SHF Livre I. Tome III. § 270. 'Des ces nouvelles fu li rois de France moult courociés, car il 
cuiodoit bien trouver les Englès sus le rivage de Somme, et là combatre.' 
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across the river.267 As we saw above, Godfrey of Harcourt says that Edward's 
intention was to reach Calais, and from what we can gather from Froissart's account 
the English were not actively seeking out the French. However, there is no indication 
that Froissart believed the English to be literally fleeing from the much superior 
French army either. On the contrary, the English army seems to have taken the time 
to pillage and plunder several small towns north of the river Somme. Sparing the 
town of Noyelle, which belonged to the sister of the late Robert of Artois, most of the 
army halted in the open country near La Broye, while the Marshals made an 
incursion to Crotoy on the coast, which they burnt to the ground, says Froissart.268 
The next day, they moved towards Crécy in Ponthieu where Edward halted and 
gave a speech to his men stating that he would take up his position there and wait 
for Philippe to come and fight. 'I am on the land lawfully inherited from my royal 
mother,  . . . ready to defend my claim against my adversary Philippe of Valois', 
Edward is reported to have said.269  
 
Edward rose early in the morning says Froissart, and heard mass with his son, 
Edward, Prince of Wales. After mass, Edward rode cheerfully on a little white 
palfrey amongst his men encouraging them to fight for his cause and inheritance. He 
spoke amicably and laughingly at them all and even the most disheartened would 
have plucked up the courage on hearing him, says Froissart, thus showing the 
                                                 
267 SHF Livre I. Tome III. § 271. 'Et regratia et loa Dieu li rois d'Engleterre ce jour plusieurs fois, 
quant si grant grace li avoit fait que trouvet passage bon et seur et conquis sus ses ennemis, et 
desconfis par bataille.' 
 
268 SHF Livre I. Tome III. § 271 
 
269 SHF Livre I. Tome III. § 272.' Si dist adonc li rois d'Engleterre à ses gens: "Prendons chi place 
de terre, car je n'irai plus avant si arons veus nos anemis. Et bien y a cause que je kes attende, 
car je sui sus le droit hiretage de madame ma mère, qui li fu donnés en mariage. Si le vorrai 
deffendre et calengier contre mon adversaire Phelippe de Vallois." Ses gens obeirent tout à se 
intention, et n'alèrent adonc plus avant.' 
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importance of personal charisma for the medieval king.270 The King also ordered that 
all should eat, drink and rest so that they would be better prepared when their 
enemy arrived. But Edward's cheerful encouragement is not the author's only focus. 
Froissart also mentions the tactical dispositions of Edward whom he says gave 
orders to his Constable and his marshals to divide the army into three bodies and to 
take up their positions.271 Froissart also names the principal noblemen making up the 
three divisions. 
 
Although the rear of Philippe’s army had not yet caught up with the rest at 
Abbeville, the French is also described to have prepared for battle, and according to 
Froissart, Philippe received advise from his officers to send out scouts to reconnoitre 
the enemy’s position, an advise he readily agreed to. A knight called Le Moine de 
Bazeilles - a man Froissart describes as both ‘brave and chivalrous’ - presented the 
outcome of this expedition to the King.272 The English were waiting, 'prettily 
disposed', and ready for battle, said de Bazeilles. However, in de Bazeilles' opinion, 
Philippe should not advance, but halt his men. 'Before the rear can come up with you 
and you can put your divisions in some order, it will be getting late. Your men will 
                                                 
270 SHF Livre I. Tome III. § 274: 'Quant ces trois batailles furent ordonnées et que cescuns sires, 
barons, contes et chevaliers, sceurent quel cose il devoient faire et retraire, li dis rois 
d'Engleterre monta sus un petit palefroi blanch, un blanc baston en sa main, adestrés de ses 
deux marschaus; et puis ala tout le pas, de rench en rench, en amonnestant et priant les contes, 
les barons et les chevaliers, qu'il volsissent entendre et penser pour se honneur garder, et à 
deffendre son droit. Et leur disoient ces langages en riant, si doucement et de si lie cière, que, 
qui fust tous desconfortés, se se peuist il reconforter, en lui oant et regardant. Et quant il ot ensi 
viseté toutes ses batailles et ses gens, et amonnestés et priiés de bien faire le besongne, il fu 
heure de haute tierce. Si se retraist en sa bataille, et ordonna que toutes ses gens mengassent à 
leur aise et buissent un cop. Ensi fu fait comme il l'ordonna. Et mengièrent et burent tout à 
loisir, et puis retoursèrent pos, barilz et pourveances sus leurs chars, et revinrent en leurs 
batailles, ensi que ordonné estoient par les mareschaus.' 
 
271  SHF Livre I. Tome III. § 274 
 
272 SHF Livre I. Tome III. § 275. 'Finablement de le bouce dou roy issi li ordenance que il 
commanda au Monne de Basèle, que on tenoit à ce jour pour l’un des plus chevalereus et 
vaillans chevaliers du monde, et qui plus avoit travilliet de son corps, que il en desist sen 
entente.' 
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be tired and in no sort of shape and you will find that the enemy are fresh and rested 
and in no doubt of the way they plan to fight. In the morning you will be able to give 
more thought to your battle-order and make a closer study of the enemy’s position to 
see which is the best line of attack,' Bazeilles is reported to have said.273 
 
Le Moine de Bazeilles’ advise demonstrates how Froissart thought that a ‘brave’ and 
‘chivalrous’ knight should reply when asked to give his opinion. Contrary to what 
we may believe, de Bazeilles was not expected to urge his king to immediately 
engage in battle, or display his own eagerness to fight. Instead, he is portrayed by 
Froissart as a wise man giving a thorough outline of the tactics he believed were the 
best to adopt under the circumstances. This is in keeping with numerous other 
descriptions in the account where 'good' and ' chivalrous' men are reported to have 
given their opinion frankly to the king, often at the time when the king was angry 
and set on performing a violent deed. The perfect knight, as he is portrayed in 
Froissart´s work, was clearly no coward set on pleasing his lord at all cost. On this 
occasion, the King is said to have fully approved of Le Moine de Bazeilles’ advice 
and ordered his marshals to put it into execution. But unfortunately for the French, 
confusion in the army led to a completely different outcome. Regardless of the 
advice of de Bazeilles, says Froissart, the army continued to advance with disastrous 
consequences.  
 
                                                 
273 SHF Livre I. Tome III. § 276. '"Sire, ce dist le Monne de Basele, je parlerai, puis que il vous 
plaist par la correction de mes compagnons. Nous avons chevauchie si avant que nous avons 
veu et consideré le couvenant des ennemis. Saciés que il se sont mis et arresté en trois batailles 
bien et faiticement; et ne font nul semblant que il doient fuir, mes vous attenderont, à ce qu’il 
moustrent. Si conseille de ma partie, salve tout dis le milleur conseil, que vous faites toutes vos 
gens ci arrester sus les camps et logier pour celle journée. Car ançois que li darrainnier puissent 
venir jusques à yaus, et que vos batailles soient ordonnées, il sera tart. Si seront vos gens lassé 
et travillié et sans arroy. Et vous trouvères vos ennemis frès et nouviaus, et tous pourveus de 
savoir quel cose il doient faire. Si porés de matin vos batailles ordonner plus meurement et 
mieulz, et par plus grant loisir aviser vos ennemis par quel lieu on les pora combatre car soiiés 
tous seurs que il vous attenderont." ' 
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Many great noblemen pressed hard to get in the first line, ‘each wanted to outshine 
his companions’, says Froissart who claims that ‘pride and vanity’ took charge of the 
events, a comment that shows that excessive lust for glory was not appreciated by 
the chronicler.274 And contrary to the cheerful leadership, calm and order he 
describes in the English camp, chaos soon took over amongst the French. ‘They rode 
on . . . in no order or formation . . . and for what they did, the leaders were much to 
blame’, continues Froissart who claims that nobody has ever been able to relate the 
whole truth of the matter.275 What he himself knew, he says, came mainly from the 
English ‘who had a good understanding of their own battle-plan’276 and some of John 
of Hainault’s men who on this occasion fought on the French side. The English, says 
Froissart, had got up with perfect discipline and formed their ranks, with the archers 
in a harrow formation and the men-at-arms behind.277 The Prince of Wales’s division 
was in front. The second division, commanded by the Earls of Northampton and 
Arundel, was on the wing, ready to support the Prince if the need arose. 
                                                 
274 SHF Livre I. Tome III. § 276. 'Ensi et par grant orgueil fu demenée ceste cose, car cescuns 
voloit fourpasser son compagnon. Et ne peut estre creue ne oye li parole dou vaillant chevalier, 
dont il leur en meschei si grandement, com vos orés recorder assés briefment. Ne ossi li rois ne 
si mareschal ne peurent adonc estre mestre de leurs gens; car il y avoit si grant nombre de 
grans signeurs, que cescuns par envie voloit là moustrer sa poissance. Si chevaucièrent en cel 
estat, sans arroy et sans ordonance, si avant que il approcièrent les ennemis, et que il les veirent 
en leur presence.' 
 
275 SHF Livre I. Tome III. § 276 - 7. 'Or fu moult grans blasmes pour les premiers, et mieulz leur 
vaulsist estre arresté à l'ordenance dou vaillant chevalier, que ce qu'il fisent. Car sitretos qu'il 
veirent leurs ennemis, il reculèrent tout à un fait si desordeneement que cil qui derrière estoit 
s'en esbahirent, et cuidièrent que li premier se combatissent et qu'il fuissent jà desconfi. . . . Il 
n'est nulz homs, tant fust presens à celle journée ne euist bon loisir d'aviser et ymaginer toute la 
besongne ensi que elle ala, qui en seuist ne peuist imaginer la verité, especialment de le partie 
des François, tant y eut povre arroy et ordenance en leurs conrois.' 
 
276 SHF Livre I. Tome III. § 277. ‘Et ce que j’en sçai, je le seuch le plus par les Englès qui 
imaginerent bien leur covenant et ossi par les gens monsigneur Jehan de Haynau qui fu toutdis 
dalés le roy de France.' 
 
277 SHF Livre I. Tome III. § 277. 'Li Englès, qui ordonné estoient en trois batailles, et qui seoient 
jus à terre tout bellement, si tos qu'il veirent les François approcier, il se levèrent moult 
ordonneement, sans nul effroy, et se rengièrent en leurs batailles, ceste dou prince tout devant, 
mis leurs arciers à manière d'une herce, et les gens d'armes ou fons de leur bataille.' 
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The comment that the French lords arrived one after another in no kind of order 
shows that the chronicler expected a structure and a tactical plan, and that, in 
Froissart's opinion, the French lords failed their task by pushing forward. Froissart 
also shows that he was not particularly impressed by some of the French 
commanders when he relates how the Count of Alençon disregarded the pleas of the 
Genoese bowmen ‘who were not ready to fight at that moment, for they had just 
marched over eighteen miles, in armour and carrying their crossbows’.278 ‘What is 
the use of burdening ourselves with this rabble who give up just when they are 
needed!’ Alençon is reported to have said.279 However, the Genoese, having been 
marshalled into proper order and made to advance, began to utter loud whoops to 
frighten the English. In contrast, the English waited in silence and did not stir, says 
Froissart, who then depicts the actions of the two sides.280 Between the English and 
the main body of the French there was a hedge of English knights, 'splendidly 
mounted and armed', who had been watching the French discomfiture and now cut 
off their retreat, he says. Seeing how miserably the footmen had performed, the 
French king called out in anger: ‘Quick now, kill that entire rabble. They are only 
getting in our way.’281 This was an order made 'par grant mautalent', states the 
                                                 
278 SHF Livre I. Tome III. § 278. ‘Là avoit de ces dis Geneuois arbalestriers environ quinze mil, 
qui euissent ossi chier nient que commencier adonc le bataille, car il estoient durement lassé et 
travillié d'aler à piet plus de six liewes tout armé et de porter leurs arbalestres.’ 
 
279 SHF Livre I. Tome III. § 278. ‘Ces parolles volèrent jusques au conte d'Alençon, qui en fu 
durement courociés, et dist: "On se doit bien cargier de tel ribaudaille qui fallent au plus grant 
besoing!"’ 
 
280 SHF Livre I. Tome III. § 278. 'Quant li Geneuois furent tout recueilliet et mis ensamble, et il 
deurent approcier leurs ennemis, il commencièrent à juper si trés hault que ce fu merveilles; et 
le fisent pour esbahir les Englès, mès li Englès se tinrent tout quoi et ne fisent nul samblant . . . 
Et cil arcier d’Engleterre, quant il veirent ceste ordenance, passèrent un pas avant, et puis fisent 
voler ces saiettes de grant façon, qui entrèrent et descendirent si ouniement sus ces Geneuois 
que ce sambloit nège . . .' 
 
281 SHF Livre I. Tome III. § 278. ‘Entre yaus et les Englès avoit une grande haie de gens d’armes, 
montés et parés moult richement, qui regardoient le couvenant de Geneouis et comment il 
assambloient: si ques, quant il cuidièrent retourner, il ne peurent. Car li rois de France, par 
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chronicler, thus, showing that, in his opinion, Philippe made a bad judgement at this 
particular point. 
'It is true that too few great feats of arms were performed that day, considering the 
vast number of fine soldiers and excellent knights who were with the King of 
France', says Froissart who also points out that the battle began late and the French 
had had a long and heavy day before they arrived. Yet, he says, they still went 
forward and preferred death to a dishonourable flight, a comment that shows that 
although Froissart believed that the noblemen should have heeded the order to halt, 
the right thing to do under the circumstances was to fight, not to fly.282 However, not 
all preferred this honourable option, according to Froissart. Men like the Lord 
Charles of Bohemia, who had brought his men in good order to the battlefield, left 
when he saw that things were going badly for his side. 'I do not know which way he 
went', the author states laconically.283 In contrast, he praises Charles' father, the blind 
King of Bohemia, mentioned in the previous chapter. The King, says Froissart, came 
so close to the enemy that he was able to use his sword several times. In fact the 
King and his men advanced so far forward that they all remained on the field, not 
one escaping alive. They were found the next day lying around their leader, with 
their horses still fastened together, Froissart comments.284 
                                                                                                                                                        
grant mautalent, quant il vei leur povre arroy, et que il se desconfisoient, ensi commanda et 
dist: "Or tos, or tos tués toute ceste ribaudaille: il nous ensonnient et tiennent le voie sans 
raison." ' 
 
282 SHF Livre I. Tome III. § 279: 'Bien est verités que de si grant gent d'armes et de si noble 
chevalerie et tel fuison que li rois de France avoit là, il issirent trop peu de grans fais d'armes, 
car li bataille commença tart, et si estoient li François fort lassé et travillié, ensi qu'il venoient. 
Toutes fois, li vaillant homme et li bon chevalier, pour leur honneur, chevauçoient toutdis 
avant, et avoient plus chier à morir, que fuite villaine leur fust reprocie.' 
 
283 SHF Livre I. Tome III. § 279: 'Là estoit messires Charles de Behagne, qui s'appeloit et escrisoit 
jà rois d'Alemagne et en poroit les armes, qui vint moult ordonneement jusques à le bataille. 
Mais quant il vei que la cause aloit mal pur yaus, il s'en parti:  je ne sçai pas quel chemin il pris.' 
 
284 SHF Livre I. Tome III. § 279: 'Ce ne fist mies li bons rois ses pères, car il ala si avant sus ses 
ennemis que il feri un cop d'espée, voire trois, voire quatre, et se combati moult vaillament.  . .  
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The King of France, on his side, was in great distress when he saw his men being cut 
down one after the other by such a handful of men as the English were, continues 
the chronicler.285 However, his judgement of the French king is not overly harsh. The 
lateness of the hour harmed the French cause as much as anything, he says, for in 
the dark many of the men-at-arms lost their leaders and wandered about the field in 
disorder only to fall in with the English, who quickly overwhelmed and killed 
them.286 In fact, some French knights and squires succeeded in breaking through the 
Prince of Wales’s archers and engaging the men-at-arms in hand-to-hand combat 
with swords, says Froissart, who states that there was much brave and skilful 
fighting at this point. 
 
Froissart also relates how the young Prince of Wales was left to fend for himself after 
his father had been informed that the young prince was hard pressed and needed 
his help by a knight named Thomas of Norwich. 'Sir Thomas', the King answered, 
'go back to him and to those who have sent you and tell them not to send for me 
again today, as long as my son is alive. Give them my command to let the boy win 
his spurs, for if God has so ordained it, I wish the day to be his and the honour to go 
to him and to those in charge I have placed him'. 287 This reply did not dishearten the 
                                                                                                                                                        
Ne onques nulz ne s'en parti, et furent trouvé à l'endemain, sus le place, autour dou roy leur 
signeur, et leurs chevaus tout alloiiés ensamble.' 
 
285 SHF Livre I. Tome III. § 280: 'Vous devez sçavoir que li rois de France avoit grant angousse 
au coer, qaunt il veoit ses gens ensi desconfire et fondre l'un sus l'autre, d'une puignie de gens 
que li Englés estoient.' 
 
286 SHF Livre I. Tome III. § 281: 'Ceste bataille, ce samedi, entre la Broie et Creci, fu moult 
felenesse et très horrible. Et y avinrent plusieur grant fais d'armes qui ne vinrent mies tout à 
cognissance; car, quant la bataille commença, il estoit jà moult tart: ce greva plus les François 
c'autre cose. Car plusieurs gens d'armes, chevaliers et escuiers, sus le nuit, perdoient leur 
signeurs et leur mestres. Si waucroient par les camps, et s'embatoient souvent à petite 
ordenance entre les Englès où tantost il estoient envay et occis.' 
 
287 SHF Livre I. Tome III. § 281. ‘Si dist li chevaliers, quant il fu venus au roy: “Monsigneur, li 
contes de Warvich, li contes de Kenfort et messires Renaulz de Gobehem, qui son dalés le 
Prince vostre fil, ont grandement à faire, et les combatent li François aigrement. Pour quoi il 
vous prient que vous et vostre bataille les venés conforter et aidier à oster de ce peril; car, se cilz 
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commanders of his son's division. Instead, says Froissart, they privately regretted 
having sent Thomas. They fought better than ever and must have performed great 
feats of arms, for they remained in possession of the ground with honour, says the 
author who clearly perceived Edward's reply as highly commendable.288 Regardless 
of his age, the young Prince Edward had to prove himself and his valiant effort at 
Crécy secured him an increase in his symbolic capital. Although the Prince played a 
very limited role in the strategic and tactical decision-making at Crécy, Edward III 
should later attribute the victory to his son who gained much in reputation through 
this, says David Green.289 
 
 At midnight the battle was over and the English had withstood several waves of 
French attackers without losing ground; eleven princes lay dead on the field, eighty 
bannerets and twelve hundred ordinary knights, according to the author. The 
French loss was horrible, he continues, and for a long time after France was much 
weakened in honour, force and council.290 But the outcome could have been even 
worse. Had the English mounted a pursuit, as they did later at Poitiers, they would 
                                                                                                                                                        
effors monteplie longement et s’efforce ensi, il se doubtent que vostre filz n’ait à faire.” Lors 
respondi li rois et demanda au chevalier, qui s’appelloit messires Thumas de Nordvich: 
“Messires Thumas, mes filz est il ne mors ne atierés, ou si bleciés qu’il ne se puist aidier?” – 
Cilz respondi: “Nenil, monsigneur, se Dieu plaist, mais il est en dur parti d’armes: si aroit bien 
mestier de vostre ayde.” – “Messire Thumas, dist le rois, or retournés devers lui et devers 
chiaus qui ci vous envoient; et leur dittes de par moy qu’il ne m’envoient meshui requerre pour 
aventure qui leur aviegne, tant que mes filz soit en vie. Et dittes leur que je leur mande que il 
laissent à l’enfant gaegnier ses esporons; car je voeul, se Dieux l’a ordonné, que la journée soit 
sienne, et que li honneur l’en demeure et à chiaus en qui carge ja l'ai bailliet.' 
 
288 SHF Livre I. Tome III. § 281. 'Sus ces parolles, retourna li chevaliers arrière, et recorda à ses 
mestres tout ce que vous avés oy; laquèle response les encoraga grandement, et se reprisent en 
yaus meismes de ce que là avoient envoiiet. Si furent milleur chevalier que devant, et y fisent 
plusieurs apertises darmes, ensi que il apparu, car la place leur demora à leur honneur.' 
 
289 Green, David: The Battle of Poitiers. 1356. Stroud 2002. p. 79. 
 
290 SHF Livre I. Tome III. § 284. 'Vous devés savoir que la desconfiture et la perte pour les 
François fu moult grande et moult horrible, et que trop y demorèrent sus les camps de nobles et 
vaillains hommes, dus, contes, barons et chevaliers, par lesquelz li royaumes de France fu 
moult depuis afoiblis d'onneur, de poissance et de conseil.' 
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have killed many more, including the King himself, states the author, who thereby 
shows that he was comparing the two battles when he wrote his account.291 
However, Froissart was not only judging the excellence, or lack of thereof, of 
noblemen when he was summing up the outcome of the battle of Crécy. 
Interestingly, the author argues that although many fine feats of arms were 
performed, the English archers were of primary importance, 'because it was them 
that contributed most to the discomfiture of the Genoese crossbowmen at the 
beginning of the battle'. This is a comment that shows that Froissart by no means 
only perceived the actions of noblemen to be importance.292 
 
Froissart´s account of the great defeat suffered by the French chivalry provides vital 
information about the chronicler's values and perspective, and there can be no doubt 
that Froissart focuses partially on individual prowess and bravery in his account. 
One example is the bravery shown by the blind king of Bohemia, another when he 
relates the bravery of the young Prince of Wales and his men. The courageous 
attacks of the French knights who were able to break through the English archers 
and engage the English in hand-to-hand combat are clearly admired,293 as are the 
actions of the French nobles who preferred death to a ‘dishonourable flight’. And 
although he does not outright condemn the actions of Lord Charles of Bohemia who 
left the battlefield when he saw that things were going badly for his side, Froissart 
clearly indicates which of the two earned his regard when he juxtaposes the 
behaviour of the son with that of his father. The emphasis he puts on Edward's 
                                                 
291 SHF Livre I. Tome III. § 284. 'Et saciés que, si les Englès eussent caciet ensi qu'il fisent à 
Poitiers, encores en fuissent trop plus demoret, et li rois de France meismes . . . .' 
 
292 SHF Livre I. Tome III. § 284: 'Si vous di que ce jour li arcier d' Engleterre portèrent grant 
confort à leur partie, car par leur tret li plusieurs dient que la besongne se fist, comment que il y 
eut bien aucuns vallains chevaliers de leur lés qui vaillamment se combatirent de le main . . . 
mais il doit bien sentir et cognoistre que li arcier y fisent un grant fait, car par leur tret de 
commencement furent desconfi li Geneuois qui estoient bien quinze mil, qui leur fu uns grans 
avantages.' 
 
293 SHF Livre I. Tome III. § 282. 
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cheerful encouragement of his men, and his refusal to come to his young son's aid so 
that the Prince and his men could win honour for themselves also show that 
Froissart admired individual prowess, courage and charismatic leadership. 
 
Still, Froissart´s description provides us with a far less one-dimensional picture of 
medieval war than we might have expected. First, we should note the structure of 
his text and the fact that the outline of the deliberations between men and the 
preparations for the battle occupies more space in his account than the description of 
the battle itself. This is an indication of the relative importance of these matters and 
Froissart´s interest in them. Secondly, throughout his account of the preliminaries 
Froissart shows a strong desire to ‘explain’ the outcome of the battle, and finds it 
necessary to relate the tactical moves and dispositions of the two armies. As we have 
seen, he praises men like the Moine de Bazeilles' who gave Philippe the wise advice 
to halt and put his men to fight when rested and the well-ordered English archers 
whose actions he believed were the most decisive factor in winning the battle. This 
implies that Froissart was not content with celebrating the actions of noblemen, nor 
did he look for the causes of defeat only in the lack of individual prowess or 
bravery. Instead, he blames the outcome on the French noblemen’s excessive need to 
‘show off’, their lack of obedience, bad communication and tired troops, an 
evaluation that indicates that, in Froissart´s opinion, to press forward to engage the 
English at whatever cost was not a commendable action.  
 
Contrary to what we may have expected, Froissart seems genuinely interested in 
relating the successful tactics and plans of the English, and the causes for why the 
battle went so horribly wrong for the French. This perspective is further developed 
in the next part of his account where the author deals with the siege of Calais. 
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3.2. The Siege of Calais 
 
After Edward's victory at Crécy, he continued towards Calais, a prosperous seaport 
to which he had no claim save as King of France. Why Edward set out for Calais has 
been a subject of debate for modern historians.294 While some, like the French 
historian Edouard Perroy, have seen Edward's attempts to take Calais as a way to 
easily secure himself a port where he could re-embark,295 Clifford Rogers see the 
siege of Calais as yet another provocation in order to bring Philippe to a decisive 
battle. 'The idea that Edward, desiring to take ship again for England, would 
abandon the port of le Crotoy (which he had already taken, and where he had long 
since ordered the fleet to arrive), then underestimate the time needed to capture a 
city by ten or twenty times, but stay there anyway for a year, just to capture a port, is 
easily dismissed,' he says.296 
 
Roger's view is supported by Froissart's account where Godfrey of Harcourt is 
described to have pointed out that Calais was the final destination of the chevauchée 
already at an early stage. 297 When Edward arrived before Calais, the chronicler says 
that it was with the firm intention to take it ‘without regard for the time and effort it 
might cost him’, thus, showing that in his opinion Edward was set on taking Calais 
                                                 
294 See R. C. Smail: "Art of War" in Medieval England, ed. A.L. Poole. Oxford 1958. p. 155. De 
Vries, Kelly R.: 'Hunger, Flemish Participation and the Flight of Philip VI: Contemporary 
accounts of the Siege of Calais 1346 - 7.' in Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History. 1991 and 
Burne, Alfred H.: The Crecy War. London 1990 (1955). 
 
295 Perroy, Eduard: The Hundred Years War. New York 1965. p 119. 
 
296 Rogers Clifford J.: War cruel and Sharp. English strategy under Edward III, 1327 - 1360. 
Woodbridge 2000. p. 274 - 75.  
 
297 SHF Livre I. Tome III.  § 262. '  . . messires Godefrois de Harcourt . . .  dist: "Chiers sires, . . .  
Vous avez encores à faire un moult grant voiage, ançois que vous soiiés devant Calais, où vous 
tirés à venir. . . .."' 
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not gaining general access to a sea-port.298 Edward had proper houses built and put 
up in ordered streets 'as though they were to be lived in for ten to twelve years', says 
the author.299 The English also established a market, haberdashers and butcher's 
shops, well supplied with goods that were brought over daily from England and 
Flanders. In addition, the English continued the terrorizing of the surrounding 
country and was thus able to replenish their stocks of food.300  According to Froissart, 
Edward decided that an assault on the town would be in vain. Instead he decided to 
‘starve the place out . . . unless King Philippe of France came to fight him again’.301  
 
 When the military commander of the castle, Sir Jean de Vienne, saw that the English 
were preparing for a long siege, he sent the poor people out of the city in order to 
save the city’s provisions and seventeen hundred of them came out straight into the 
English army, says Froissart. But instead of killing them or sending them back, a 
solution that would have made most sense strategically and put more stress on the 
city’s resources, Edward, according to the author, let them pass. He also gave them a 
hearty meal and two pence each, ‘a merciful act that was highly praised’, says 
Froissart who in this way manages to paint a picture of a courteous king showing 
clemency when it was appropriate.302 
                                                 
298 SHF Livre I. Tome IV. § 288. 'Car tèle estoit se intention qu'il ne s'en partiroit, ne par ivier ne 
par esté, si l'aroit conquis, quel temps ne quel painne qu'il y deuist mettre ne prendre.' 
 
299 SHF Livre I. Tome IV. § 288. 'Et fist batir et ordonner entre le ville et le rivière . . . maisons, et 
carpenter de gros mairiens, et couvrir les dittes maisons, qui estoit assises et ordonnées par 
rues bien et faiticement, . . . , ensi que donc que il deuist là demorer dix ans ou douze.' 
 
300 Other sources also show that he borrowed huge sums of money in order to establish his 
siege. See Indentures of war, Bundle 70. no. 13. Edward borrowed money from several, for 
instance Gautier de Shirton and Gilbert de Windlinbourg.  
 
301 SHF Livre I. Tome IV. § 288.'Et point ne faisoit li dis rois ses gens assallir le ditte ville de 
Calais, car bien savoit que il perderoit se painne et qu'il s'i traveilleroit en vain. Si espargnoit 
ses gens et se artillerie, et disoit que il les affameroit, com lonch terme que il y deuist mettre, se 
li rois Phelippes de recief ne le veoit combatre et lever le siège.' 
 
302 SHF Livre I. Tome III. § 288: 'Si en vuidièrent et partirent sus un merkedi au matin, que 
hommes, que femmes, que enfans, plus de dix sept cens, et passèrent parmi l'ost dou roy 
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Froissart´s description of Edward’s largesse is similar to the one we find in Jean le 
Bel’s account where the author explicitly says that he has included this passage due 
to the ‘grande gentillesse’ shown by Edward.303 It is also the description given by the 
modern historian Michael Prestwich in his book The Three Edwards.304 However, the 
description differs widely from what we find in Henry Knighton’s contemporary 
account in which he claims that Edward did not let the poor people pass but left 
them to die of hunger and frost between the city and the English army.305  
 
It is of course difficult to establish who is telling the truth, although one may suspect 
that the Augustinian canon’s account of the events is the most truthful. Froissart, 
who based this portion of his narrative on le Bel, may not have known that the 
events could have unfolded somewhat differently at Calais. Le Bel could have been 
better informed but may have chosen to change his story at this particular point so as 
not to detract from Edward’s honour by relating the events as they actually 
unfolded. One may also suspect that a description of how Edward failed to act with 
                                                                                                                                                        
d'Engleterre. Et leur fu demandé pourquoi il vuidoient; il respondirent que il n'avoient de quoi 
vivre. Adonc leur fist li rois grasce que de passer et aler parmi son host sauvement; et leur fist 
tous et toutes donner à disner bien et largement, et apriès disner à çascun deux estrelins: 
laquèle grasce et aumosne on recommenda à moult belle, ce fu bien raisons.' 
 
303 Jean le Bel: Chronique. SHF. Chapitre LXXIII. 'Quant le noble roy [Edward III] vit ainsy ces 
povres gens mises dehors de leur ville, ilz les fist venir tous devant luy en sa grande sale et leur 
fist à tous donner à boyre et à menger planteuresement, et quant ilz eurent bien mengié et but, 
il leur donna congié d'aler hors de son ost, et à chascun fist donner III vielz estrelins pour 
l'amour de Dieu et les fit conduire bien loing de son ost. On doibt bien cecy recorder pour une 
grande gentillesse.' 
 
304 Prestwich, Michael: The Three Edwards. War and State in England 1272- 1377. London 1980. pp. 
178 - 79.  
 
305 Knighton, Henry: Knighton's Chronicle 1337 - 1396, ed. G.H. Martin. Oxford 1995. Henry 
Knighton was an English chronicler and an Austin (Augustinian) canon at the Abbey of St 
Mary of the Meadows in Leicester. His work is partly a retrospective history and partly a 
chronicle of contemporary events. He died in 1396 and was a contemporary of Froissart. It 
should be noted that there is no apparent reason why Knighton should record a 'disfavourable' 
account of the events. 
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clemency towards the poor, expelled people of Calais would not only detract from 
Edward’s honour, but also deal a blow to the narrator’s project of displaying 
chivalrous deeds as examples for other knights to follow. As we have already seen, 
descriptions of merciful acts towards poor people are celebrated in other sequences 
of the Chroniques, for instance in the portrayal of Gaston Fébus. 
 
Calais continued to be steadily reduced by famine, but held out. Philippe, however, 
was unable to raise an army to come to its rescue until July 1347, a whole year after 
the beginning of the siege. However when Philippe finally came, however, Edward 
did not jump at the chance of battle according to Froissart (and le Bel). Instead he 
reflected that the siege had cost him so dear in money, lives and personal hardship 
that he would not abandon it. He therefore decided to cut off the two roads by which 
the French army could approach him, states the author.306 When this was reported to 
Philippe, the French decided to send envoys to Edward with a chivalrous request for 
battle. Pointing out that he would dearly like to raise the siege, but that Edward and 
his men were impossible to approach, Philippe suggested that the two parties should 
take council and agree to arrange a fight on a fair field.307 
 
                                                 
306 SHF Livre I. Tome IV. § 308: 'Or vous dirai que li rois d'Engleterre fist et avoit jà fait, quant il 
sceut que li rois de France venoit à si grant host pour lui combatre et pour dessieger la ville de 
Calais, qui tant li avoit cousté d'avoir, de gens et de painne de son corps; et si avoit bien que il 
avoit la ditte ville si menée et si astrainte que elle ne se pooit longement tenir: se li venroit à 
grant contraire, se il l'en couvenoit ensi partir. Si avisa et imagina li dis rois que li François ne 
pooient venir à lui ne approecier son host ne le ville de Calais, fors que par l'un de deux pas, ou 
par les dunes sus le rivage de le mer, ou par dessus là où il avoit grant fuison de fossés, de 
croleis et de marés.' 
 
307 SHF Livre I. Tome IV. § 309. ‘Là s'avança messires Ustasses de Ribeumont à parler pour tous; 
et disent: "Sire, le rois de France nous envoie par devers vous et vous segnefie que il est ci 
venus et arrestés sus le mont de Sangates pour vous combatre; mais il ne poet veoir ne trouver 
voie comment il puist venir jusc’à vous: si en a il grant desir, pour dessegier sa bonne ville de 
Calais. Si a il fait aviser et regarder par ses gens comment il poront venir jusc’à vous, mes c’est 
cose impossible. Si veroit volontiers que vous volsissiés mettre de vostre conseil ensamble, et il 
metteroit dou sien, et par l’avis de chiaus, aviser place là où on se peuist combatre, et de ce 
sommes nous cargié de vous dire et requerre.’ 
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This is a request we may have expected a truly chivalrous king to accept. Edward, 
however, declined Philippe’s offer after a brief consultation with his advisers, says 
Froissart, an event widely recorded in letters and diaries of the age. Froissart, 
however, seemingly saw nothing wrong in this decision.  Instead, he shows how 
Edward issued a statement where the King claimed that he had every right to be 
where he was and had been for nearly a year.  'I am not disposed to do very much to 
suit his [Philippe’s] plans and convenience or let slip the thing I have so strongly 
desired and bought so dearly', Edward is reported to have said urging Philippe and 
his men to look for a better way to reach him.308 Edward’s refusal, as portrayed by 
Froissart, did not detract from the King's honour. In this respect it is interesting to 
note that when relating the same story Robert d’Avesbury claimed that Edward 
accepted Philippe’s request for battle.309 This indicates that not everybody believed 
Edward's refusal to be in keeping with the chivalrous ethos of the day. 
 
In reality the battle never took place, a fact somewhat in opposition to Rogers' view 
that Edward was actively seeking a decisive battle. Frustrated and angry Philippe 
finally gave up and retreated to Tournai while the citizens of Calais surrendered.310 
And again the English king did not immediately react in the manner we would 
                                                 
308 SHF Livre I. Tome IV. § 309. ‘Li rois d' Engleterre, qui bien entendi ceste parolle, fu tantost 
consilliés et avisés de respondre, et respondi et dit: "Signeur, j’ay bien entendu tout ce que vous 
me requerés de par mon adversaire, qui tient mon droit hiretage à tort, don’t il me poise. Se li 
dirés de par mi, se il vous plaist, que je suis ci endroit, et y ay demoret, depuis que je y vinc, 
priès d’un an. Tout ce a il bien sceu; et y fust bien venus plus tost, se il volsist. Mais il m’a ci 
laissiet demorer si longuement que jou ay grossement despendu dou mien. Et y pense avoir 
tant fait que assés temprement je serai sires de le ville et dou chastiel de Calais. Si ne sui mies 
consilliés dou tout faire à sa devise et se aise, ne d’eslongier ce que je pense à avoir conquis et 
que j’ay tant desiret et comparet. Se li disés, se ilz ne ses gens ne poeent par là passer, si voisent 
autour pour querir la voie’. 
 
309 See Robert of Avesbury: De gestis mirabilibus regis Edwardi Tertii, ed. Edward Maunde 
Thompson. London, Rolls Series, 1889. Froissart based his description on Jean le Bel’s account 
and the refusal is related in both Chronique Normande du XIVe siècle, ed. A. and E. Molinier. Paris 
1882 and La Chronographia. 
 
310 SHF Livre I. Tome IV. § 310 - 11. 
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expect of this 'most chivalrous king'. After Calais had been taken Froissart describes 
how Edward was reluctant to spare the remaining citizens and noblemen of the 
town.311 When Sir Jean de Vienne, the town’s commander, asked permission to leave, 
Edward failed to grant his request and Vienne was forced to plead his case to Sir 
Walter Manny. Pointing out that the French defenders had served the King of France 
in accordance with their honour and duty, in the same manner as Manny would 
have done had the roles been reversed, de Vienne was able to persuade Manny to 
plead their case to Edward.312  
 
However, in spite of the fact that de Vienne's request was clearly a chivalrous one, 
Edward was not readily moved on this occasion and, according to Froissart, Sir 
Walter Manny had to ‘reason with the King’ by pointing out that his refusal could 
have detrimental effects. Portrayed as speaking fairly frankly, Manny claimed that 
Edward was setting a bad example by refusing to let the noble defenders of Calais 
go. 'Suppose one day you sent us to defend one of your fortresses, we should go less 
cheerfully if you have these people put to death, for then they would do the same to 
us if they had a chance', Manny is reported to have said. 'This argument did much to 
                                                 
311 See SHF Livre I. Tome III. § 262. Edward’s anger and initial wish to put all the inhabitants to 
the sword is also seen in the description of the sack of Caen, but Geoffroy de Harcourt 'wisely' 
showed how the King’s resources would be better spent otherwise.  
 
312 SHF Livre I. Tome IV. § 311. ‘Adonc respondi messires Jehans de Viane et dist: “Ce seroit 
trop dure cose pour nous, se nous consentions ce que vous dittes. Nous sommes un petit de 
chevaliers et d’escuiers qui loyaument à nostre pooir avons servi nostre signeur, ensi comme 
vous feriés le vostre, en samblant cas; et en avons enduré mainte painne et tamainte mesaise. 
Mais ançois en soufferions nous tèle mesaise que onques gens n’endurèrent ne souffrirent la 
parelle, que nous consentissions que li plus petis garçons ou varlés de le ville euist aultre mal 
que li plus grans de nous. Mais nous vous prions que vous voelliés aler par vostre humilité 
devers le roy d’Engleterre, et li priiés que il ait pité de nous: si ferés courtoisie, car nous 
esperons en lui tant de gentillèce que il ara merci de nous" - "Par ma foy, respondi messires  
Gautiers, messire Jehan, je le ferai volentiers. . . ."' 
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soften the King’s heart', says Froissart,' especially when most of his barons supported 
it . . . '313 
 
This sequence, copied by Froissart from Jean le Bel,314 shows clearly that both authors 
believed in lenient treatment of prisoners of war, and especially of the noble 
prisoners. But the account also shows that a valiant knight was not afraid to stand up 
to his king. Loyalty did not preclude frankness. One may suspect that it occasionally 
took a lot of persuasion to make a king, hungry for victory or blinded by rage, to 
change his mind, and Froissart shows how Edward had to be persuaded to spare the 
lives of men on several occasions. However, his intention was probably not to 
portray Edward acting in opposition to the chivalrous ethos, but to show that acting 
in accordance with chivalrous virtues could be hard and challenging, especially if 
one’s own losses had been great or if one had received unfair treatment. Even though 
Edward had to be persuaded to spare the inhabitants of Calais, he gave in when one 
of his trusted councillors pointed out the correct procedure and his initial reluctance 
did not detract from his honour. To be guided to right action by your 'wise' knights 
clearly did not threaten the royal honour.  
 
Edward did not, however, agree to spare all the men of Calais. Six of the most 
prominent burghers would have to give themselves up, and after long deliberations 
six wealthy merchants volunteered, an act clearly admired by Froissart who 
describes the despair of the citizens of Calais in greater detail than le Bel.315 He also 
                                                 
313 SHF Livre I. Tome IV. § 311. ‘Lors de retrest avant li gentilz sires de Mauni et parla moult 
sagement au roy, et dist pour aidier chiaus de Calais: "Monsigneur, vous poriés bien avoir tort, 
car vous nous donnés mauvais exemple. Se vous nous voliiés envoiier en aucunes de vos 
fortèreces, nous n’irions mies si volontiers, se vous faites ces gens mettre à mort, ensi que vous 
dittes, car ensi feroit on de nous en samblant cas." Cilz exemples amolia grandement le corage 
dou roy d'Engleterre, car li plus des barons qui là estoient l'aidièrent à soustentir.’ 
 
314 Jean le Bel: Chronique. SHF. Chapitre LXXX. pp. 161 - 63. 
 
315 SHF Livre I. Tome IV. § 312. 'Quant il furent tout venu et assamblé en le place, hommes et 
femmes, messires Jehans de Viane leur remoustra moult doucement les paroles toutes tèles que 
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names the courageous citizens and portrays how Sir Jean de Vienne praised their 
courage and honour. Stripped to their shirts and breeches, the citizens placed halters 
round their necks and carried with them the keys to the town and the citadel. And 
again, Sir Walter Manny is described to have appealed, asking the King to curb his 
anger. Manny also pointed out that Edward had a reputation for royal clemency and 
urged the King not to perform an act that might tarnish it: ‘If you do not spare these 
men, the world will say that it was a cruel deed and that it was too harsh of you to 
put to death these honourable citizens who have voluntarily thrown themselves on 
your mercy to save the others’.316 
 
Manny is the voice of chivalry, Edward the punishing lord. In Froissart´s text 
punishment was the natural consequence to opposition, and a nobleman or king, had 
the right to determine the fate of lesser men. Everybody recognised Edward’s right 
to chastise the inhabitants of Calais, still the chivalrous code and the quest for 
symbolic capital suggested a less harsh option. In spite of this, it was not until Queen 
Philippa, Froissart´s patroness, pleaded for the six burghers that Edward agreed to 
let them go. Philippa, in the author's opinion, was crucial in restraining the 
implacable justice of the King. As the Virgin Mary interceded with God on behalf of 
mankind, so it was thought right and proper for a queen to intercede with the king 
on behalf of the commoners. According to Froissart, the townsmen received new 
                                                                                                                                                        
chi avant sont recitées, et leur dist bien que aultrement ne pooit estre, et euissent sur ce avis et 
brief response. Quant il oïrent ce raport, il commencièrent tout à criier et à plorer telement et si 
amerement qu'il ne fust nulz si durs coers ou monde, se il les veist et oïst yaus demener, qui 
n'en euist pité, et n'eurent en l'eure pooir de respondre ne de parler.' 
 
316 SHF Livre I. Tome IV. § 312. 'Adonc parla messires Gautiers de Mauni et dist: Ha! gentilz 
sires, voeilliés rafrener vostre corage. Vous avés le nom et le renommée de souverainne 
gentillèce et noblèce. Or ne voelliés donc faire cose par quoi elle soit noient amenrie, ne que on 
puist parler sur vous en nulle manière villainne. Se vous n’aves pité de ces gens, toutes aultres 
gens diront que ce sera grant cruaultès, se vous faites morir ces honnestes bourgeois, qui de 
leur proper volonté sont mis en vostre merci pour les aultres sauver.' 
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clothes and an ample dinner in Philippa's chambers before they were escorted into 
safety. 
 
 The French knights of the town, ‘who were gentlemen’ and according to Froissart 
'could be trusted on their word', were sent off and the rest of the population were 
sent out of Calais to seek their fortune elsewhere.317 It was a great pity to see these 
great and noble burgers and their beautiful children leave the city of their ancestors, 
says Froissart, who also says that the burghers received no compensation from the 
King of France, for whose sake they had lost everything.318 Froissart also states that 
Edward wanted to populate Calais with ‘pure-blooded English’,319 a rather puzzling 
comment given the fact that the retinue of the English king was made up of men of 
various nationalities; English, Normans and Gascons.320 It should also be noted that 
the comment is not found in le Bel's account of the same events.321  
 
According to Jules Viard and Eugene Déprez, editors of the SHF edition of Jean le 
Bel's chronicle, it is not true that Philippe failed to compensate the burghers of 
                                                 
317 SHF Livre I. Tome IV. § 313. ' . . .li rois d' Engleterre . . . leur dist: " . . . Et préndes tous les 
chevaliers qui laiens sont et les metés en prison, ou faites leur jurer et fiancier prison; ils sont 
gentil homme: je les recrerai bien sus leur fois." ' 
 
318 SHF Livre I. Tome IV. § 314. 'Or me samble que c'est grans annuis de piteusement penser et 
ossi considerer que cil grant bourgeois et ces nobles bourgeoises et leurs biaus enfans, qui 
d'estoch et d'estracion avoient demoret, et leur ancisseur, en le ville de Calais, devindrent: des 
quelz il y avoit grant fuison au jour quelle fu conquise. Ce fu grans pités, quant il leur couvint 
guerpir leurs biaus hostelz et leurs avoirs, car riens n'en portèrent; et si n' en eurent oncques 
restorier ne recouvrier dou roy de France, pour qui il avoit tour perdu.' 
 
319 SHF Livre I. Tome IV. § 313. ' . . .li rois d' Engleterre . . . leur dist: ". . .Et tous aultres 
saudoiiers, qui sont là venu pour gaegnier leur argent, faites les partir simplement, et tout le 
demorant de le ville, hommes et femmes et enfans, car je voeil la ville repeupler de purs 
Englès." ' 
 
320 In fact, compared to contemporary texts, like for instance Le Chronique des quatre premiers 
Valois, Froissart is not very nationalistic. See Chronique des quatres premiers Valois, ed. S. Luce. 
Paris 1862. In this later work, the enemy was predominantly the English. 
 
321 Jean le Bel: Chronique. SHF. Chapitre LXXX. pp. 167 - 69. 
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Calais, but conferred various offices and rights upon them.322 In fact, says Geoffroy 
Brereton, many of the burghers of Calais were either not dispossessed or re-admitted 
into Calais after a few weeks, a scenario which seems more in accordance with the 
traditional procedure in these matters.323 Eustache de Saint Pierre, one of the six 
honourable burghers willing to give their life for the rest of the inhabitants, is 
confirmed to have been given a post of special responsibility and to have kept his 
possessions in Calais, says Brereton.  
 
However, both le Bel and Froissart make a point out Philippe's alleged lack of 
restitution to the citizens of Calais.  The reason for this is clear in le Bel's case - 
throughout his account his tone is hostile and condemning towards Philippe and 
favourable towards 'le noble roy Edouard'. However, the reason why Froissart chose 
to include the allegations, if they were not true, is far less apparent. Although 
seemingly far more positive towards Philippe, it could be that he too found 
Philippe's failure to come to the rescue of Calais to detract from the symbolic capital 
of the French king. 
 
Although his luck in battle was not greater, Philippe's son, John, should gain a better 
reputation for chivalry than his father, as we shall see in Froissart´s description of the 
battle of Poitiers.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
322 See Jean le Bel: Chronique. SHF. Chapitre LXXX. pp. 169. Note 1. and Molinier, M: Cabinet 
historique.1878, pp. 254-289. ‘Documents relatifs aux Calaisiens expulsés par Edouard III’.   
 
323 The Chronicles of Jean Froissart. ed. and trans. Brereton, Geoffrey. London 1968. p. 110. 
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3.3. The defeat at Poitiers 
 
As stated by Froissart in his evaluation of the battle of Crécy, Valois monarchy was 
gravely weakened in 'honour, force and council' by the events in 1346 - 7.324 
However, it should take another eight years before the English, this time led by the 
young prince Edward, should meet the French king, John II, in battle again.325 'Like 
the Crécy campaign of 1346, the Poitiers chevauchée has often been interpreted as 
"nothing but the razzia of a ravenous pirate", a simple booty-collecting expedition 
rather than the execution of a strategic plan aimed at obtaining a decisive political 
result,' says Clifford Rogers pointing to the treatment of the campaign by various 
modern historians.326 This, he says, was not the case. Still, the opinion that the battle 
of Poitiers was a battle, which difficult circumstances constrained the prince to fight, 
is more credible than the corresponding case for 1346, he says, pointing to his 
previous analysis of the Crécy campaign as a provocation in order to bring the Valois 
to decisive battle. 
 
In Froissart´s account it is by no means clear that the Prince was actively seeking to 
provoke John of France into battle. On the contrary, Froissart's description supports 
the view that the Prince was trying to escape back to his lands in Aquitaine after a 
long pillaging raid. However, the Prince's campaign in Languedoc in 1355 is 
certainly described as being intended to provoke Count Jean d' Armagnac into going 
against him. According to Froissart, several towns and cities were sacked and 
                                                 
324 SHF Livre I. Tome III. § 284. 'Vous devés savoir que la desconfiture et la perte pour les 
François fu moult grande et moult horrible . . . par lesquelz li royaumes de France fu moult 
depuis afoiblis d'onneur, de poissance et de conseil.' 
 
325 One of the most obvious reasons why this took so long was that Black Death struck England 
in 1348. 
 
326 Rogers Clifford J.: War cruel and Sharp. English strategy under Edward III, 1327 - 1360. 
Woodbridge 2000. pp. 348 - 49. 
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pillaged, and men, women and children killed.327 However, Armagnac did not come 
out to meet the Prince, and the ravaging campaign continued undisturbed.328 
According to the author, the Prince and his men moved forward in good military 
order in the same manner as his father had done before him ten years earlier.329 
Moving through the prosperous region of Berry, they took towns and castles, 
prisoners and supplies in quantity. And what they did not take, they burnt, the 
author states, again without condemnation. 
 
Hearing of the ravaging of his realm, the King of France, John, who at this point was 
laying siege to Breteuil,330 had a great wish to go against the English, says Froissart, 
and quickly left the siege. At Chartres, he gathered a new and larger army, and 
started reinforcing the garrisons of various fortresses.331 However, when news of 
John's decisive moves reached the Prince, he was not discouraged, but took council 
with his men and decided to continue the raids in Touraine and Poitou 'before 
                                                 
327 SHF Livre I. Tome IV. § 357 - 59. In his book on Charles V, Roland Delachanal stated that this 
ravaging raid was void of strategic consideration, with no other goal than ruining the country 
through which the English army passed. According to Rogers, this was not the case. The 
campaign was inteneded as political theater, albeit theater of a particulary brutal and bloody 
kind. By his actions, Edward the Black Prince was making an announcement to all Frenchmen, 
that, even if they lived far from the normal conflict zones, John could not protect them, says 
Rogers. See Delachenal, Roland: Histoire de Charles V. Paris 1909 p. 126. and Rogers Clifford J.: 
War cruel and Sharp. English strategy under Edward III, 1327 - 1360. Woodbridge 2000. p. 313. 
 
328 SHF Livre I. Tome IV. § 357. 'Et se trouvoient bien de communaulté quarante mil hommes, 
qui estoient en grant volonté de issir hors et de combatre les Englès; mes li contes d' Ermignach 
leur deffendoit et leur aloit au devant. Et disoit que, si il issoient hors, il s' iroient tout perdre.' 
 
329 SHF Livre I. Tome IV. § 370: 'Si chevauçoient li dis princes et cil signeur et leurs gens 
ordonneement, et passèrent la rivière de Garonne à Bregerach, et puis oultre, en venant en 
Roerge, le rivière de Durdonne. Si entrèrent en ce pays de Roerge, et commencièrent à guerriier 
fortement, à rançonner villes et chastiaus ou ardoir, à prendre gens, à trouver pourveances 
grandes et grosses, car li pays estoit lors pourveus, et demoroit tout brisiet et essillet derrière 
yaus.' 
 
330 Breteuil was a stronghold of Charles the Bad, King of Navarre, who had rival claims to the 
French throne. 
 
331 SHF Livre I. Tome V. § 371. 
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heading back to Bordeaux from where they came', a comment which can be seen to 
imply that the Prince was in fact trying to escape the French army.332 When news of 
the Prince's flight reached the King of France, the King pressed on, 'fearing that the 
Prince should escape him before he could bring him to battle', says the author.333  The 
Prince's army on their side knew nothing of the whereabouts of the French, but was, 
at one point able to take some French prisoners who informed them that the French 
were ahead of them rather than behind. Realising that they could not leave the 
district without fighting, the Prince halted in the fields and gave orders that no one 
should ride ahead of the Marshal’s banner, an order that was strictly observed, 
according to the chronicler.334 The English then continued towards Poitiers and a 
reconnoitring force was sent out to observe the French.  
 
John of France was pleased to hear that his enemies where behind him and not 
ahead, says the author, and started organising his troops and preparing for battle the 
next morning.335 The French army was divided into three divisions, each numbering 
around 16,000 men, and four knights were sent out to reconnoitre the English 
force.336 One of these, Sir Eustace de Ribemont, is said to have reported back that 
they estimated the English numbers at two thousand men-at-arms, four thousand 
                                                 
332 SHF Livre I. Tome V. § 372. 'Si eut li dis princes conseil qu'il se metteroit au retour et 
passeroit parmi Touraine et Poiti, et revendroit, tout en guerriant, ardant et essillant le pays, à 
Bourdiaus dont il s'estoit partis.' 
 
333 SHF Livre I. Tome V. § 376.'Nouvelles vinrent au roy de France, que li princes de Galles se 
hastoit durement pour retourner ens ou pays dont il estoit partis. Si se doubta li dis rois que il 
ne li escapast, ce que il n'euist nullement volentiers veu, tant le desiroit il à combatre.' 
 
334 SHF Livre I. Tome V. § 377. 'Quant li princes de Galles et ses consaulz eurent entendu que li 
rois Jehans et ses batailles estoient devant yaus . . . et que nullement il ne se pooient partir dou 
pays, sans estre combatu, si se recuillièrent et rassamblèrent ce samedi sus les camps. Et fu 
adonc commandé de par le prince, que nuls, sus la teste, ne courust ne chevauçast sans 
commandement devant la banière des mareschaus.' 
 
335 SHF Livre I. Tome V. § 377. 'Quant li rois entendi que si ennemi, que tant desiroit à trouver, 
estoient derrière de lui et non devant, si en fu durement et grandement resjoïs; et retourna tout 
à un fais et fist retourner toutes manières de gens boen avant sus les camps et yaus là logier.' 
 
336 SHF Livre I. Tome V. § 378. 
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archers and fifteen hundred light-armed men. When inquiring how the English 
troops were disposed, John, according to Froissart, was well informed of the strong 
position of his opponent: ‘Although we are convinced that they have only one 
division, it is extremely skilfully placed’, Sir Eustace is reported to have stated. When 
asked by the King to give his advice as to the proceedings Sir Eustache is said to 
have replied that the best course of action would be 'with everyone on foot, except 
for three hundred of the most vigorous and experienced knights in your army, 
mounted on first rate horses, to break through those archers and scatter them. And 
then your formations of men-at-arms would follow quickly and engage their men-at-
arms hand-to-hand.'337  
 
As we may see above Froissart has chosen to relate the tactics of the French army in 
the dialogue between John and Sir Eustache. These preliminary events occupy a 
substantial place in the narrative and are vital to our understanding of what follows. 
‘When the King’s forces were mustered and armed, with each commander among 
his men under his own banner, and each fully aware of the part he had to play, 
orders were given for everyone to dismount, except those who had been chosen by 
the Marshals to break through the archers,' says the author. These orders were 
obeyed to the letter, for everyone accepted them as right and proper . . .’.338 
                                                 
337 SHF Livre I. Tome V. § 379. 'Adonc respondi messires Eustasses de Ribeumont, si com je fui 
enfourmés, pour tous, . . . et dist ensi: "Sire, nous avons veu et considerés vos ennemis: si 
poeent estre par estimation doi mil hommes d'armes, quatre mil arciers et quinze cens brigans." 
- "Et comment gisent il?" dist li rois. - "Sire, respondi, messires Eustasses, il sont en très fort lieu, 
et ne poons veoir ne imaginer qu'il n'aient fait que une bataille; mès trop bellement et trop 
sagement l'ont il ordonné. . . . " Adonc parla li rois et dist: "Messires Eustasse, et comment y 
conseilleriés vous à aler et combatre?" Dont respondi li chevaliers et dist: "Sire, tout à piet, 
excepté trois cens armeures de fier des vostres, tout de plus apers, hardis, durs, fors et 
entrependans de vostre host, bien armés et bien montés sus fleurs de coursiers, pour 
desrompre et ouvrir ces arciers, et puis vos batailles et gens d'armes vistement sievir tout à piet 
et venir à ces gens d'arms, main à main, et yaus combatre de grant volenté. C'est tous li 
consaulz que de mon avis je y puis donner ne imaginer; et qui mieulz y scet, se le die." ' 
 
338 SHF Livre I. Tome V. § 380. 'Quant les batailles dou roy de France furent toutes ordonnées et 
appareillies, et cescuns sires desous se banière et entre ses gens, et savoit ossi cescuns quel cose 
il devoit faire, on fist commendement, de par le roy, que cescuns alast à piet, excepté cil qui 
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With their battle-plan in order, the French were ready to advance. However, at the 
very moment the French troops were about start moving, the Cardinal of Perigord 
came riding up, asking to be heard, says Froissart.339 The Cardinal wanted to make 
an attempt to negotiate between the two parties, a request the King of France agreed 
to.340 Against the advice of Sir Eustace de Ribemont, who as we have seen, had made 
the initial battle-plan, the Cardinal managed to get the French king to agree to a one-
day truce. The Cardinal 'begged and exhorted the King so fervently that he 
eventually gave in', says Froissart.341 However, on the English side the truce was very 
welcome, he says, not because they feared the battle, but ‘because they were 
continually improving their dispositions and their battle-plan’.342 What the English 
feared the most, says Froissart (and le Bel)343 was to be hemmed in so closely that 
they could not send out foragers, and compared to the French, the English were 
getting low on food. It is fair to say, says the author, that the English feared battle 
                                                                                                                                                        
ordonné estoient avoecques les mareschaus pour ouvrir et fendre les arciers, et que tout cil qui 
lance avoient le retaillassent au volume de cinq piés: par quoi on s'en peuist le mieus aidier, et 
que tout ossi ostassent leurs esporons. Ceste ordonance fu tenue et fu à tout homme belle et 
bonne.' 
 
339 SHF Livre I. Tome V. § 380. 'Ensi que il devoient approcier et estoient par samblant en grant 
volenté de requerre leurs ennemis, evous le cardinal the Pieregorch qui vient ferant battant 
devers le roy, . . . , et  encline le roy moult bas en cause d'umilité et le prie à mains jointes, pour 
si hault homme que Diex est, que il voelle astenir et afrener un petit tant qu'il ait parlé à lui.' 
 
340 Pope Inncoent VI had sent the cardinal of Perigord and the cardinal of Urgel to France to try 
to make peace between the King of France and his enemies, says Froissart, and especially the 
King of Navarre whom the King of France had imprissoned.  See SHF Livre I.Tome V. § 375. 
 
341 SHF Livre I. Tome V. § 380. 'Mès finablement li dis cardinaulz qui s'en ensonnioit, en espesse 
de bien, pria tant et preeça le roy de France que li rois s'i assenti et donna et acorda le respit à 
surer le dimence tout le jour et l'endemain jusques soleil levant.' 
 
342 SHF Livre I. Tome V. § 380. 'Et le raporta ensi li dis cardinaulz moult vistement au prince et à 
ses gens, qui n'en furent mies courouciet, pour tant que toutdis s'efforcoient il d' avis et 
d'ordenance.' 
 
343 Jean le Bel: Chronique. SHF. Tome II. Chapitre XCIV. p. 236.  
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less than being pinned down where they were and starved out like a beleaguered 
garrison.344 
 
Although the Prince offered to restore to the King of France everything he had taken 
on his campaign, both towns and castles, to hand over all his prisoners and to swear 
not to take up arms against France for the next seven years, the French would not 
give in to the proposal, according to Froissart.345 Knowing that the English could 
neither retreat nor escape, John wanted a hundred English knights, including the 
Prince and his closest followers, to surrender unconditionally, a suggestion which 
the Prince and his council would never have accepted, says Froissart.346 Although a 
pitched battle against a superior force was clearly feared, complete surrender would 
have been too dishonourable and dangerous, at least in this case. When the 
negotiations failed both parties were ready to fight, and Froissart relates how the 
English made some minor alterations to their battle-order and tactics, before the 
Prince gave two of his knights, James Audley and Eustace d’Aubrecicourt 
permission to make the first attack on the enemy:347 
 
                                                 
344 SHF Livre I. Tome V. § 382: 'Che dimence se tinrent li François tout le jour sus les camps, et 
au soir il se retraisent en leurs logeis et se aisièrent de ce qu'il eurent. Il avoient bien de quoi, 
vivres et pourveances assés et largement; et li Englès en avoient grant defaute. C'estoit la cause 
qui plus les esbahissoit; car il ne savoient où ne quel part aler fourer, si fort leur estoient li pas 
clos; ne il ne se pooient partir de là sans le dangier des François. Au voir dire, il ne 
ressongnoient point tant le bataille que il faisoient ce que on ne les tenist en tel estat, ensi que 
pour assegiés et affamés.' 
 
345 SHF Livre I. Tome V. § 380. 'Et me furent dit jadis des gens le dit cardinal de Pieregorch, qui 
là furent present et qui bien en cuidoient sçavoir aucune cose, que li princes offroit à rendre au 
roy de France tout ce qui conquis avoit en ce voiage, villes et chastiaus, et quitter tout 
prisonniers que il ne ses gens avoient pris, et jurer à lui non armer contre le royaume de France 
sept ans tous entiers.' As we may see, the Prince and his men must have believed that they 
could not win over the French superior force. 
 
346 SHF Livre I. Tome V. § 380. ' . . . lequel trettiet li princes de Galles ne ses consaulz n'euissent 
jmais acordet.' 
 
347 SHF Livre I. Tome V. § 384. 
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Messire James d'Audelée, en le garde de ses quatre escuiers et 
l'espée en le main, si com ci dessus est dit, estoit ou premier 
fronch de ceste bataille, . . . , et là faisoit merveillez d'armes. Et 
s'en vint par grant vaillance combatre desous le banière de 
monsigneur d' Audrehem, marescal de France, un moult hardi 
et vaillant chevalier; et se combatirent grant temps ensamble. . . 
Là eut grant froisseis et grant bouteis, et maint homme reversé 
par terre. Là escrioient li aucun chevalier et escuier de France, 
qui par tropiaus se combatoient: "Monjoie! Saint Denis!" et li 
Englès: "Saint Jorge! Giane!" Là estoit entre yaus grandement 
proèce remoustrée; car il n'i avoit si petit qui ne vausist un bon 
homme d'armes. . . . Et y avinrent trop plus de biaus fais 
d'armes sans comparison que il ne fesissent à Creci, comment 
que tant de grans chiés de pays n'i furent mies mort, que il 
furent à Creci. Bien est verités que plusieurs bon chevalier et 
escuier, quoique leur signeur se partesissent, ne se voloient mies 
partir, mès euissent plus chier à morir que fuite fust reprocie . . . 
Et se acquittèrent si loyaument envers leur signeur tout cil qui 
demorèrent à Poitiers, mort ou pris, que encore en sont li hoir à 
honnourer, et li vaillant homme qui là se combatirent, à 
recommender.348 
 
  
In this way began the battle of Poitiers, where the French against all odds were so 
badly beaten and their king taken. As we may see in the very abbreviated account 
above, Froissart enhances the prodigies of valour that were performed by what he 
perceives as 'worthy men-at-arms'. Although some of the great lords left the battle, 
                                                 
348 SHF Livre I. Tome V. § 385 - 89 
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their men stayed behind, preferring death to dishonourable flight, he says. 
According to Froissart there were incomparably more fine feats of arms at Poitiers 
than at Crécy although not so many great lords were killed, a comment that shows 
that the author compared the two battles when he evaluated the battle. 'All who fell 
at Poitiers or were taken prisoner did their duty so loyally to their king that their 
heirs are still honoured for it and the gallant men who fought there are held in 
perpetual esteem', states the chronicler.349 One of the men however, deserved 
particular recommendation, in Froissart´s opinion: John of France, Tucoo-Chala’s 
idealist, who remained on the field from beginning to end, 'like the brave knight and 
stout fighter he was'.350 Being determined never to retreat, he stood in the forefront 
of his men, says Froissart. 
 
The passage quoted above captures the essence of what we generally perceive today 
as chivalrous warfare and revokes numerous other descriptions from the Middle 
Ages, like Bértrand de Born’s appraisal of the beauty of war351 and the author of 
L'Histoire de Guillaume le Maréchal’s description of his hero’s honourable behaviour 
                                                 
349 SHF Livre I. Tome V. § 388. 'Et si acquittèrent si loyaument envers leur signeur tout cil qui 
demorèrent à Poitiers, mort ou oris, que encore en sont li hoir à honourer, et li vaillant homme 
qui là se combatirent, à recommender.' 
 
350 SHF Livre I. Tome V. § 388. ' . . . on ne poet pas dire ne presumer que li rois Jehans de France 
s'effreast onques pour cose que il oist ne veist; mès demora et fu toutdis bons chevaliers et bien 
combatants, et ne moustra pas samblant de fuir ne de reculer . . .' 
 
351 de Born, Bértrand.: The poems of the Troubadour Bertran de Born ed. W.D. Paden, T . Sankovitch 
and P.H. Stablein. Berkeley 1986. '. . . I love to see, amidst the meadows, tents and pavilions 
spread; and it gives me great joy to see, drawn up on the field, knights and horses in battles 
array; and it delights me when the scouts scatter people and herds in their path; and I love to 
see them followed by a great body of men-at-arms; and my heart is filled with gladness when I 
see strong castles besieged, and the stockades broken and overwhelmed, and the warriors on 
the bank, girt about by fosses, with a line of strong stakes, interlaced . . . Maces, swords, helms 
of different hues, shields that will be riven and shattered as soon as the fight begins; and many 
vassals struck down together; and the horses of the dead and the wounded roving at random. 
And when battled is joined, let all men of good lineage think of naught but the breaking of 
head and arms; for it is better to die than to be vanquished and live. I tell you, I find no such 
savour in food, or in wine or in sleep.' 
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and bold fighting at the battle of Drincourt.352 Still, it is perhaps not the descriptions 
of the personal prowess, but the lack of bias in the account and the descriptions of 
noblemen honouring their opponents that bear witness to Froissart´s great reverence 
for chivalrous values and his understanding of the principle that real honour was 
obtained through overcoming a 'worthy' enemy. This is of course especially seen in 
Froissart's description of the dinner scene after the battle, discussed in the previous 
chapter. 
 
However, as we have also seen, displays of prowess only make up parts of 
Froissart´s account. Froissart´s description of the battle–site and the placement, 
disposition and plans of the two parties reveals that war, in Froissart's opinion, was 
so much more than the actual fighting between noblemen. Although he relates how 
men like James Audley and Arnould d'Audrehem were able to perform glorious 
deeds of arms, he also relates long and detailed discussions about battle-dispositions 
and plans. Froissart´s desire to analyse the causes of the defeat is also seen in his final 
evaluation of the battle where he claims that in spite of the French defeat, the battle 
of Poitiers was better fought than the battle of Crécy, and not solely because there 
were more fine feats of arms being performed. ‘Both armies had greater 
opportunities to observe and weigh up the enemy, for the battle of Crécy began 
without proper preparation in the late afternoon, while Poitiers began in the early 
morning, and in good enough order, if only luck had been with the French’, states 
the author.353 In addition, the description of how John abandoned Sir Eustace de 
                                                 
352 HGM Verses 886 – 1106. ‘ . . . The Marshal, whose lance was broken, took the sword in his 
hand an inspired all his companions to bravery . . . The heralds and minstrels started 
proclaiming his valiant behaviour . . . The Marshal did not stop to fight until the Flemish 
sergeants had put an iron hook through his shoulder. They were thirty to get him off his horse, 
but the horse died. The burghers who saw the Marshal’s hardiness, regained their spirit . . . 
One said that the Marshal had kept all at bay’. (My translation) 
 
353 SHF Livre I. Tome V. § 388. 'Mais au voir dire, la bataille de Poitiers fu trop mieulz combatue 
que ceste de Creci, et eurent toutes manières de gens d'armes, mieulz loisir de aviser et 
considerer leurs ennemis, que il n'euissent à Creci; car la ditte bataille de Creci commença au 
 117
Ribemont’s initial battle-plan under the pressure of the Cardinal of Perigord 
functions in an explanatory way. Had the Cardinal not interfered and thus given the 
English less time to organise, de Ribemont’s plan might have worked and the French 
could have been victorious. 
 
There can be no doubt that Froissart perceived both Edward the Black Prince and 
John the Good of France as men with great symbolic capital who lived their lives in 
accordance with the chivalrous ideal. However, in Froissart's account these great 
men were not merely courteous, generous and valiant, able to inspire their men to 
fight for their cause. He also portrays them as men who planned their battles 
carefully and cunningly with the help of their foremost magnates. In the case of the 
Prince, Froissart also shows how this 'Flower of Chivalry' tried to escape from the 
French army, having ravaged and pillaged the French countryside. Although the 
Prince's actions may have been misunderstood by Froissart and indeed was intended 
to provoke John into battle, the account still indicates that in Froissart´s view there 
was no discrepancy between the chivalrous ideal and the actions of the Prince. 'If the 
strategy that led to victory involved destroying the reputation and revenue of one's 
enemy by burning and destroying the land, property and persons of non-combatants 
then this was, by definition, chivalrous,' states David Green in the introduction to his 
book about the battle.354  
 
Similarly to Froissart´s description of Gaston Fébus, the ideals and values the author 
propagates in the descriptions of 'chivalrous' warfare are far more complex than we 
may have expected, and he also shows a clear willingness to 'explain' how and why 
the events unfolded as they did. This impression is further enhanced if we look at 
                                                                                                                                                        
vespre tout tart, sans arroi et sans ordenance, et ceste de Poitiers matin, à heure de prime, et 
assés par bon couvenant, se eur y euist eu pour les François.' 
 
354 Green, David: The battle of Poitiers 1356. Stroud 2002. p. 14. 
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Froissart´s account of the later development in the war between the English and the 
French.  
 
In 1369 the peace between England and France was broken, and the French, led by 
Bértrand du Guesclin attacked and captured fortresses in Aquitaine. At one point they 
also laid siege to Limoges, and according to Froissart, du Guesclin was able to 
negotiate so skilfully with the Black Prince's commander, the Bishop of Limoges that 
the town went over to the French side.355 This enraged the Black Prince who by this 
point was suffering from the illness, which was to cause his death. Although unable to 
ride a horse, he was still able to order the attack on Limoges. However, having 
thoroughly examined the fortifications and the number of armed men in the town, 
says Froissart, the Prince recognised that they would not be able to take it by assault. 
Consequently, a different tactic was put into operation, he says, and a team of miners 
were ordered to dig under the city wall.356 Eventually, the mines were set on fire 
bringing a large part of the walls surrounding the city down.  
 
The massacre that followed was clearly lamented by Froissart: 
 
Là eut grant pité; car hommes, femmes et enfans se jettoient en 
genoulz devant le prince et crioient 'Merci, gentilz sires, merci!' 
Mais il estoit si enflammés d'aïr que point n'i entendoit, ne nuls 
ne nulle n'estoit oïs, mès tout mis à l'espée, quanques on 
trouvoit et encontroit, cil et celles qui point coupable n'i 
                                                 
355 SHF Livre I. Tome VII  § 663. 'Tantost il [du Guesclin] commença à aherdre les trettiés qui 
estoient entamé entre l'evesque de Limoges et chiaus de le cité et le duc de Berri, et les 
poursuivi si songneusement et si sagement qu'il se fisent et se tournerèrent françois.' 
 
356 SHF Livre I. Tome VII.  § 663. 'Au dire voire, quant li princes et si mareschal eurent bien 
imaginé et consideré le circuité et le force de Limoges, et il sceurent le nombre de gentilz 
hommes qui dedens estoient, si disent bien que par assaut il ne l'aroient jamais. Lors jeuèrent il 
d'un aultre avis, et menoit par usage toutdis li princes avoeuch lui en ses chavaucies grant 
fuision de huirons c'on dist mineurs. Chil furent tantost en oevre mis et commnecièrent à miner 
efforciement par grant ordenance.' 
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estoient; ne je ne sçai comment il n'avoient pité des povres gens 
qui n'estoient mies tailliet de faire nulle trahison; mais cil le 
comparoient et comparèrent plus que li grant mestre qui 
l'avoient fait. Il n'est si durs coers, se il fust adonc à Limoges et il 
li souvenist de Dieu, qui ne plorast tenrement dou grant 
meschief qui y estoit, car plus de trois mil personnes, hommes, 
femmes et enfans, y furent deviiet et decolet celle journée. Dieu 
en ait les ames, car ils furent bien martir!'357  
 
Many scholars have seen the massacre of Limoges as one of the foremost examples of 
the 'gap' that had opened up between chivalrous ideals and practices, and it has also 
been argued that Froissart in spite of his lamentations did not fully fathom the extent 
of the tragedy, because he also relates how the Black Prince stopped to watch the 
valiant fighting between the English and some of the French noblemen.358 The French 
knights finally surrendered and were granted mercy while the massacre of the 
townspeople continued unchecked. However, although the juxtaposition of the scene 
were the inhabitants of Limoges pled for mercy and the scene were the Prince 
admires the skilful fighting of his men may seem a little tasteless for a modern 
reader, I believe that the criticism of Froissart's description of the events at Limoges 
is too harsh.  
 
Numerous scenes related by Froissart in his chronicles support the view that he 
believed clemency to be an essential part of the qualities a good nobleman should 
possess, and, as we may see above, he clearly expresses the view that he could not 
understand how the Prince could fail to take pity on the inhabitants of Limoges. The 
                                                 
357 SHF Livre I. Tome VII.  § 666. 
 
358 Kilgour, Raymond L.: The Decline of Chivalry as shown in the French literature of the Late Middle 
Ages. Cambridge, Massachusetts 1937. pp. 66 - 68. 
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actions of the Prince clearly detracted from his symbolic capital, although the author 
seems unable to outright condemn him. However, it should be noted that the picture 
we get of the Prince in the last part of Book I is more negative than we may have 
expected. When relating the relations between the Prince and one of his vassals, the 
Lord of Labreth, Froissart states that the prince was 'very haughty . . . and always 
expected his vassals to agree with him', a portrayal which seems far removed from 
the humble youngster serving at the French king's table359 According to Richard 
Vernier, also other sources bespeaks the deterioration of the Prince's vaunted 
chivalry and fading status in the eyes of contemporaries.360 
 
In France, says Froissart, the news of the destruction of the city of Limoges was 
received with anger and dismay, and it was decided that what was needed was a 
military commander 'un cief et gouvreneur nommé constable'. As already related, 
the man appointed to the office was Bértrand du Guesclin, a man who should adopt 
a completely different and more pragmatic attitude when it came to waging war on 
the English.361 Having learned from their mistakes, says Froissart, the French were 
not so easily provoked when Edward III, after the Treaty of Brétigny, sent his other 
son, John of Gaunt, to Picardy where he and his men started terrorizing the 
countryside. ‘The English plainly showed that they desired nothing more than to 
engage the French in battle’, says Froissart, but the King of France, doubtful of the 
result, and set on avoiding more disastrous defeats, would not permit his men to 
                                                 
359 SHF Livre I. Tome VI  § 559. 'Veci auques le première fondation de la hayne qui fu entre le 
prince de Galles et le signeur de Labreth. Et en fu adonce li sires de Labreth en grant peril, car 
le prince estoit durement garns et haus de courage et crueulz en son aïr, et voloit, fust à tort, 
fust à droit, que tout signeur asquelz il pooit commander tenissent de lui.' 
 
360 Vernier, Richard: The Flower of Chivalry. Bértrand du Guesclin and the Hundred Years War. 
Woodbridge 2003. pp. 145 - 50. Vernier rightly argues that the author of the Anonimalle 
chronicle cannot be suspected of pro-French symphaties. 
 
361 SHF Livre I. Tome VI  § 668. 
 
 121
fight and decided instead to have the English followed.362 Although the forces did 
eventually engage in minor fights outside Ribemont and Ouchy, both to the 
disadvantage of the English, the French did not attack.363  
 
This passive strategy, says Froissart, was criticised by several French noblemen who 
felt that the nobility was failing its duty by not bringing the English to open battle.364 
However, the Constable of France, Bértrand du Guesclin, did not share this view. In 
a discussion with the King and his council, du Guesclin stated that he only wanted to 
fight the English if the French were in a position of advantage - 'as they know how to 
do so well and have done so often . . .'365 Du Guesclin's view was, according to 
Froissart, shared by another great noble, Olivier de Clisson,366 and the advise of the 
                                                 
362 SHF Livre I. Tome 8. § 740. 
 
363 SHF Livre I. Tome 8. § 744. 
 
364 SHF Livre I. Tome 8. § 743. ' . . . car plusieur baron et chevalier dou royaume de France et 
consaulz des bonnes villes murmuroient l'un à l'autre et disoient en puble que c'estoit grans 
inconveniens et grans vitupères pour les nobles dou royaume de France, où tant baron, 
chevalier et escuier dont la poissance est si renommée, quant il laissoient ensi passer les Englès 
à leur aise, et point n'estoient combatu, et que de ce blasme il estoient vituperé par tout le 
monde.' 
 
365 SHF Livre I. Tome 8. § 744. 'Si parla par l'amendement d'yaus tous . . . et dist au roy: "Sire, 
tout chil qui parollent des Englès combatre, ne regardent mies le peril où il en poeent venir, 
non que je die nullement que il ne soient combatu, mais je voeil que ce soit à nostre avantage, 
ensi que bien le scevent prendre, quant il leur touche; et l'ont plusieurs fois eu à Creci, à 
Poitiers, en Gascongne, en Bretagne, en Bourgongne, en France, en Pikardie, et en Normendie, 
les queles victores ont trop grandement adamagié vostre royaume et les nobles qui y sont; et les 
ont tant enorgueillis que il ne prisent ne amirent nulle nation fors la peur, par les grans 
raençons que il en ont pris et eus, de quoi il sont enrichi et enhardi.' 
 
366 SHF Livre I. Tome 8. § 744. 'Li sires de Cliçon . . . porta grant couleur au connestable, en 
disant que il consilloit bien le roy et moult loyaument, et tantost i mist raison pour quoi: " . . . 
De mon petit avis, je ne conseille pas que on les combate, se il ne sont pris à meschief, ensi 
qu'on doit prendre son ennemi. Je regarde que les besongnes dou royaume de France sont 
maintenant en grant estat, et que ce que que li Englès y ont tenu par soutieument guerriier, il 
l'ont perdu." '  Olivier de Clisson came from a great Breton family serving both the French and 
the English crowns at different times. After his father’s execution for treason in Paris in 1343, 
the young Olivier was taken by his mother to England and brought up at the court of Edward 
III, who treated the young knight generously. He fought on the English side for a considerable 
time, going over to the French side openly in 1370.  
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two prominent men was heeded. ‘I will not risk my men and my kingdom for a bit of 
flat country', the King of France is reported to have said, an opinion supported by 
the Duke of Anjou: 'We shall still be waging war against the English, just a before. 
But when they expect to find us in one part of the country we shall be in another, and 
we shall take from them when it best suits us the few pieces of territory they still 
hold’.367 The French stuck to their plan and did not engage in fights with Gaunt's 
force. Desperate to bring the French to battles, the young English duke sent a formal 
challenge to the French, but was refused, a reply that brings back to memory the 
outfall when Philippe sent his challenge to Edward III at Calais.368   
 
Froissart labels du Guesclin as 'le plus vaillaint, mieus tailliet et sage de ce faire et le 
plus ewireus et fortuné des ses besongnes, qui en ce temps s'armast pour le couronne 
de France'369 - an evaluation I believe sums up the more complex chivalrous ideal 
propagated by Froissart in his descriptions of war. Not only was du Guesclin the 
most ‘worthy’, ‘gallant’ leader fighting at that time in the service of France, he was 
also the wisest and the most successful. Although clearly paying reverence to 
'prowess', Froissart´s account of campaigns, sieges and battles, shows that men 
increased their symbolic capital by behaving in ways that led to victory and success. 
This, I believe, again indicates that Froissart operated with a more complex, even 
more pragmatic, concept of chivalry than we may have expected. 
 
                                                 
367  SHF Livre I. Tome 8. § 744.  ’ "Par ma foy, dist li rois, sires de Clicon, je n'en pense ja à issir, 
ne à mettre ma chevalerie et mon royaume en peril d' estre perdu pour un pan de plat pays. . . . 
Et vous, qu'en dittes, mon frere d'Ango?" - "Par ma foy, respondi li dus d'Ango, qui vous 
consilleroit autrement, il ne le feroit pas loyaument. Nous guerrierons tous les jours les Englès, 
ensi que nous avons commenchié; quant i nous cuideront trouver en l'une partie de royaume, 
nous serons à l'autre, et leur torrons tous jours à nostre avantage ce petit que il y tiennent." ' 
 
368 SHF Livre I. Tome VIII. § 748. 
 
369 SHF Livre I. Tome VII. § 668 
 
 123
In the next chapter, I will attempt to analyse Froissart’s account of the reign of 
Richard II, a reign that ended in crisis and a coup d’état where his cousin, Henry of 
Derby, son of John of Gaunt, duke of Lancaster, was installed on the English Crown. 
Why, according to Froissart, was Richard overthrown? Was it because he failed to act 
in accordance with the rules of chivalry? Or do we again find that the values and 
ideals propagated are more complex? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 124
4. Chivalry and kingship  
 
Geoffrey Brereton, in the Introduction to his widely read abbreviated translation of 
Froissart´s chronicles, states that Froissart, in one sense, was the first of the great 
war-reporters,370 and it is true that the author put great emphasis on campaigns and 
battles, especially in the first part of his account. However, he also recorded events of 
a more social and political nature, including popular uprisings, political dealings and 
the downfall Richard II of England, an account which occupies large parts of Book IV 
of his chronicles as well as parts of Book II and III. 
 
Richard II, born in Bordeaux in 1367, was the son of Edward the Black Prince and 
Joan the Fair of Kent, and was but ten years old when he succeeded his grandfather, 
Edward III. During his minority a council under the leadership of John of Gaunt, his 
uncle, ruled England. Central in the government of the realm was also his uncle 
Thomas of Gloucester and to a lesser degree, his other uncle, Edmund of Langley, 
duke of York.371 Today, Gaunt’s rule is mainly judged as a failure exacerbating the 
economic crises brought on by the Black Death and the war with France. The 
resulting Peasants’ Revolt of 1381 was the first crisis of Richard’s reign.372 Later 
Richard tried to distance himself from the rule of his uncles and began to build up a 
group of unpopular favourites from less influential noble families. Amongst them 
was Robert de Vere,373 and he was also close to his tutor Sir Simon Burley. However, 
                                                 
370  Jean Froissart. ed. and trans. Brereton, Geoffrey. London 1968. p. 9. 
 
371 For a discussion of the relationship between Richard II and his uncles, see Chris Given 
Wilson’s article ‘Richard II and the Higher Nobility’ in Richard II. The Art of Kingship. Oxford 
1999. pp. 107 – 28.  
 
372 For a comprehensive overview of the causes for the Peasant’s revolt in England in 1381, see 
for instance Saul, Nigel: Richard II. Yale 1997. pp. 56 – 82. 
373 Robert de Vere, the ninth earl of Oxford (1362 - 92), was the only son of Thomas de Vere, 
eighth earl of Oxford, and Maud (d. 1413), daughter of Sir Ralph de Ufford (d. 1346), and a 
descendant of King Henry III. He became the ninth earl of Oxford upon his father’s death in 
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Richard’s reliance on these councillors led to widespread dissatisfaction and an 
organised opposition, led by his uncle Thomas of Gloucester, the Earl of Arundel 
and the Earl of Warwick, began to surface. 
Gaunt, the leading man in English politics, kept the peace, but his departure for 
Spain in July 1386 left Richard exposed.374 Richard's request for money to fight 
France prompted Parliament to demand the dismissal of his favourites, something 
Richard refused. This provoked Parliament to impeach his chancellor, and create a 
commission to oversee the King’s activities. When Richard declared these measures 
treasonable, Parliament and his opponents retaliated in 1388 by outlawing his closest 
counsellors and friends, and several were executed.375 Richard appeared defeated 
and submitted to the demands of the five ‘Lords Appellant’ who in addition to 
Gloucester, Arundel and Warwick consisted of Thomas Mowbray, the Earl Marshal 
and Henry of Derby, Gaunt’s son.376  
                                                                                                                                                        
1371 and married Philippa (d. 1412), daughter of his guardian Ingelram de Couci, Earl of 
Bedford, a son-in-law of Edward III. Already hereditary great chamberlain of England, Oxford 
was made a member of the Privy Council and a Knight of the Garter; castles and lands were 
bestowed upon him and he was constantly in the company of Richard II. In the 1380’s he was 
given extensive rights in Ireland and was created Marquess of Dublin for life. He was regarded 
with jealousy by the nobles and also made powerful enemies when he divorced his wife and re-
married. In the parliament of 1388 he was found guilty of treason and was condemned to 
death, but as he had fled abroad the sentence was never carried out.  
374 In 1371, following the seizure of the Castilian throne by Henry of Trastamara, John of Gaunt 
had married Constance, daughter of the deposed Pedro, and laid claim to the throne in her 
right. When Henry of Trastamara died in 1379, Gaunt perceived the opportunity to reclaim  the 
throne and left to engage in campaigns in Spain. See Saul, Nigel: Richard II. Yale 1997. pp. 96 – 
97. 
 
375 Saul, Nigel: Richard II. Yale 1997. pp. 193 - 97. In addition to Sir Simon Burley, Sir John 
Beauchamp, Sir John Salisbury and Sir James Berners were all impeached on sixteen counts of 
treason and were executed. 
 
376 Saul, Nigel: Richard II. Yale 1997. p. 189. According to Saul there is evidence that suggest that 
Richard already at this point was deprived of his crown. According to the chronicle of Whalley 
Abbey, Gloucester and his nephew Derby could not agree on which one of them was to take 
Richard's place and in the end he was restored to his title. 
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Gaunt’s return from Spain in late 1389 stabilized matters, and for eight years Richard 
worked in apparent harmony with Gaunt and his uncles.377 Yet he gradually formed 
a second, stronger royalist party. In 1397 he arrested and tried three of the former 
Appellants. The Earl of Arundel was convicted of treason and executed, Warwick 
was banished and Gloucester imprisoned and probably murdered. For a short time, 
Richard was able to strengthen his position. He was granted revenues for life and the 
powers of Parliament were delegated to a committee.378 He also built up a power 
base in Cheshire and wedded the seven-year-old Isabella of Valois, daughter of 
Charles VI of France, presumably to end a further struggle with France. The 
marriage was widely criticised by contemporaries. 
In September 1398 a quarrel between the two former Appellants, Henry of Derby 
and Thomas Mowbray, Earl Marshal and now also Duke of Norfolk, gave the King 
an opportunity to banish them both – the Earl Marshal for life, Derby for ten years. 
Richard, according to his biographer Nigel Saul, was at this point at the height of his 
powers.379 This renewed confidence may have prompted him to confiscate the vast 
Lancastrian estates and extend Henry’s banishment to life after John of Gaunt's death 
in 1399. However, these actions did not strengthen his authority, and dissatisfaction 
and unrest spread in the country. Set on getting back his inheritance, Derby, who 
had been residing in France during his banishment, invaded England where he 
rallied both noble and popular support. Richard who at this point had undertaken a 
campaign to Ireland, desperately tried to raise support to go against his cousin, but 
found himself deserted by several key-members of the nobility. He surrendered 
without meeting Henry in battle. In September 1399 he abdicated and Derby 
                                                 
377 Saul, Nigel: Richard II. Yale 1997. pp. 205 – 69. 
 
378 Saul, Nigel: Richard II. Yale 1997. pp. 366 – 404. 
 
379 Saul, Nigel: Richard II. Yale 1997. pp. 402 - 04. 
 
 127
ascended the throne as King Henry IV. In October, Richard was imprisoned in 
Pontefract Castle, where he died four months later.380 
‘Richard’s deposition was arguably the most portentous event in the political history 
of late medieval England’, says Chris Given-Wilson in the introduction to his 
selection of contemporary narratives describing the events of 1397 – 1400.381 The 
deposition was vigorously debated amongst contemporary authors whose texts bear 
witness to a great variety of viewpoints.382 At one end of the spectrum we find the 
Record and Process,383 the official account of Richard’s deposition condemning 
Richard’s rule and justifying Henry’s actions, and Thomas Walsingham’s 
chronicles.384 At the other end of the spectrum, we find two French texts: Chronique de 
la Traison et Mort de Richart Deux Roy Dengeleterre,385 which condemns the usurpation 
and urges the French nobility to take action, and the Histoire du Roy d’Angleterre 
Richard386 written in verse. More independent, but still mainly favourable towards 
Henry’s cause are a selection of Cistercian chronicles387 and the chronicle of Adam of 
Usk,388 a text that according to Given-Wilson ‘reads like the work of a man for whom 
                                                 
380 Saul, Nigel: Richard II. Yale 1997. pp. 425 – 26. Whether a direct order to dispose of Richard 
was given is uncertain, according to Saul. 
 
381 Given-Wilson, Chris : Chronicles of the Revolution, Manchester 1993. p. 1. 
 
382 For an overview of the sources for the reign of Richard II, see Martin, G.H.: ‘Narrative 
sources for the reign of Richard II’ in The Age of Richard II, ed. James. L. Gillespie.  Stroud 1997. 
 
383 Rotuli Patliamentorum, ed. J. Strachey et al, vol.iii. 1783. See this text in Given-Wilson, Chris : 
Chronicles of the Revolution, Manchester 1993. pp. 168 – 89. 
 
384 Walsingham, T.: Historia Anglicana, ed. H. T. Riley. 2 vols. London 1863-64. 
 
385 Chronique de la Traison et Mort de Richart Deux Roy Dengleterre, ed. B. Williams. 1846. 
 
386 Histoire du Roy d’Angleterre ed. J. A. Buchon. (Collection des Chroniques Nationales 
Françaises, vol. XXIII, 1826). 
 
387 Kirkstall Abbey Chronicles, ed. J. Taylor. 1952 and the Dieulacres Chronicle in Given-Wilson, 
Chris : Chronicles of the Revolution, Manchester 1993. pp. 94 – 98.  
 
388 Chronicon Adae de Usk, ed. E. M. Thompson. 1904. 
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the clash of loyalties had become too astute.’389 We also find descriptions of some of 
the earlier events of Richard’s reign in the Westminster Chronicle390 and the Chronicon 
Henrici Knighton.391 
 
Traditionally, Froissart has been seen as being less negative towards Richard than 
many of the writers above who wrote to placate their Lancastrian patrons and an 
audience set on justifying the overthrowing of an anointed king.392 However, 
although not writing a ‘Lancastrian tract’,393 Froissart was in fact quite critical of 
Richard and his policies, as we will see in the following.394 His own opinion and 
attitudes towards the events and people he describes are by no means easy to 
establish, even at times contradictory. Noblemen, who are portrayed as acting fairly 
valiantly and courteously in one part of his account, are described as presumptuous 
and foolish in others. This of course makes it difficult to make absolute judgements 
when it comes to the ideals and values propagated at this stage in his account. 
However, Michel Zink points out that the last chapters of Froissart´s chronicles 
where he relates the downfall of Richard II seems to be constructed as a lesson.395 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
389 Given-Wilson, Chris: Chronicles of the Revolution. Manchester 1993. p. 6. 
 
390 Westminster Chronicle 1381 – 1394, ed. L. C. Hector and B. F. Harvey. 1982. 
 
391 Chronicon Henrici Knighton, ed. J. R. Lumby, 1895. For a modern translation see Knighton's 
Chronicle 1337 – 1396, ed. G.H. Martin. Oxford 1995. 
 
392 See for instance Duls, Louisa D.: Richard II in the earlier chronicles. Den Haag 1975 pp. 235 – 38 
and Sherbourne, James: ‘Charles VI and Richard II’ in Palmer, J.: Froissart. Historian. 
Woodbridge 1981. p. 54. 
 
393 Ainsworth, Peter: Jean Froissart and the Fabric of History. Oxford 1990. p. 307. ‘Froissart is only 
too well aware of the uncomfortable status of the usurper king,' says Peter Ainsworth. 
 
394 This is also a point made by George B. Stow in ‘Richard II in Jean Froissart’s Chroniques’ in 
Journal of Medieval History 11. 1985.  pp. 333 - 45. 
 
395 Zink, Michel: Froissart et le Temps. Paris 1998. p. 89. 
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Although not always easy to grasp, this lesson, I believe, provides insight to 
Froissart´s perceptions of kingship and chivalry and the relationship between them. 
 
4.1. ‘Comment les fortunes de ce monde sont merveilleuses et tournet 
deversament'396  - the downfall of Richard II. 
 
Froissart deals with the life and deeds of several kings or great magnates in his 
chronicles. Some descriptions are highly favourable, like the descriptions of Edward 
III, and his son the Black Prince, while the descriptions of Edward II and Richard II, 
respectively at the beginning and the end of his chronicles, are portrayals of kings 
who failed their task and were deposed. In the introduction to his chronicle, Jean le 
Bel, states that it was commonly believed amongst the English that in between two 
brave and warlike kings there was always one less gifted in body and mind.397  
Froissart on his side, states that while Edward III's grandfather, Edward I, was a 
brave, wise and resourceful ruler, enterprising in war, his son Edward II was of a 
different calibre, governing his kingdom badly and foolishly on the advice of his evil 
counsellor Sir Hugh Despenser.398 In Froissart´s account, Richard II made many of 
the same mistakes as his great-grandfather, and Michel Zink in his book on Froissart 
argues that there is a distinct symmetry between the beginning and the end of his 
chronicles.399  
                                                 
396 Chroniques Livre III et IV. Livre IV. §82. 'Or considerez, seigneurs, rois, ducs, contes, prelatz et 
toutes gens de lignange et de poissance, comment les fortunes de ce monde sont merveilleuses 
et tournent diversament!' 
 
397 Jean le Bel: Chronique. SHF. Chapitre I. '. . . l'opinion des Anglès est communement telle, et l'a 
on souvent veu avenir en Angleterre puis le roy Artus, que entre deux vaillains roys d' 
Angleterre a tousjours eu ung mains souffisant de sens et de proesse.' 
 
398 SHF Livre I. Tome II. § 1. 
 
399 Zink, Michel: Froissart et le Temps. Paris 1998. pp. 105  - 6. In his book on Richard II, Nigel Saul 
shows that there are in fact many analogies between the two kings. See Saul, Nigel: Richard II. 
Yale 1997. pp. 430 – 34. However, Saul argues that unlike Edward II Richard was not the victim 
of manipulation by over-mighty councillors and courtiers. ‘It was Richard himself who had 
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In Froissart´s Chroniques we first meet Richard as a boy-king in Book II when the 
author relates the Peasants’ Revolt in England.400 The revolt had started in 
Brentwood, Essex in May 1381 where a mob had risen against tax collectors. These 
later joined with a group of men from Kent and thousands of people sacked the city 
of London, 'passing like a tornado, levelling and gutting the houses of lawyers and 
judges'.401 They also forced a knight by the name of Sir John Newton to become their 
captain, and were able to persuade several knights and nobles to go with them, 
according to Froissart.  
 
Arriving at Blackheath, the villains decided to send John Newton to ask the King for 
a meeting, a request to which Richard agreed. However, when he arrived in his 
barge where the mob was waiting, they all began to shout. This scared the noblemen 
following Richard and they advised the King not to land, says Froissart.402 However, 
Richard was not frightened, but is described by the chronicler as being bold enough 
to address the crowd before the barge was turned back to London.403 Seeing that they 
                                                                                                                                                        
raised the crown to such dizzy heights of power and fame; and it was Richard himself who 
created the conditions in which, ‘like glist’ring Phaethon’, he was brought down,’ says Saul. p. 
434. 
 
400 This revolt occurred for a combination of reasons, virtually all of which were prompted by 
the Black Death. The plague that struck Britain from 1348 killed almost half the population. 
Those agricultural workers who survived found their wages rising (by 200-300 %) as demand 
for their services by competing landlords increased. However, the landlords were reluctant to 
pay the higher wages or allow workers to move to rival estates. In addition, three poll taxes 
appeared. The ‘Poll Tax’ of 1380 was particularly hated, as it took no account of individual 
wealth or earnings and demanded the same sum from all, rich or poor. 
 
401 Chroniques Livre I et II. Livre II. § 49. ' . . . ilz cheminèrent devers Londres et abatoient maison 
d'avocas et de procureurs, et firent les chevaliers aler avec eulx, voulsissent ou non, et prindrent 
à Rocestre le chevalier qui gardien en estoit, apellé Jehan Mouton, et en firent leur capitaine, et 
lui couvint aler avec eulx; onques ne s'en pot excuser, autrement l'eüssent occis.' 
 
402 Chroniques Livre I et II. Livre  II.  § 49. 'Quant ilz virent la barge du roy, ilz huèrent si hault que 
c'estoit horrible chose à öir, et n'ot mie le roy conseil qu'il presist terre.' 
 
403 Chroniques Livre I et II. Livre II.  § 49. 'Si dist le roy: "Seigneurs que voulez vous? Dictes le 
moy." ' 
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were prevented from talking to their King, the crowd, according to the author, 
continued towards London destroying and ransacking buildings as well as freeing 
the prisoners in the King's prison on their way. When they reached London, they 
began threatening the Londoners who had closed the gates to the city. However, 
Froissart also claims that many Londoners were favourable to the rebels. Eventually 
the gates were opened and more than thirty thousand men went through London. 
Going from street to street, the rebels burnt the palace of Savoy, belonging to the 
Duke of Lancaster, robbed the houses of the Lombards and also killed all the 
Flemings they could find. Towards the evening, they moved towards the Tower of 
London, where they installed themselves. According to Froissart, the actions of the 
mob were clearly an outrage. The King, however, was advised by his counsellors to 
appease the crowd by ‘fair words’, rather than attacking them, he says.404  
 
The next morning, the crowd continued to shout for the King to come and speak to 
them, and Froissart describes how the young King decided to meet the mob and 
their leader, Wat Tyler, at Mile End. And again the young King, according to 
Froissart, showed courage and determination. As they were going there, he says, the 
Earl of Kent and Sir John Holland, left the King because they feared for their life. 
Richard however, rode right in among the rebels and said very amiably: ‘Good 
people, I am your lord and king.  What do you want to say to me?’ The rebels made 
demands to be freed ‘both we and our heirs and our lands, so that we shall never 
again be serfs’. The King complied, a grant he is later said to have withdrawn.405 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
404 Chroniques Livre I et II. Livre II § 49. ' . . . et distrent les sages au roy: "Se vous les pouez 
appaisier par belles paroles, c'est le meilleur. Et leur accordez tout ce qu'ilz demandent, liement, 
car se nous commençons chose dont nous ne puissons à chief venir, nous et tout le royaume 
serions désers."' 
 
405 Chroniques Livre I et II. Livre II. § 50. ' "Bonnes gens, je suis vostre roy. Que voulez vous dire?" 
Ils respondirent. "Nous voulons que tu nous afranchises à tousjours; nous, noz hoirs et noz 
terres, et que jamais nous ne soions tenu serf." Dist le roy: "Je le vous accorde. Retrayés vous en 
vos maisons, et laissiés de par vous de chascun village ou hommes, et je leur bailleray lettres de 
quanque vous demandez." ' 
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Froissart´s portrayal of the King in Book II of his chronicles shows a young man who, 
in the same manner as his father at Crécy, wanted to prove himself; and although the 
setting is different, Richard’s behaviour, as related by Froissart, was clearly worthy 
of admiration. By presenting himself with authority he was able to calm the crowd, 
something he also did the next day at Smithfield where he is described to have met 
with Wat Tyler and his men again. Here, however, Richard eventually lost his 
temper and ordered the killing of Tyler, an act the author clearly did not deplore. 
After the slaying of Tyler, Richard is described to have left his men, with the request 
that no one was to follow him. Acting with great courage, the young King addressed 
the crowd: ‘Sirs, what more do you want? You have no other captain but me, I am 
your King, behave peaceably’. On hearing this, the majority of them were ashamed 
and began to break up, the author claims.406 
 
Froissart´s description of Richard’s behaviour in connection with the Peasants’ 
Revolt shows an enterprising and brave young king, able to face confrontation when 
his brothers and other men around him fled. By using words like ‘captain’ and 
pointing to his role as their guardian, the young king, in Froissart´s portrayal, was 
both able to calm a crowd of grown men and make them feel ashamed of themselves 
and their behaviour. Although the setting is not the battlefield, the situation is 
described as equally frightening and chaotic. The emphasis Froissart has chosen to 
put on Richard’s courageous actions and the lack of brave exploits performed by 
other noblemen shows that at this stage in the account (Book II of the Chroniques) 
Froissart had a positive impression of the new king and was set on presenting 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
406 Chroniques Livre I et II. Livre II. § 50. ‘Ces villains qui là estoient assemblez virent leur 
cappitaine tuer, si distrent entr´eulx: “alons, alons et tuons tout!” Lors se commencièrent à 
rengier en ordonnance de bataille, et dont le roy s´en ala devers ces vilains, et dist à ses gens que 
nul ne le sivist, puis vint à ses meschans gens et leur dist: “Que vous fault? Vous n´avez autre 
capitaine que moy: je sui vostre roy. Tenez vous en paix." '        
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Richard in a similar vein as his celebrated father who had also proven his valor at an 
early age, at Crécy. 
 
However, when we meet Richard again in Book III (1387), both the themes and the 
chronicler’s tone appear quite different. Instead we find a far more analytical 
portrayal of a young king surrounded by ambitious favourites and magnates set on 
renewing war with France. According to Froissart, the discontent of some of the 
greater men of the realm was great, and they believed the King to be relying too 
much on the friendship and advice of men like John and Thomas Mowbray, the Earls 
of Salisbury and Stafford, Earl Robert de Vere of Oxford, the Hollands - his half-
brothers, and the Earl of Suffolk, Sir Michael de la Pole.407 Especially condemned was 
the King’s relationship with Robert de Vere, and Froissart presents the problem by 
relating a conversation between the Dukes of York and Gloucester, the Earls of 
Salisbury, Arundel, Northumberland and Nottingham and the Archbishop of 
Canterbury:  
 
Ce duc d'Irlande fait en Angleterre et du roy ce qu'il vuelt, et 
n'est le roy conseilliez forz de mesceans gens et de basse 
venue ens ou regard de princes. Et tant que il ait le conseil 
qu'il tient delez lui, les choses ne puevent bien aler, car ung 
royaulme ne puet estre bien gouverné ne ung seigneur bien 
conseilliez des mescheans gens. On voit qu'ung povre 
homme, quant il monte en estat et son seigneur l'aveuve, il 
se corrompt et destruit aussi son peuple et son pays; et est 
ainsi d'ung povre homme à femme, qui ne scet que c'est 
d'onneur, qui desire à tout engloutir et tout avoir, que d'ung 
loutre qui entre en ung estant et destruit tout le poisson que 
                                                 
407 SHF Livre III. Tome XII. § 2.  
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il y treuve. A quoy est-ce bon que ce duc d'Irlande est si bien 
du roy? Nous cognoissons bien son estraction et sa venue et 
que le royaulme d'Angleterre sera du tout gouverné par luy, 
et en laira les oncles du roy et ceulx de son sang. Ce ne fait 
pas à souffrir ne à soustenir. - “Nous savons bien qui le 
conte d'Asquessuffort est,” disoient les autres, “il fut filz au 
conte d'Aubery d'Asquessuffort qui oncques n'eubt grace ne 
renommée en ce pays, d'onneur, de sens et de conseil, ne de 
gentilesce.”' 408 
 
It is of course unlikely that Froissart had any exact knowledge about the private 
deliberations of these men, although he could have received some inside 
information. His quotations of what the various actors said must therefore be seen as 
a textual construction functioning in an explanatory manner, pointing out what 
Froissart believed to be the opinions of the fraction unfavourable to Richard. Instead 
of culturing a relationship with the men who should be the King’s natural advisors, 
Richard promoted men without the necessary background and reputation. In his 
account, men like Thomas of Gloucester or the Earl of Arundel could not accept that 
men with less status than them should be promoted or be asked to counsel the King 
in important political matters. 
 In Book I, Froissart relates how Bértrand du Guesclin was appointed to the office of 
constable of France, although he was of humble origins. However, contrary to de 
Vere, du Guesclin, in Froissart's portrayal, was well aware that his origins did not 
make him 'worthy' and tried to point this out to the King.409 Du Guesclin's excuses 
                                                 
408 SHF Livre III Tome XIV. § 183.  
 
409 SHF Livre I. Tome VII. § 668. ‘Lors s' escusa encores li dis messires Bertrans par une aultre 
voie et dist: "Chiers sires et nobles rois, je ne vous voeil, ne puis, ne ose desdire de vostre bon 
plaisir; mais il est bien verités que je sui uns povres homs et de basse venue. Et li offisces de le 
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were not accepted according to Froissart. Instead Charles V is said to have praised 
du Guesclin's enormous symbolic capital and the fact that no man would disobey the 
orders of du Guesclin in war. De Vere, however, did not possess a symbolic capital 
that would make up for his humble origins. On the contrary, says Froissart, it was a 
widely held opinion that the honour of the de Vere family was not such that Robert 
deserved to be made a duke.  However, what Froissart himself seems to have 
deplored the most was the fact that de Vere had left his wife, Philippa de Coucy, 
Countess of Bedford and the daughter of the Lord of Coucy, for a young maid-in-
waiting of the Queen of England.410 But the Duke felt so secure in the King’s favour, 
Froissart says, that he believed that no one could harm him. However, de Vere’s self-
assurance was unfounded. When a report ran through England that a tax of one 
nobel was to be levied on each hearth, by which the rich (who had several fires in 
their houses) would make up for the poor, the King’s uncles who knew that this 
would be a great burden, decided to act, says Froissart.411 They caused the word to be 
spread that such a tax would be too damaging to the people and that there were in 
fact large sums of money in the royal treasury. Their strategy succeeded and 
according to Froissart, the Londoners approached Thomas of Gloucester for advice.  
Demonstrating to the Londoners how they should proceed in order to get an account 
of the financial dispositions of the King, Gloucester is portrayed as the driving force 
                                                                                                                                                        
connestablie est si grans et si nobles qu'il couvient, qui bien s'en voeult acquitter, exercer et 
esploitier et commander moult avant, et plus sus les grans que sus les petis. Et veci messigneurs 
vos fréres, vos neveus et vos cousins, qui aront carge de gens d'armes, en hos et en chevaucies: 
comment oseroi je commander sus yaus? . . . Lors respondi li rois et dist: "Messire Bertran, 
messire Bertran, ne vous escusés point par celle voie; car je n'ai frère, ne neveu, ne conte, ne 
baron en mon royaume, qui n'obeisse à vous"; . . . ' 
 
410 SHF Livre III. Tome XIV. § 184. See the discussion of the repudiation of Philippa de Coucy in 
Tuck, A: Richard II. p. 78 and p. 114.  
 
411 SHF Livre III. Tome XIV. § 184. ' . . . et y estoit mise hors une commune fame parmy 
Angleterre que on feroit une taille et que cascun feu paieroit un noble; si porteroit le fors le 
foible. Les oncles du roy savoit bien que ce seroit trop fort à l'esvoiturer et avoient fait semer 
parolles parmy Angleterre ens es citez et ens es bonnes villes, que le peuple seroit trop grevez, 
et que il y avoit ou devoit avoir très grant finance ens ou tresoir du roy. . . ' 
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behind the events that followed.412 According to the chronicler Richard was obliged 
to call Parliament together to inquire into the management of the royal funds and the 
government of the country. During this meeting serious accusations were voiced, 
especially concerning the lack of order and justice in the realm.413 Later, Sir Simon 
Burley, Richard’s former tutor and a leading man in the government was found to 
show a deficit on the account he had been administrating of 250,000 francs.414 He was 
also accused of ‘hoarding up silver and gold, salting it away in Germany and other 
countries’.415 In addition, says Froissart, the common people said that Burley had 
wanted to steal the shrine of Saint Thomas in order to sell it abroad, an accusation 
Froissart himself clearly did not believe. However, ‘this kind of talk became so 
general that Sir Simon Burley was gravely prejudiced by it’, says Froissart, showing a 
definite understanding of the workings of political life and the effect rumours could 
have.416 ‘It was decreed, by the King’s uncles and the burgesses acting with them, 
that he had deserved death on account of the charges against him.' Burley was 
beheaded, an event, which filled Froissart with dismay and anger, he says, because 
                                                 
412 SHF Livre III. Tome XIV. § 184. It should be noted that Gloucester’s advice and detailed 
instruction to the Londoners occupies almost two pages in the SHF edition. 
 
413 SHF Livre III. Tome XIV. § 185. 'Très redoubtez sire, salve soit vostre grace; mais justice est en 
vostre royaulme trop foible, et vous ne savez pas tout ne povez savoir, car point n'en enquerez 
ne demandez; et ceulx qui vous conseillent s'en cessent de vous dire, pour le grant prouffit qi'ilz 
y prendent. Ce n'est pas justice, sire roy, de coper testes, ne poings, ne piez, ne pendre; cela est 
pugnicion. Mais est justice de tenir et garder son peuple en droit et de luy donner voye et 
ordonnance qu'il puist vivre en paix, par quoy il n'ait nulle cause de luy esmouvoir.' 
 
414 SHF Livre III. Tome XIV. § 186. 
 
415 SHF Livre III. Tome XIV. § 188. 
 
416 SHF Livre III. Tome XIV. § 188. 'Tant se monteplierent ces parolles et amises que messire 
Symon Burlé fut grandement aggrevé et fut ordonné des oncles du roy et du conseil des citez et 
bonnes villes d'Angleterre, qui aveucques eulx estoient ahers et conjoins, qu'il avoit desservi 
pugnicion de mort sus les articles de sa fin.' 
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he had found him ‘a very pleasant knight . . . and a man of great judgement’ (grand 
sens).417 
 
Froissart´s evaluation of Burley points us directly to what the author perceived as 
valuable: to be a pleasant knight, full of courage, wisdom and good judgement. In 
contrast stands his description of the King who instead of standing up for his former 
mentor chose to leave for the Welsh Marches with the Queen and de Vere, who had 
recently been appointed Duke of Ireland. However, according to Nigel Saul the 
accusation that Richard did not plead his former mentor's case is in fact wrong. 
'Richard and his queen, the latter on bended knees, interceded on behalf of the 
former chamberlain, but Gloucester, strengthened by the support of the commons 
refused to give way,' says Saul who thus, gives a different impression of the King’s 
attitude and actions than Froissart.418 It should however be noted that Richard is 
described by Froissart to have expressed great anger when he heard of the beheading 
of his former tutor.419 
 
At this point in Froissart´s account, Simon Burley seems to be the character acting 
with most honour and integrity, and the author clearly saw his death as a great 
injustice. However, contrary to what we may expect, it is not the scheming 
Gloucester who is condemned for his fate, but de Vere who is described to have 
                                                 
417 Froissart later describes how Nicolas Brembre celebrates the valiant Simon Burley in a 
speech. SHF Livre III. Tome XIV. § 193. 'A la requeste du roy parla messire Nicolas Branbre et 
dist: " . . . Ja ont-ilz fait morir ce vaillant chevalier et preud'omme, sans nul tiltre de raison, 
messire Symon Burlé, qui tant de biaulx services a faictes au royaulme d'Angleterre . . .' 
 
418 Saul, Nigel: Richard II. Yale 1997. pp. 194 - 95. 
 
419 SHF Livre III. Tome XIV. § 189. ‘Quant le roy Richard d’ Angleterre . . . sceut la mort de 
messire Symon Burlé, son chevalier et l’un de ses maistres, qui tousjours l’avoit nourry et 
introduit, si en fut durement courrouciez, et dist et jura que la chose ne demouroit pas ainsi, et 
que à grant tort et pechié et sans nul titre de raison on l’avoit mis à mort. La royne d' Angleterre 
en fut durement dolente et en ploura bien et assez, pour tant que le chevalier messire Symon 
l'avoit amenée de Alemaingne en Angleterre.’ 
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reassured the loyal Burley that the King would come to his rescue. ‘Don’t argue the 
point, do as they tell you,’420 says de Vere in Froissart´s account, an advice Burley 
believed. ‘If I did not believe that you could greatly help me, I would have left 
England for Germany where I would have been well received and could let things 
cool off a bit’,421 Burley is reported to have said, thus, indicating that he could have 
escaped his fate had he not been mislead by de Vere. 
 
De Vere, according to Froissart, should give further proof of his duplicity and lack of 
courage. The King, who at the time was dwelling in Bristol decided to move his 
forces against London and appointed de Vere his foremost commander.422 On their 
side, the King's uncles, led by Thomas of Gloucester and the Londoners (who 
Froissart at this point states did anything the King's uncles commanded), decided to 
go against them.423 The two forces met at Radcot Bridge. However, reflecting that 
Gloucester would have him killed shamefully if he was caught, de Vere announced 
to his closest companions that he would rather escape than give battle. Hiding his 
real intentions, says Froissart, de Vere falsely encouraged his army to fight for the 
King's honour before he and his fellow noblemen fled and left the men of their side 
to fend for themselves. ‘When the King’s men saw them (flee), their courage forsook 
                                                 
420 SHF Livre III. Tome XIV. § 186. ‘En ce trouble, il ot ung secret conseil entre le duc d’Irlande et 
luy, et lui dist: “Messire Symon, j’ay entendu que vous serez arrestez et mis en prison et tenus 
tant que vous arrés rendu la somme que on vous demande. Ne debatez rien, ales là où on vous 
envoie. Je feray bien vostre payx et l’eussent tout juré. Je doy recevoir du connestable de France 
LX. Mille frans pour la redemption Jehan de Bretaigne, si comme vous savez que il me doit. Au 
fort je les vous presteray pour appaisier le conseil de present; en la fin le roy est souverain. Il le 
vous pardonnera et le vous quictera tout, car le pourfit luy doit retourner et non à aultrui."’ 
 
421 SHF Livre III. Tome XIV. § 186. ‘Respondy messire Symon Burlé: "Se je ne cuidoye que vous 
ne me deuissiez grandement aidier envers le roy et aussi à porter oultre mon fait, je me 
departiroie hors d’ Angleterre et m’en yroie en Alemaigne delez le roy de Boesme; je y seroie le 
bien venus et laisseroie les choses courrir ung temps tant qu’elles seroient appaisiés."’ 
 
422 SHF Livre III. Tome XIV. § 191. 
 
423 SHF Livre III. Tome XIV. § 194. 'Les Londriens, comme gens tout conforté et tout appareilliez 
de obeir au plaisir et commandement des oncles du roy, . . . , respondirent . . .' 
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them’, says Froissart, adding to the picture of de Vere as a cynical and cowardly man 
with no honour and little right to his elevated position.424  
 
Somewhat unexpectedly, Froissart at this point shows the Duke of Gloucester 
behaving honourably and nobly towards the King’s army, sparing their lives.425 
When the Duke of Gloucester saw the disorder in the army facing him, says 
Froissart, a twinge of conscience seized him and he decided not to do his worst 
against them. Knowing that many if not all had been either forced or incited to come 
by the Duke of Ireland, Gloucester is said to have forbidden his men to kill any man 
unless he put up a defence; knights or squires should be taken prisoner and brought 
before him. His orders were obeyed, says Froissart, and only those who died in the 
press when they were riding against each other, were killed. While de Vere is 
portrayed as a man who, overwhelmed by the opposing forces, hides his intentions 
and later flees from his army, Gloucester, at this stage in the account, is portrayed as 
a merciful man who takes pity on the knights of his adversary.426 We should also 
note that Froissart omits the fact that it was in fact Henry of Derby who commanded 
the appellant army at Radcot Bridge.427 
                                                 
424 SHF Livre III. Tome XIV. § 197. 'Si trestost que les gens du roy les veirent venir en ce 
convenant, ilz furent tous esbahis et ne tindrent nul arroy mais se deffouqierent et tournerent 
les dos, car voix general courut que le duc d'Irlande, leur cappitaine, s'enfuioit et ceulx de son 
conseil aussi.' 
 
425 SHF Livre III. Tome XIV. § 197. 'Quant le duc de Glocestre vey le convenant de ces gens 
assemblez contre lui, il luy vint ung remors de conscience et ne voult pas faire du pis qu'il eust 
bien peut, car bien savoit que tout ou en partie y estoient venus par constrainte et pour 
l'incitation du duc d'Irlande.'  
 
426 However, it should be noted that Gloucester later beheaded John Beauchamp, John Salisbury 
and Nicholas Brembre - some of the noblemen present in the King’s army. 
 
427 Keen, Maurice: England in the Later Middle Ages. London 1973. p. 305. 
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Nigel Saul, Richard's modern biographer, says that it is very possible that Richard, at 
this point, in reality, was threatened with deposition.428 The Chronicle of Whalley Abbey 
Lancashire suggests that for a brief while Richard actually ceased to reign, says Saul. 
However, seeing that Gloucester and Henry of Derby could not agree on which of 
them was to take his place, Richard was eventually restored to his title. This, of 
course, is an account which differs widely from the one found in the Chroniques.   
According to Froissart, the intention of the fraction that has later been called the 
‘Lords Appellants’ was not to deprive the King of his sovereignty, but to have 
councillors who could guide the young King down the right road and allow the 
kingdom to be restored.429 The overall impression is that although Froissart clearly 
was aware of the scheming of Gloucester and how he manipulated the Londoners, 
he essentially wanted to interpret the events as the efforts of loyal vassals to guide 
their young king. However, it should also be noted that although Froissart clearly 
reproaches Richard for his lack of sound judgement and failure to stand up for Sir 
Simon Burley, he does not outright condemn him at this stage. Instead his focus is on 
judging the King’s evil councillors. 
We know from other sources that the causes of the conflict between the King, de 
Vere and Gloucester were more complex than shown in Froissart´s account. 'Chief 
amongst these was the matter of his [Gloucester’s] inadequate territorial 
endowment,' says Nigel Saul. Exceptionally for a royal duke, Gloucester was 
dependent for his income on exchequer goodwill and it should therefore come as no 
surprise that he quickly became jealous of courtiers like de Vere who was richly 
rewarded by Richard. In addition, the Duke also held a more specific grudge against 
                                                 
428 Saul, Nigel: Richard II. Yale 1997. p. 189. 
 
429 SHF Livre III. Tome XIV. § 199. 'Aprés la mort de Nicolas Branbre, veirent les oncles du roy 
que tous ceulx que ilz hayaoient et vouloient oster hors du conseil du roy estoient mort ou 
eslongiet tellement que plus n'y avoit de raloiance, et convenoit que le roy et le royaulme fust 
remis et refourmez en bon estat, car, quoyqu'ilz eussent mors et enchachiez les dessudiz, si ne 
vouloient-ilz pas oster au roy sa seignourie; mais ilz vouloient rieuler sus bonne fourme et estat 
à l'onneur de luy et de son royaulme.' 
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de Vere arising from competition with the Earl for leadership of county society in 
Essex, says Saul.430 Lacking both landed wealth and influence at Court; Gloucester 
found it difficult to recruit a powerful following of his own to bolster his own 
prestige and to keep watch over his interests in the county. The financial situation of 
Gloucester and the internal disputes in Essex, are not, however, dealt with by 
Froissart who might have been little informed about this or may have found such 
information irrelevant to his account. 
Instead he proceeds to show how the uncles who ‘now wanted to put the kingdom 
back on a sound footing’ decided to send for the King. The Archbishop of 
Canterbury was entrusted the task of persuading Richard to come back from Bristol. 
This, says Froissart, was something Richard did most unwillingly and only after he 
had been persuaded to do so by his first wife, Anne of Bohemia, and one of his ‘wise’ 
knights, Sir Richard Stury.431 Back in London a general assembly of Parliament was 
held, says Froissart, and then a mass. After the mass, the King’s uncles and the great 
magnates of the land renewed their homage to the King – ‘in the way one should; 
hands clasped and kissing him on the mouth.' 432 However, says Froissart, it was easy 
to see by watching the ceremony which ones the King kissed readily and which 
not.433 Had he been able to, he would not have kissed them, says the author, 'but 
taken vengeance for the execution of Sir Simon Burley and his other knights who had 
been taken from him and put to death so undeservedly'.434 Whether this last 
                                                 
430 Saul, Nigel: Richard II. Yale 1997. pp. 178 - 79. 
 
431 SHF Livre III. Tome XIV. § 199. 
 
432 SHF Livre III. Tome XIV. § 200. ' . . . et baisoient par foy et hommaige, leurs mains jointes, 
ainsi comme il appartient, le roy en la bouche.’ 
 
433 SHF Livre III. Tome XIV. § 200. 'Là veoit-on au baisier lesquelz le roy baisoit de bonne 
voulenté et lesquelx non, car quoy qu’il le fesist, tout n’estoit pas en son amour, mais faire luy 
convenoit, car il ne vouloit pas yssir de rieule ne du conseil de ses hommes.' 
 
434 SHF Livre III. Tome XIV. § 200. 'Mais bien sachiez que, s’il eust oeut, autant dessus euls que 
pas ne povoit, il n’en eust riens fait, mais eust prins cruelle vengance de la mort de messire 
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comment should be taken as a sign that Froissart, at this point, found the treatment 
of Richard to be overly harsh is difficult to say. However, the account clearly 
foreshadows future troubles. 
Froissart´s summary shows that he is keen to stress that the Appellants’ actions were 
no real encroachment on the King’s power, in the sense that the whole situation is 
portrayed as necessary to establish social order and harmony. In his account 
Gloucester and the rest of the Lords Appellant were driven to take action against the 
King and his council. However, I would also argue that although his tone and 
attitude towards Richard is increasingly negative, Froissart at this point in his 
narrative seems to express the view that Richard, being young, was not necessarily 
expected to have proven himself in all areas of political life. However, allowing so 
much space to his loyal following of courtiers - the ‘marmosets’- and disregarding 
the advice of the more prominent men of the realm was clearly not a sign of ‘sound 
judgement’ and contributes to a picture of a king who was irresolute and lacking in 
determination. For a long time after the incidents related above, the King was not 
master of his own council, says Froissart.435  
 
Froissart himself made a return to England in July 1395 and he probably received 
ample information about the events related previously during his stay.436 At this 
point he was also able to meet Richard in person and present him with a book, ‘well 
written, illuminated and illustrated’, he says.437 The book greatly pleased Richard, a 
                                                                                                                                                        
Richart Burlé et ses aultres chevaliers que on luy avoit osté et fait morir sans deserte.’ Froissart 
here makes a mistake and writes ‘Richart Burlé, instead of Simon. 
 
435 SHF Livre III. Tome XIV. § 200. 
 
436 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XV. pp. 140 - 66. 
 
437 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XV. p. 167. ' . . . et voult veoir le roy le 
livre que je luy avoie aporté. . . . Il l'ouvry et regarda ens, et luy pleut très-grandement et bien 
plaire luy devoit, car il estoit enluminé, escript et historié et couvert de vermeil velours à dix 
clous attachiés d'argent dorés et richement dorés et roses d' or ou milieu, à deux grans frumaus 
dorés et richement ouvrés ou milieu de roses d'or.' 
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fact Froissart does not fail to mention in his account. Froissart also relates how he 
learned about Richard's recent military successes in Ireland, from a knight named 
Henry Crystede.438 He was also informed of Richard's intention to marry the young 
Isabella of France, from a knight named Sir Jean de Grailly, as well as the affaires of 
Aquitaine.439 Although the aging chronicler found the changes great and old 
acquaintances scarce, his account of his stay in England is by no means very 
negative, an observation that has enforced the impression some historians in the past 
have had of Froissart as an author reasonably sympathetic to Richard.440 Although 
this is a picture that will be nuanced in the following, I would argue that Froissart in 
the next part of his account of the affaires of England reserves his harshest criticism 
for Thomas of Gloucester, ‘who was such that even the wise did not dare to speak in 
front of him,’441 and later the Earl Marshal, Thomas of Mowbray. 
 
Although Froissart in some respects seems fascinated by Gloucester, he was clearly 
not favourable to him or the views he represented. We should also note that the 
author consistently fails to mention that Thomas of Gloucester's abilities as a military 
commander were esteemed as far a field as Gascony.442 Gloucester was inclined by 
nature to be proud and overbearing and was always in disagreement with the King's 
council, states the chronicler,443 who clearly did not approve of the Duke’s haughty 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
438 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XV. p. 181.   
 
439 Richard's first wife Anna of Bohemia died on 7 June 1394. The marriage was childless. 
 
440 See George B. Stow in ‘Richard II in Jean Froissart’s Chroniques’ in Journal of Medieval History 11. 
1985. pp.  333 -45. 
 
441 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XV. p. 182. 'Et tout ce fut bien amentu des 
sages au conseil du roy, le duc de Glocestre absent, car en nulle manière devant luy on n’ en 
ousoit parler.' 
 
442 See Saul, Nigel: Richard II. Yale 1997. pp. 177 – 80. 
 
443 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XV. p. 240. ' Le duc de Gloucestre estoit 
de une autre matière et ordonnance, car il ne tenoit compte de nulluy, quoyque ce fuist le 
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and presumptuous attitudes.444  Gloucester took no real part in the government of the 
realm, he says, and only came when sent for by the King if it suited him. If he did go 
he was the last to arrive and the first to leave, and as soon as he had given his 
opinion, he insisted on it being accepted without question, says Froissart.445 This he 
did although the King always made himself humble when he was with the Duke, 
and never refused him anything, states the author, who thereby implicitly explains 
Richard's difficult situation.446 Froissart also reminds his readership of 'moult de 
crueuses and hastives justices' on the part of the Duke, especially the execution of Sir 
Simon Burley.  
 
The Duke of Gloucester worked in all kinds of subtle and secret ways to win over the 
Londoners to him, says Froissart, and was eager to see his great-nephew the young 
Earl of March, grandson of the deceased Lionel, Duke of Clarence, on the throne of 
England.447 When this scheming did not work out as he planned, the Duke started 
stirring up the Londoners and whispered in their ear that they ought to demand to 
be relieved from the taxation that had originally been imposed on them to meet the 
                                                                                                                                                        
maisné de tous les frères, mais il estoit trop orgueilleux et présumptueux de manière, et en ce 
s'enclinoit sa nature, et mal concordant à tous les consauls du roy, se ils ne s'enclinoient de tout 
à sa volonté.' 
 
444 See for instance the description of the attitudes of the duke and duchess of Gloucester 
towards Lancaster's second wife Katherine de Ruet, who they believed to be far beneath them in 
rank. Although the marriage was quickly accepted by the rest of the high nobility the Duke did 
not approuve, according to Froissart. Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XV. 
pp. 239 - 40. 
 
445 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. pp. 5 - 6. 'Ainsi se devisoit le duc de 
Glocestre . . . Et avoit acqueillié le roy d' Angleterre son nepveu en très-grant hayne, et ne 
pouvoit nul bien dire, ne recorder de luy . . . Et quant le roy le mandoit, se bien luy venoit à 
plaisance, il y aloit, mais le plus du temps il demouroit, et lorsque il venoit devers le roy, c'estoit 
le darrain venant et le premier départant. Si trestost qu'il avoit dit son entent, il ne voloit point 
qu' elle fuist brisie, mais acceptée.' 
 
446  Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. p. 6. '. . . le roy se humilioit tousjours 
envers luy, et ne sçavoit ce duc demander chose au roy, que le roy ne luy octroiast.' 
 
447 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. pp. 7 -8. 
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expenses of the wars.448 This they did, and in Froissart´s account the Londoners got 
their reply from the loyal Duke of Lancaster, Richard’s other uncle, who spoke so 
'well and wisely' on behalf of the King, that the Londoners were calmed and 
submitted.449 Disappointed by these developments, Gloucester is said to have retired 
to his house at Pleshey, where he continued his scheming - ‘always trying to find out 
new ways to make trouble in England and renew the war with France’.450 
 
Around the same time, says Froissart, came the Count of Saint-Pol from France to see 
the King and his new Queen, the very young Isabella of France. According to the 
author, the King here explained to Saint-Pol how he found his uncle of Gloucester 
'hard, rebellious and out of order' ('dur, merveilleux et rebelle') and was advised by 
Saint-Pol to take action. If Richard did nothing, said Saint-Pol, Gloucester would 
proceed to attract the hearts of the poorest knights of the country, who desired war 
more than peace,451 a comment, which in my opinion should be interpreted as 
Froissart´s own evaluation on the matter and his views on the potential danger in 
letting Gloucester continue his scheming. However, nothing was done and Saint-
Pol’s visit turned out to further Gloucester’s plans. Some time later, says Froissart, a 
rumour started to spread that the Count of Saint-Pol had come from France to 
                                                 
448 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. pp. 8 - 9. 
 
449 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. pp. 9 - 12. 
 
450 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. pp. 12 - 13. ‘Les Duc de Gloucestre  . . 
. tousjours visant et subtillant comment il pourroit mettre ung tourble en Angleterre et trouver 
voye que la guerre fusit renouvellée en France . . .' 
 
451 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. pp. 14 – 15. 'Le conte de Saint-Pol 
s’esmerveilla de plusieurs paroles que le roy luy dist, et il en respondy que elles ne faisoient pas 
à souffrir, ne à soustenir: ”Car monsigneur, dist-il, se vous le laissiés convenir, il vous honnira. 
On dist bien en France que il ne tire ne tent à autre chose, fors que les trèves soient rompues et 
la guerre renouvellée entre France et Angleterre. Et petit à petit il attraira les cuers de plusieurs 
povres bacelers de ce royaulme, qui plus désirent la guerre que la paix; ne les vaillans hommes, 
se le pays s’esmuet et que gens d’armes et archiers se allient ensemble, ne seroient point creus, 
ne ouys, car raison, droitture et justice n’ont point de lieu, ne de audience, où mauvaisetié 
règne.”’ 
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discuss some way of giving Calais back to the French. The rumour disturbed the 
Londoners so much that they went to see Gloucester at Pleshey. In this meeting, the 
Count, according to Froissart, said nothing to calm them, instead he supported the 
accusations against Richard and Saint-Pol.452 This, in turn, led the Londoners to seek 
out Richard at Eltham. Although Richard was able to assure the Londoners that 
Saint-Pol's visit had nothing to do with the affaires of Calais, he became very 
thoughtful and started to doubt his uncles, says the author.453 
 
Soon after, says Froissart, Richard received information that his uncle of Gloucester 
and the count of Arundel, supported by the Londoners, were plotting against him. 
The plan, he was told, was to put the King and the young Queen under guard. 
Gloucester, Arundel and the King’s two other uncles - Lancaster and York - should 
govern the realm.454 Deeply dismayed and fearing his uncle of Gloucester, Richard is 
described by Froissart to have turned to his uncles Lancaster and York for assurance 
and guidance, a support he did not receive. On the contrary, the uncles are reported 
to have told Richard not to worry about their ‘unruly and rash’ brother of 
Gloucester. But seeing that a crisis was indeed brewing, and that a great feud was 
developing between the King and Gloucester, the uncles did not wish to be involved, 
says Froissart, and withdrew to their own estates with their families. This was a 
decision they should live to regret, states the chronicler, because soon after their 
departure things happened which caused deep disquiet in the whole of England and 
                                                 
452 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI pp. 15 - 16. 'Le duc ne les appaisa pas, 
ne amenry les paroles, mais les esleva et exaulça du plus que il pot, voire en disant ainsi: “Il n’ y 
auroit que faire. Les Franchois vouldroient bien qu’il leur euist cousté toutes les filles du roy de 
France et que ils euissent Calais en leur baillie."' 
 
453 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. pp. 17 -18.  
 
454 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. pp. 19 - 20 
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which would not have occurred if they had stayed, a comment indicating that in the 
author’s opinion this was a bad judgement and maybe also cowardly on their part.455 
 
Shortly after the Dukes of Lancaster and York had gone away, Richard decided on 
action. Reflecting that it was better 'to destroy than to be destroyed', says Froissart, 
he sought the help of his cousin, the Earl Marshal, in preventing Gloucester from 
ever being a threat again.456 In a dramatic account, Froissart shows how an ill-
advised, revengeful and scheming Richard invited himself to Gloucester’s house, 
where he later persuaded the Duke to come with him under the pretext of a meeting 
with York and Lancaster in London. On the way to London Gloucester was seized by 
the Earl Marshal, Thomas of Mowbray,457 and taken to Calais where he was 
incarcerated,458 and later killed.459 The Count of Arundel and the Count of Warwick, 
Thomas Beauchamp, were also seized and taken to the Tower of London.460 Arundel 
was later executed,461 while Warwick received help from the Count of Salisbury who 
                                                 
455 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. pp. 22 - 23. 'Pour tant que ces deux 
seigneurs dessus nommés veoient bien que les besoignes d’ Angleterre se commencoient à mal 
porter et grandes haynes nourrir entre le roy et le duc de Glocestre, à la fin que ils n’en fuissent 
en riens demandés, ils se départirent de l’ostel du roy, euls et toutes leurs familles . . . Depuis se 
repentirent grandement les deux oncles du roy de ce que partis estoient; car tels choses 
advinrent assés tost asprès leur partement, don’t toute Angleterre fur tourblée et esmeue, et qui 
point ne fuissent advenues, se ils fuissent demourés delés le roy; car ils y euissent autrement 
pourveu que ceulx ne firent, qui le roy conseilloient.’ 
 
456 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. pp. 26 - 28. 'Le roy Richart d’ 
Angleterre nottoit bien toutes ces paroles que on luy disoit . . . et tant les notta et pensa sus, 
comme ymaginatif qu’il estoit, que ung petit après . . . il mist oser et hardement ensemble et dist 
en soy-meismes qu’il valloit mieux que premièrement il destruisist autry, que il fuist destruit . . ' 
 
457 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. pp. 27 –  28. 
 
458 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. pp. 71 –  73. 
 
459 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. pp. 75 – 76. See the discussion on 
Gloucester's death in Saul, Nigel: Richard II. Yale 1997. pp. 378 -79. 
 
460 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. pp. 73  –  74.  
 
461 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. p. 77. 
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interceded with the King, claiming that Warvick was a very old man who had been 
persuaded by the other two to participate. He was condemned as a traitor but his 
punishment was later reduced to life-long exile at the Isle of Man.462 Of the original 
Appellants only the two younger now remained: Henry, the Earl of Derby and the 
Earl Marshal, the one Froissart claims carried out the abduction of Gloucester.463 
 
The Earl Marshal was more than willing to help his cousin get rid of his uncle, says 
Froissart,464 'because he had received more favours from his cousin, the King, than 
from Gloucester'.465 The author portrays the Earl Marshal as playing a vital role both 
in the murder of Gloucester and also in the beheading of his own father-in-law, Lord 
Arundel, where the Earl Marshal is said to have been the one to blindfold him.466 
Although Froissart at this point voices the opinion that Richard had created a 
                                                 
462 Froissart claims it to be Isle of Wight. Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. 
pp. 78 – 79. 
 
463 Derby was difficult to attack because he was the son of John of Gaunt, but there are several 
indications that Richard never hated these two men as much as the older Appellants. Froissart 
says that Richard had greatly rewarded the Earl Marshal, and we know from other sources that 
the same was true for Derby. Both Derby and the Earl Marshal had opposed the execution of 
Simon Burley, Richard’s tutor, and had publicly asked the others to have mercy on him. This 
may explain why Richard not only decided not to bring charges against the two, but to reward 
them for their services to ‘King and Country’. The Earl Marshal became Duke of Norfolk and 
Henry became Duke of Hereford. See Saul, Nigel: Richard II. Yale 1997. p. 382 and p. 398. 
 
464 In reality this might not be the truth. In the Introduction to his book The Chronicles of the 
Revolution, Chris Given-Wilson gives a short, but comprehensive overview of what is probably 
a more accurate account of the events. Although the Earl Marshal, Thomas Mowbray, may have 
played an important role in what might have been the murder of Gloucester, Walsingham, an 
author who was no friend of the Earl Marshal, says that he was very reluctant to arrange the 
murder, and only did so after he was threatened with death himself if he refused. Evidence 
suggests that the Earl Marshal quickly became disillusioned with the King’s behaviour, says 
Given-Wilson. See Chris Given-Wilson: The Chronicles of the Revolution. Manchester 1993. 
Introduction. 
 
465 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. p. 27. 'Le conte Mareschal qui plus 
amoit le roy que le duc de Gloucestre, car il luy avoit fait moult de bien, tint la parole du roy en 
secret, fors à ceulx desquels il se vouloit aidier, car il ne pouvoit faire son fait seul.' 
 
466 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. p. 77. 
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situation where no on dared to speak against him,467 the author apparently has no 
understanding for the actions of the Earl Marshal who is portrayed as both greedy 
and traitorous. 
 
One day when the Earl Marshal was discussing matters with Henry, the Earl of 
Derby, says Froissart, Henry made a remark concerning the King’s behaviour and 
voiced the view that if Richard continued his course he would drive the nobles out of 
England. 'He shows clearly that he has no desire to increase his country’s power, but 
to destroy it,' Derby is reported to have said.468 The Earl Marshal made no reply, says 
Froissart, but found the Henry's opinion highly offensive to the King. As for Derby, 
Froissart writes that he meant his words to be treated confidentially, and never 
thought they would be repeated. But the Earl Marshal, who is already characterised 
as traitorous, could not keep the words to himself, says Froissart, and decided ‘since 
the devil was no doubt working on his mind and what must be, must be’ to disclose 
the Earl of Derby’s words to the King in such a public way that an open scandal 
would be unavoidable.469 
 
                                                 
467 Froissart says that the King at this point had so subdued the great lords of England that none 
dared to show their dissatisfaction openly. Richard had spread the word throughout England 
that anyone who spoke in favour of either the Duke of Gloucester or the Earl of Arundel would 
be branded as false, a miscreant and a traitor and would incur his extreme anger, says Froissart. 
Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. p. 83 and pp. 89 – 90.  
 
468 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. p. 91. ' "Sainte Marie! beau cousin, 
dist le conte d'Erby, et quelle chose a nostre cousin le roy enpensé à faire? Veult-il mettre hors 
d'Engleterre et essorer tous les nobles?"' 
 
469 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. p. 91. 'Si se advisa (ainsi que le diable 
luy entra en la teste et que les choses tournent ainsi que elles doivent tourner et advenir, ne on 
ne les puet fuyr, ne eschiéver), que ces paroles seroient si notoirement remonstrées devant le 
roy et là où il y auroit tant de nobles d'Angleterre, que tous s' en esbahiroient. Et vint, assés tost 
après ces paroles dittes entre luy et le conte d' Erby, devers le roy pour luy complaire.’ 
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Froissart´s account deviates quite a lot from what we know about the causes for the 
ensuing dispute from other sources,470 and it has recently been argued by Nigel Saul 
that Froissart systematically reverses the roles of the two lords throughout. 
According to Saul, the Earl Marshal had participated in the arrest of the three former 
Appellants and afterwards received vast amounts of rewards from the King. Still, in 
1397 he seemed to feel himself insecure in the King’s favour, a concern he voiced in 
confidence to Henry of Derby who in turn is said to have betrayed the Earl Marshal 
by sharing their private conversation with the King. Other sources claim that the Earl 
Marshal in fact warned Derby of a plot by some of the King’s closest men to destroy 
the Lancastrian inheritance, says Saul.471 And apparently it was Derby who reported 
the conversation to the King, not the Earl Marshal, in a parliament at Shrewsbury 
where the Earl Marshal was probably not present.472 At a later parliament at Bristol, 
the King ordered that the conflict created by this betrayal of confidence be settled 
‘according to the law of chivalry’, by wager of battle.473 
 
In Froissart´s account, however, the events unfolded differently. Loaded with what 
he perceived as vital information, the Earl Marshal urged the King to summon all the 
                                                 
470 In the introduction to his book The Chronicles of the Revolution, Chris Given-Wilson points out 
that in other sources it was the Earl Marshal who approached Henry Bolingbroke to warn him 
of a potential plot against them both. However, Henry of Derby broke his confidence and told 
his father, John of Gaunt, about the allegations at which point the Earl Marshal seems to have 
panicked, fearing that Gaunt would divulge the allegations in parliament. Adam of Usk says 
that the Earl Marshal tried to prevent Gaunt from reaching parliament by setting death traps. In 
fact, the Earl Marshal probably did not attend the parliament where Froissart claims that he laid 
out the allegations against Henry. The Earl Marshal was stripped of all his offices and ordered 
to meet before the King within a fortnight, which he did. At that meeting he denied all the 
charges put forward by Henry of Deby and demanded the right to defend him-self in personal 
combat. As we can be seen, these events are very different from what we find in Froissart’s 
account of the events. See Chris Given-Wilson: The Chronicles of the Revolution. Manchester 1993. 
 
471 Saul, Nigel: Richard II. Yale 1997. p. 396. 
 
472 Saul, Nigel: Richard II. Yale 1997. p. 399. 
 
473 The records of the parliamentary committee are related in The Chronicles of the Revolution, ed. 
Given-Wilson, Chris, Manchester 1993. pp. 89 – 93. 
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members of his family at a festival at Eltham where the accusations were voiced in 
public.474 The Earl of Derby, who Froissart describes as coming forward in ‘all 
innocence’, and ‘standing stiffly’475 when he heard the accusations, was more than 
willing to defend himself in single combat. The whole court was in a state of 
confusion, says Froissart, but the Earl Marshal could not take back what he had said 
and appeared to have no intention of doing so. ‘He was far too great and haughty, 
with a heart full of pride and presumption’, says the author.476 But before the battle 
took place, at the last moment, says Froissart, Richard insisted that the two men 
should be exiled instead - Nottingham for life, Henry of Derby for ten years, a 
punishment which was clearly perceived by Froissart as unjust, because he describes 
the judgement to be condemned as far away as in France.477  
 
After the sentence had been received,478 the two men left England, and Froissart 
describes how more than forty thousand people where in the streets to see Henry of 
Derby off, crying and lamenting his fate.479 Accompanied for a while by the maire of 
                                                 
474 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. pp. 92 - 93. 
 
475 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. pp. 93 - 94. ' . . . le conte d’ Erby, qui 
nul mal n’ y pensoit . . . fut tout esbahy de ces paroles, et se traist arrière, et se tint tout droit ung 
espace sans riens dire . . . ' 
 
476 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. p. 95. 'Vous devés bien croire et 
sçavoir que toute la court pour la journée fut grandement tourblée, et moult de seigneurs, 
barons et chevalliers courrouchiés de ceste advenue, et grandement en requoy blasmoient le 
conte Mareschal, mais ce qu'il avoit dit, il ne le povoit retraire, et monstroit par samblant que il 
n'en faisoit compte, tant estoit grant et haultain, de cuer orgueilleux et présumptueux.' 
 
477 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. p. 97. ‘Et autres gens disoient, qui 
parloient plus seurement: “Les roy d’Angleterre ne monstre pas à estre sage, ne bien conseillié, 
quant pour paroles et oiseuses et où il n’ appartient nulles arme à faire, il laisse ainsi entrer en 
hayne l’un sur l’autre su hauls et nobles hommes de son sang et lignage comme sont le conte d’ 
Erby son cousin germain et le conte Mareschal, . . .’ 
 
478 Although Froissart later describes how Henry met with Richard who reduced his cousin’s 
banishment from 10 to 6 years. Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. p. 110. 
 
479 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. p. 111. 
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London, Henry set out for the Continent and Paris where he, according to the author, 
was well received by the noblemen of France.480 His father, John of Gaunt, on the 
other hand, was so unhappy about the state of the affaires of England and that his 
son had been banned from England for such a 'small cause' that he became ill and 
died, says Froissart.481 The problems in the realm augmented and it was a generally 
held opinion, especially in the city of London, says Froissart, that Richard should 
pardon and recall his cousin after the death of Lancaster. Richard, however, refused 
and declared the Lancastrian land confiscated and extended Derby exile to life.482 
This was a decision, not only condemned in England, according to Froissart, but also 
amongst the noblemen of France who had found Henry 'gracious, courteous and 
good'.483 According to the author, opinion had been broadly favourable to Henry 
from the moment Henry arrived at the French court, and he had received many 
favours and offers from prominent French noblemen. In fact Henry was so highly 
esteemed by the King of France and his uncles that they offered him the daughter of 
the Duke of Berry in marriage, a marriage Richard, according to Froissart, prevented 
                                                 
480 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. pp. 114 – 16. ‘Et fu ledit conte d’Erby 
acconvoié et accompaignié de tous ces seigneurs de France et mis à son hostel.’ 
 
481 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. p. 137. ' . . . le duc Jehan de Lancastr 
qui vivoit en grant desplaisance tant pour son fils que le roy avoit mis hors d'Angleterre à petit 
de cause, que pour le povre et petit gouvernement qu'il veoit en son nepveu le roy Richart, et 
sentoit bien ledit oncle que s' il persévéroit en cel estat longuement et on le laissaist convenir, le 
royaulme seroit perdu. Et tomba le duc de Lancastre en une maladie de laquelle il moru et 
trespassa de cè siècle.' 
 
482 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. pp. 150 - 51. '“Helas! disoient le 
povre pueple. Et quelle chose ont vos enffans fourfait quant le roy leur oste et tolt l’eritage de 
leur pere et de leur tayon et ce qui doit ester leur par droitte hoirrie et succession? Certes ceste 
besogne ne puet longuement durer, ne demourer ainsi, ne nous ne le pourrions veoir, ne 
souffrir."' 
 
483 ‘The words are ‘gracieux, doux, courtois et traittable’. See Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de 
Froissart. Tome XVI. pp. 140 –  41. In the Chronique du Religieux de Saint-Denys, 1388 - 1422, vol ii, 
pp. 674 - 76, ed. M.L. Bellaguet (Documents Inédits Sur l'Histoire de France) we find a vivid 
description of the honourable treatment Henry received in France. ‘The [French] king 
accommodated not only him, but all his followers in royal residences, entertained them and 
plied them with gifts’, the chronicler of Saint-Denys says. Henry had arrived in Paris in mid-
October and the chronicler of Saint-Denys was in a good position to observe the favourable 
treatment accorded to Henry, and his account of the events is confirmed by other sources.  
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by sending the Duke of Salisbury to Paris with letters to the French King claiming 
that Henry was a traitor.484  
 
As we may see, Froissart is adamant that Richard disinherited his cousin, an opinion 
contested by modern historians. In a recent article C.D. Fletcher convincingly shows 
that legally Richard did not confiscate the Lancastrian lands. ‘The section of the 
Parliament Roll frequently cited as the confiscation of the Lancastrian inheritance 
does not, in fact, contain such an act’, says Fletcher.485 Also Nigel Saul in his book on 
Richard II notes that the King seems to have retained the possibility that either 
Henry or his son might one day be restored.486 However, helped by a vast romance 
literature describing disinherited noblemen standing up to unjust lords and kings, 
Henry was encouraged to portray himself as disinherited, says Fletcher. 'By 
appearing as the disinherited hero, Henry stood to unite all those who were 
disaffected by Richard’s actions in 1397-99. His position was strengthened by a 
language of disinheritance that appealed to the deep moral resonance of these 
themes. Yet, the fact remains that, in law, Henry had not been disinherited.'487 
 
 ‘Les fortunes de ce monde sont bien merveilleuses, et la fortune fut bien terrible et 
merveilleuse en celle saison pour le roy d’Angleterre’, says Froissart introducing the 
rest of his account of the downfall by a prophesy he said he received from an old 
knight he met when he was first in England in the company of Queen Philippa. 
                                                 
 
 
485 Fletcher, C.D: ‘Narrative and Political Strategies at the Deposition of Richard II’ in Journal of 
Medieval History 30 (2004) pp. 323 - 341. Yet, Fletcher also argues that it remains that Richard did 
act in a number of ways which would have given Henry grave cause for concern. This includes 
revocation of letters patent and Henry not being allowed to appoint his own officials. 
 
486 Saul, Nigel: Richard II. Yale 1997. pp. 402 - 04. We know that Richard was quite fond of 
Henry’s son, the later Henry V, and included him in his retinue on numerous occasions. 
 
487 Fletcher, C.D: ‘Narrative and Political Strategies at the Deposition of Richard II’ in Journal of 
Medieval History 30 (2004) pp. 323 - 41. 
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According to the author, this prophecy stipulated that the Crown of England should 
not go to any of Edward III’s sons, but return to the House of Lancaster. 'These were 
words I remembered when I saw Henry, Count of Derby, becoming King of 
England,' the author says, alerting his readership to the outcome of the events in his 
following account.488 
 
Richard, as he is portrayed in Froissart´s account, continued to be widely criticized 
by members of the nobility, even those, he says, that rode with him on one of his 
campaigns to Ireland.489 Their grievances were similar to those that were set forward 
by Henry of Derby in his conversation with the Earl Marshal, and again ‘evil council’ 
is described as the most prominent accusation against Richard. The King was also 
deserted by some of his foremost magnates, like Thomas of Percy.490 However, in 
Froissart's account, not only noblemen voiced accusations against Richard. Also the 
rest of the population of England became restless and began to engage in internal 
strife. All the courts of justice were closed, to the dismay of honest men seeking 
‘tranquillity and fair dealing, with the payment of their lawful debts’, says 
Froissart.491 In addition, people began to be attacked by a class of people who roamed 
the country in troops and gangs. ‘Merchants did not dare to ride about upon their 
business for fear of being robbed, and they did not know to whom to turn for 
                                                 
488 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. pp. 142 - 43. ‘Ces paroles me 
revindrent au devant, quand je vey en mon temps Henry, conte d’ Erby, roy d’Angleterre.’ 
 
489 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. p. 152. ‘Vous devés savoir que 
plusieurs barons, chevalliers et escuiers d’Angleterre, quoyque ils chevauchassent en 
compaignie du roy Richart en ce voyage d’ Irlande, si se contendoient-ils mals de luy, et n’ y 
estoient pas de bon cuer, et en parloient moult souvent l’un à l’autre. . .’ 
 
490 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. pp. 154 - 55.  
 
491 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. p. 156.’ Le roy d’ Angleterre . . . 
tenant ses estas et ses oiseuses, les hommes génerallement parmy Angleterre se commencérent 
moult fort à esmouvoir et à eslever l’un contre l’autre. Et estoit justice close par toutes les cours 
d’Angleterre, don’t les vaillans hommes, les prelats et les paisibles qui ne vouloient que paix, 
amour et simplesse et paier ce qu’ils devoient commenchèrent très-grandement à esbahir.’ 
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protection or justice’ says the author.492 Such misdeeds began to multiply rapidly, 
Froissart continues, until complaints and lamentation were heard all over England.493 
‘Things have changed for the worse since the death of King Edward . . . If this state 
of affairs goes on for long, England will be ruined,  . . . we do not have a king worth 
anything. His only concern is his own pleasure and he does not seem to care how 
things are going, so long as he gets his own way’.494 This harsh evaluation of Richard 
attributed to the 'good' people of England may have been partially shared by 
Froissart. However, the author also says that the same people began to allege that 
King Richard’s intentions in France might not be favourable to the English. ‘Now this 
King Richard has sent his brother, the Earl of Huntingdon to Calais. How easy it 
would be for him to make some bad secret pact with the French and give back Calais 
to them. If Calais is given up we English would feel utterly humiliated (esbahis); and 
with good reason, because he will then have lost the key to the kingdom of France’.495 
In my opinion, it is unlikely that Froissart himself believed that Richard was in deed 
trying to give Calais back to the French as he does not mention this in other parts of 
                                                 
492 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. p. 156. ’. . . et n’osoient les marchans 
chevaulchier, ne aler en leurs marchandises, pour la doubte d’ estre rués jus et desrobés, et ne 
s’en sçavoit à qui plaindre, qui leur en fesist droit, raison et justice. . . .’ 
 
493 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. p. 157. ‘. . . se commencèrent ces 
meffais trop grandement à mouteplier . . . Et disoient les bonnes gens: "'Le temps nous est mué 
de bien en mal depuis la mort du roy Edouard, de bonne memoire, que justice estoit tenue et 
gardée grandement et souffisamment." 
 
494 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. p. 157. 'Et disoient les bonnes gens: . . 
"Le temps nous est mué de bien en mal depuis la mort du roy Edouard . . . Ceste chose ne se 
puet longuement tenir en cel estat, que Angleterre ne soit perdue sans recouvrer; car nul ne va 
au devant, ne nous n’avons point de roy qui riens vaille. Il n’entent que à toute oyseuses et à 
accomplir ses plaisances, et n’a cure, à ce qu’il monstre, comment la chose voist, mais que sa 
voulenté soit faitte."' 
 
495 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. p. 157. 'Et disoient les bonnes gens:  . 
"Il y fait pourveir, ou nos ennemis et malvueillant seront resjouis de nos adversités. Jà a ce roy 
Richart mis et envoié à Calais son frère le conte de Hostidonne. Il n'y aroit que faire que par luy 
se pourroient faire aucuns mauvais et couvers traittiés devers les François et Calais rendre, qui 
tant est propice et nécessaire au royaulme d'Angleterre. Et, se le cas advenoient que Calais fuist 
rendue aux François, oncques gens ne furent plus esbahis que Anglois seroient et à bonne cause, 
car ils auroient perdu les clefs du royaume de France." ' 
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his account, for instance in connection with Richard's meeting with Saint-Pol. The 
accusations concerning Calais should therefore be seen as the author’s opinion of 
how the people of England described and explained the state of affaires. 
 
Richard, however, did nothing to appease his subjects, according to Froissart, but 
chose instead to leave England to go on what was seen as yet another of his futile 
Irish campaigns, leaving the situation at boiling point. The critical state of affaires 
was recognised by the noblemen of the realm. However, in Froissart´s account it was 
the Londoners, not the prominent noblemen, who decided that the only man who 
could restore internal peace and justice was Henry of Derby. The Londoners decided 
in a secret meeting with some of the prelates and knights of the realm to send the 
Archbishop of Canterbury496 to Paris to ask the Earl of Derby to come back to claim 
the English throne.497 At Henry’s hostel in Paris the Archbishop described the 
troubled state of England to the Earl, and 'the violence and destruction that were 
taking place in many parts of the country', says Froissart. Henry was also told that it 
was the Londoners, 'with certain prominent men, prelates and others,' who wanted 
to put a stop to the unrest, and had unanimously agreed that the Earl ought to return 
to England. Henry, said the archbishop, would be made King, since Richard of 
                                                 
496 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. p. 162. ' Si fut pryé l'archevesque de 
Cantorberie, qui estoit homme d'honneur, d'excellence et de prudence, à faire ce message, 
lequel pour le prouffit commun du royaulme d'Angleterre s'accorda bien légièrment de ce faire 
à la prière et requeste des Londriens.' 
 
497 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. p. 161. ‘Les cytoiens de Londres 
comme chiefs de royaume d´Angleterre et puissans que ils sont, pour obvier et pourveir aux 
grans meschiefs, lesquels estoient apparens en Angleterre, orent secrets consauls ensemble, et 
aveuc euls aucuns prélats et chevalliers dudit pays, ens ésquels consauls il fut dit et arresté que 
on envoieroit querre le conte d´Erby qui se tenoit à Paris ou là près, et le feroi-on retourner en 
Angleterre et, luy revenu, on lui remonstreroit le mauvais gouvernement de ce roy Richart, et 
luy metteroit-on avant qu'il voulsist entreprende la gouverne de l'éritage et couronne d' 
Angleterre, et on le feroit roy luy et ses hoirs à demourer perpetuéllement, et qu'il voulsist tenir 
ledit royaulme en tous bons usages’. 
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Bordeaux had done or permitted so many infamous things that the whole population 
was complaining bitterly and was ready to rise against him.498 
 
The support for Henry was thus, overwhelming, but contrary to what we might have 
expected, Henry, in Froissart´s description, was by no means thrilled by the prospect 
to overthrow his cousin. On the contrary, Froissart describes Henry’s initial reaction 
as reluctant.499 However, after deliberating with his men, Henry decided to act.500  
Having assembled ships and men in Brittany, Henry reached Plymouth and 
advanced to London where he, according to Froissart, was heartily welcomed by the 
burgesses. Together they decided that they would march with all speed towards the 
King, ‘whom the Londoners and others now called plain Richard of Bordeaux, with 
no courtesy titles’, says the author.501  The citizens had already covenanted with the 
Earl of Derby that he should be their lord and king and should act in all matters on 
their advice, states Froissart.502 In return, they promised to be loyal to him always 
and to help him attain his ends, says Froissart. Further to this agreement, Henry 
                                                 
498 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. pp. 163 – 64. ‘Et là luy remonstra et 
recorda le dit archevesque la débilitation du royaulme d'Angleterre . . . car Richart de 
Bourdeaulx avoit tant fait et consenty à faire de fais infames que tout le poeuple se doulousoit 
amèrement et se vouloit eslever contre luy.’ 
 
499 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. p. 165. 'Le conte d’ Erby eut ot tout 
au long parler l’archevesque de Cantorbie, si ne respondy point si tost, mais s’appuia à une 
fenestre qui regardoit dedens les gardins, et pensa là une espace et ot mainte ymagination; et 
quant il se retourna vers l’archevesque, il dist: “ Sire, vos paroles me donnent moult à penser." ' 
 
500 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. pp. 166 - 67. 
 
501 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. p. 175. 
 
502 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. p. 175. 'Et jà avoient les Londriens 
traittié devers le conte d’ Erby que il seroit leur seigneur et roy et se ordonneroit de tous poins 
par leur conseil, et, à ceste ordonnance et aliance faire, le conte d’ Erby mist en termes que il 
emprendroit le fais et la gouverne du royaulme à demourer perpétuellement à tousjours à luy et 
à son hoir.' 
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stipulated that he and his heirs should assume responsibility for the government for 
all future time. ‘This the Londoners swore to him, put it in writing and sealed it.' 503  
 
As we may see from this scene and other comments in Froissart´s account Henry is 
essentially portrayed as the ‘instrument’ of others, especially the mighty Londoners, 
rather than the ‘driving force’ behind the events. Caroline M. Barron, in an article on 
Richard II’s relationship with the Londoners, asserts that Froissart´s analysis is 
‘neither particularly subtle, nor particularly accurate’ at this point and that the role 
played by the Londoners in Richard’s deposition was minor compared with the part 
played by the retinues of the disaffected nobility.504 Froissart however, consistently 
portrays the Londoners as Henry’s most important supporters. The importance he 
attributes to them is also seen in the description of the subsequent events.  
 
The Earl of Derby and the Londoners had their spies coming and going, says 
Froissart,505 and were told that Richard had withdrawn to a castle called Flint where 
he was surrounded only by the members of his household. Henry was also told that 
Richard seemed to have no intention of fighting, but wanted to escape from his 
predicament, possibly by negotiation.506 After deciding to seek out Richard at Flint, 
says Froissart, Henry decided to ride ahead with two hundred men leaving the 
                                                 
503 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. p. 176. 'Et ainsi les Londriens luy 
jurèrent, escripvirent et séellèrent à tenir et luy eurent en convenant de luy faire jurer et séeller 
tout le demourant du royaulme d' Angleterre . . . ' 
 
504 See Caroline M Barron: ‘Richard II and London’ in Richard II. The Art of Kingship. Eds. A. 
Goodman and James L. Gillespie; and ‘The Deposition of Richard II’ in Politics and Crisis. pp. 
132 - 49. 
 
505 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. p. 181. ‘Le conte d’Erby et les 
Londriens avoient leurs espies alans et venans, qui leur rapportoient tout l’estat du roy, et aussi 
faisoient chevalliers et escuiers qui se venoient rendre au conte d’ Erby de leur voulenté.’ 
 
506 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. p. 181. ‘Nouvelles vindrent au dit 
conte d’Erby et à son conseil que le roy estoit retrait et enfermé ens ou chastel de Fluich, et 
n’avoit pas grans gens aveuc luy fors que son hostel tant seulement, et ne monstroient pas que il 
voulsist la guerre; ne la bataille, fors à yssir de ce dangier, se il pouvoit, par traittié.’ 
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Londoners and the rest of his army behind. This he did solely on his own initiative. 
‘Le conte d’Erby s’arresta, . . . et ot conseil de soy-meismes et non d’autry’, states the 
author, a comment that underlines the fact that although Henry normally followed 
the will of the Londoners, his decision to seek out Richard with only a few men was 
his own.507 However, Froissart, also proceeds to show how the Londoners at this 
point felt it necessary to gain Henry’s assurance that he would not be tricked to let 
Richard get away.508 
 
Froissart´s description of the events at Flint is highly dramatic. Banging loudly at the 
door of the castle where a frightened and deserted king was hiding, Henry is the 
master of the situation from the very beginning. Recognising the authority of Henry 
and the weak position of their King, Richard’s men urged their King to receive his 
cousin.509 Richard complied and in the meeting that followed between the two men,  
- the climax of Froissart´s account of the downfall of Richard - we meet a King highly 
reduced, shattered by the prospects of being surrendered to the raging Londoners. 
Henry, on the other hand, is described to have shown great courage by stepping into 
the castle with only twelve men. The asymmetrical relation between the two men is 
also seen in Froissart's account of how Henry reassured his distraught cousin that he 
would protect him against the Londoners. Fearing the mob and recognising that he 
                                                 
507 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. p. 181. 
 
508 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. pp. 181 - 82. 'Dont respondy le conte 
d'Erby et dist en telle manière: "Nennil, ne vous doubtés en riens. Tout ce qui est emprins à 
faire, sera fait." ' 
 
509 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. p. 183. 'Sire, en ceste requeste n’a que 
tout bien. Vous le povés bien faire venir à vous douzième tant seulement et oyr quel chose il 
voeult dire; c’est vostre cousin et un grant seigneur en ce pays. Il vous puet bien partout 
accorder, s’il veult; car il est moult grandement amé ou royaulme d’ Angleterre, et par espécial 
des Londriens qui l’ont remandé de par delà la mer et lesquels sont si fort eslevés présentement 
contre vous.' 
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had no other option, Richard accepted to do 'whatever Henry asked of him', 
according to the chronicler.510 
 
In Froissart´s account Richard put his fate in the hands of his cousin who is described 
to have allowed Richard to keep his household just as it was ‘without removing or 
changing any of his attendants,’ a comment that shows that Henry to some extent let 
Richard keep his dignity.511 Henry is also described to have sheltered Richard from 
the Londoners and issued strict orders that no one was to take anything from the 
castle or lay hands on any of Richard’s men. Henry, who the author at this point 
starts to call Duke of Lancaster, was now the lord, and ‘Richard of Bordeaux’, the 
inferior. Probably to further enhance the impression of the shift in status between the 
two men, Froissart relates the following story, which he says was told to him and 
which he claims was observed by more than thirty thousand people:  
 
King Richard had a greyhound called Blemach, says Froissart, 'a truly magnificent 
dog', which would follow no one except the King. As the King and the Duke were 
standing talking in the middle of the courtyard, ready to mount their horses and 
discussing how to proceed, the greyhound left the King and went to the Duke of 
Lancaster, 'showing him all the marks of affection which he used to show to the 
King'. According to the author, the Duke of Lancaster, who had never seen the dog 
before, was puzzled by the dog's behaviour and asked Richard for an explanation: 
'Cousin,' said the King, 'it demonstrates that you are of great importance, while I am 
                                                 
510 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. p. 186. ' "Non! dist le roy qui s'effroia 
grandement de ces paroles, car il sçavoit bien que les Londrien le haioient, et dist ainsi: "Et vous, 
cousin, n’y povés-vous pourveir? Je ne me mets point voulentiers en leurs mains; car je sçay 
bien que ils  me hayent et ont hay ung long temps, je qui suis leur sire.” Dont respondy le conte 
d’ Erby et dist: "Je n’y voy autre pourvéance, ne remède, fors que vous vous rendés à moy; et 
quant ils scauront que vous serés mon prisonnier, ils ne vous feront nul mal, mais il vous fault 
ordonner, et toutes vos gens, de venir à Londres et tenir prison en la Tour de Londres."' 
 
511 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. p. 186. ‘ . . . et luy fist avoir son estat 
tout entier sans muer, ne brisier, ainsi comme il le avoit eu en devant.’ 
 
 161
of very little. . . the dog is hailing and honouring you today as the King of England 
which you will be, while I shall be deposed . . . '. The Duke of Lancaster understood 
perfectly, states the author, and stroked the greyhound, which, according to the 
author, henceforth ignored Richard of Bordeaux and followed him.512 
 
The symbolism of the scene is powerful. Richard is defeated, a fact which is 
recognised by Richard’s companion animal, the most loyal and noble of dogs, the 
greyhound.513 The dog, which had hitherto always been loyal to Richard, followed 
what Froissart calls its 'congnoissance naturelle', and deserted his master for Henry. 
Although Richard was the anointed king, the greyhound revealed to all that it was 
Henry who was now the lord of the realm.  By relating this scene I also believe that 
Froissart is able to relieve some of the tension connected to Henry’s actions, because 
it enhances the impression that what happened was in fact God’s will.  
                                                 
512 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. p. 187. ‘Le roy Richart avoit ung 
lévrier, lequel lévrier on nommoit Blemach, très bel lévrier oultre mesure, et ne vouloit ce chien 
congnoistre nul homme fors le roy seulement, et lorsque le roy devoit chevauchier, celluy qui 
l'avoit en garde, le lassoiet aler, et ce lévrier venoit tantost devers le roy et le festoioit et luy 
mettoit ses deux piés sus ses epaules. Et adont en advint que le roy et le conte d´Erby parlans 
ensemble emmy la place de la court du dit chastelet leurs chevauls tous ensellés . . . ce lévrier 
nommé Blemach qui coustumier estoit de faire au roy ce que dit vous ay, laissa le roy et s´en 
vint tout droit au duc de Lancastre, et luy fist toutes les contenances telles que en devant il 
faisoit au roy Richart, et luy assist ses deux piés sus les espaules, et le commenca moult 
grandement à conjouir. Adont le duc de Lancastre point ne cognoissoit le lévrier demanda au 
roy et dist "Mais que veult ce lévrier faire?" - "Cousin, respondy lors le roy, ce vous est une 
moult grande significance et à moy une trés-petite" - "Comment, dist le duc de Lancastre, 
l´entendes-vous?" - "Je l'entends ainsi, dist le roy. Cestuy lévrier vous recueille et festoie 
aujourd´huy come roy d´Angleterre que vous séres, et j´en seray déposé et débouté, et le lévrier 
en a congnoissance naturelle; si le ténes delés vous, car il vous sieuvra et jà ne vous eslongera." 
Le duc de Lancastre entendy et notta bien ceste parole, et conjouy fort le lévrier, equel oncques 
depuis ne le habaadonna, car plus ne voulu sieuvrir le roy Richart, mais très-bien le duc de 
Lancastre, et ce veirent et sceurent eulx plus de trente mille hommes’. 
 
513 The medieval image of the dog is characterized by a fundamental ambiguity, says Ben Ramm 
in an article from 2005 on the significance of the chienet in Old French Romance. It is represented 
either as an unclean, quasi-heretical hell-hound, or else gentrified and even partly humanized 
as man's best friend. See Ramm, Ben: 'Barking Up the Wrong Tree? The significance of the 
chienet in Old French Romance.' in Parergon 22.1. 2005. The greyhound was generally revered as 
a noble animal and a symbol of goodness and luck. Although a hunting dog, used primarily at 
the end of the hunt when the quarry was in sight, the greyhound was valued for their docile 
temper at home, and often allowed inside as pets. 
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The story of the dog resembles an account given by Adam of Usk who claims to be 
an eyewitness to some of the events. Usk, too, claimed to have seen Henry with a 
greyhound ‘of wonderful nature’, that after the death of his first master, the Earl of 
Kent, Richard’s half-brother, had sought the company of King Richard.514 However, 
at one point during the events of late 1399, the dog left Richard’s court and turned 
up at Henry’s quarters in Shrewsbury where it was made welcome because Henry 
believed ‘that thereby his good fortune was foretold’, says Usk, who like Froissart 
makes a point of the fact that the dog would no longer recognise Richard. To what 
extent Froissart knew of Adam of Usk’s account of the events is uncertain, but the 
fact that both authors relate a similar story indicate that the story of the dog 
deserting Richard was a widespread story in the aristocratic milieu of the age.515 
 
According to Peter Ainsworth, Froissart included the passage relating the events at 
Flint where the greyhound Blemach left Richard in favour of Henry because he 
wanted to both safeguard his vision of what kingship should be as well as to give an 
unfailing transmission to posterity of the ancient values of chivalry. If Froissart 
'succeeds in making Henry Bolingbroke a just man who refuses to countenance the 
thought of regicide, the best means available to him with which to guarantee the 
resurrection of proece and simultaneously, that of his own (chivalrous) conception of 
the monarchy is a device which might legitimately be seen as the ultimate 
metonymic transference in the Chroniques, the scene in which Richard’s greyhound . . 
. deserts its royal master before an audience of thousands.'516 By relating the story of 
                                                 
514 See Chronicon Adae de Usk, ed. E. M. Thompson. 1904, pp. 191 - 202. Quoted here from The 
Chronicles of the Revolution, translated and annotated by Chris Given-Wilson. pp. 242 - 43. 
 
515 The Dieulacres chronicle also make an allusion to greyhounds when he says that it had been 
pre-ordained by a prophecy that the esquires of the Duke of Lancaster should subdue ‘like 
greyhounds’ the pride of the hated beast the white hart, Richard’s emblem. See The Chronicles of 
the Revolution, ed. Given-Wilson, Chris, Manchester 1993. p. 155. 
 
516 Ainsworth, Peter: Jean Froissart and the Fabric of History. Oxford 1990. p. 214. 
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the dog, Froissart not only shows that Henry was revealed to all as the true King, but 
also that Richard himself recognised and accepted it. In this way the dilemma 
regarding the rival claims of birth and legitimacy on the one hand, and of effective 
fitness to govern on the other, is resolved, says Ainsworth. This view, I believe, is 
supported by Froissart´s later descriptions of how Richard himself gave up his 
crown, recognising his own failures and his cousin’s superiority. 
 
In Jean Creton’s account in the Metrical History517 things happened somewhat 
differently at Flint. Creton was a Frenchman, valet-de-chambre to King Charles VI, 
and probably also a servant of the Duke of Burgundy. He tells us in his account, 
mainly written in verse, that he was an eyewitness to the meeting at Flint. Although 
partisan to Richard, Creton gives a fairly credible account of the events and does not 
demonise Henry. According to Creton, Henry sent the Earl of Northumberland to 
Richard, making him false promises and claiming that ‘He [Henry] desires nothing 
that is yours, for you are his immediate and rightful king; and he truly regrets the 
great mischief and wrong that he has committed against you . . . and will come 
before you most humbly on his knees and sue for mercy’. According to Creton, 
Richard was duped, taken prisoner by Northumberland and later taken to Flint were 
he awaited the arrival of Henry. This is in opposition to Froissart's statement that 
Richard was in fact hiding - not a prisoner - at Flint. 
 
Henry arrived at Flint accompanied by many knights and esquires, upwards of one 
hundred thousand men, says Creton, a description that differs from Froissart´s 
description of Henry's great courage when he arrived at Flint accompanied only by 
two hundred men and later stepped into the castle with only twelve of his closest 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
517 See Jean Creton’s account in The Chronicles of the Revolution, ed. Given-Wilson, Chris, 
Manchester 1993. pp. 13 - 152. Also see Creton, Jean: Metrical History, ed. and trans. Webb, pp. 
55 - 176; Collection des Chroniques Nationales Francaises, ed. J. A. Buchon, xxiii, Paris, 1826. pp. 341 
- 415.  
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followers. Creton also claims that many of the men in Henry's army where men who 
had hitherto been Richard’s. Henry’s troops surrounded the castle, says Creton, and 
when the imprisoned King had eaten, Henry called out in a 'stern and savage voice, 
“bring the King’s horses”, and he was brought two little horses that were not worth 
forty francs . . .'. This is a very different description from Froissart´s where he puts 
strong emphasis on the respect, protection and reassurance Henry offered the 
defeated Richard. 'It was in this way that Duke Henry captured King Richard, his 
lord', says Creton who clearly saw nothing honourable in Henry's actions. In 
Creton's opinion, this was a fierce assault on an anointed king and he shows how 
Richard was overwhelmed by trickery and by the sheer use of manpower. Not 
surprisingly there is little said about the Londoners and no mention of a greyhound. 
According to Creton, Richard was told that Henry was not seeking to overthrow 
him, but would accept peaceful settlement on three conditions: that his inheritance 
be restored to him, that a parliament be summoned over which he would preside as 
steward; and that five of the King's councillors be put on trial for treason. This, 
Richard is said to have accepted, but was fooled. 
 
According to Nigel Saul, we should not readily believe the accounts of Lancastrian 
origin, which maintain that Richard freely resigned his crown to Henry of Derby. 
Indeed, right to the end, says Saul, Richard was to take a principled stand on his 
anointed status.518 In Saul’s opinion it is also very likely that Henry had far greater 
ambitions on the outset than stated by Froissart. In spite of the fact that Froissart 
early in his account of the events says that overthrowing Richard was the stated goal 
for the Londoners, and shows how Henry signed an agreement to this effect 
immediately after arriving in London, Froissart still proceeds to portray Henry as 
being almost naively ignorant of this prospect, just wanting to regain his lands and 
                                                 
518 Nigel Saul: Richard II. Yale 1997. pp. 418 - 19. 
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rightful position. Seemingly, it was the events at Flint that ultimately made Henry 
realise that it might be right for him to seek the throne.  
 
At no point in Froissart´s account do we get the impression that it was Henry’s 
personal ambition to become king, and not once is he portrayed as scheming or 
making political plans to overthrow his cousin. His participation in the group of the 
Lords Appellant is described as the result of a wish to seek justice and the 
subsequent dispute with the Lord Marshal is described as a conflict where he was 
unjustly accused. The fact that in reality it was most probably Henry of Derby who 
instigated the conflict and accused the Lord Marshal of treason, supports the 
hypothesis that Froissart wanted to convey an image of Henry as a man propelled 
toward power by external forces, not driven by his own ambition.  
 
This impression is further enhanced in Froissart´s description of Richard’s meeting 
with Henry in the Tower after he had been brought to London, where the former 
King is said to have insisted on abdicating. Recognising that he had treated Henry 
and other members of his blood unjustly, Richard is said to have recognised that 
pardon was not an option for him. Therefore, he said, he would give up his crown 
freely. ‘Et pour tant, de bonne et libérale volenté, je vous veuil résigner léritage de la 
couronne d´Angleterre, et vous prie que le don et résignation prendés amiablement’, 
are the words Richard is said to have used.519 Richard, in Froissart´s account, is 
himself the ultimate judge of his actions, both in the scene at Flint where he 
interprets the meaning of the actions of the greyhound Blemach and here in the 
                                                 
519 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. pp. 198 - 99. ‘Nouvelles vindrent au 
duc de Lancastre que le roy Richart le demandoit et que il avoit grant désir de parler à luy. . . . le 
roy Richart . .  recueilly le duc de Lancastre moult doulcement et se humilia très-grandement 
envers luy, ainsi que celluy qui se veoit et sentoit en grant dangier et péril de sa vie, et luy dist: 
"Cousin, je regarde et considère mon estat . . . Et tant que à tenir règne, ne à gouverer poeuple, 
ne à porter la couronne, je n`ay que faire de penser . . . Cousin, tout considéré, je sçay bien et 
congnois que grandement je suis mesprins envers vous et envers plusieurs nobles de mon sang 
en ce pays, par lesquelles choses je sens et congnois que jamais je vendray à paix, ne à pardon.”' 
 
 166
Tower.520 Accepting that he was so unloved by his people that he could no longer 
rule, Richard gave up his throne of his own free will. 
 
It is difficult to say if Froissart´s account at this point was marked by Lancastrian 
propaganda or if he had other reasons for presenting the events as he did. What is 
clear, however, is that it is not very likely that the events in the Tower of London 
unfolded as the author claims. The abdication is for instance contested by the author 
of Chronique de la Traison et Mort de Richart Deux Roy Dengleterre who says that 
Richard refused to give up the throne for a considerable amount of time after being 
put in the Tower.521 The author of the Chronique de la Traison et Mort also shows 
Richard enraged by his imprisonment and Henry 'falling on his knees', assuring that 
nothing 'unreasonable' should be done to the King. The asymmetry, as we may see, 
is here in Richard's favour and he shows his regality even in prison. The Chronique de 
la Traison et Mort is of course at least as biased as Froissart´s, but according to Nigel 
                                                 
520 The image of the perpetrator admitting to his wrongful actions is in fact a literary tableau 
common in medieval literature. According to the author L'Histoire de Guillaume le Maréchal John 
Lackland admitted to treating the Marshal unjustly on his deathbed, and urged the Marshal to 
take care of his young son after his own death. HGM Verses 15174 - 87. 
 
521 Chronique de la Traison et Mort de Richart Deux Roy Dengleterre, ed. B. Williams. 1846. 
According to the author of Chronique de la Traison et Mort de Richart Deux Roy Dengleterre this is 
what happened: ‘The King asked the Duke of Lancaster, “Why do you keep me so closely 
guarded by you men-at-arms? I wish to know if you acknowledge me as your lord and king, or 
what you mean to do with me”. The Duke replied, “It is true that you are my lord and king, but 
the Council of the Realm has ordered that you should be kept in confinement until the day of 
the meeting of Parliament”. Then was the King in great wrath, but he could not help himself 
and said to the Duke that he did great wrong, both to him and the Crown. The Duke replied, 
"My lord, we cannot do otherwise till the Parliament meets." The King was so enraged by this 
speech that he could scarcely speak, and paced twenty-three steps down the room without 
uttering a word; and presently he broke out thus: “You have acknowledged me as your king 
these twenty-two years, how dare you use me so cruelly? I say that you behave to me like false 
men and like false traitors to their lord; and this I will prove, and fight four of the best of you, 
this is my pledge”, saying which the king threw down his bonnet. The Duke of Lancaster 
[Henry] fell on his knees and besought him to be quiet till the meeting of Parliament, and there 
everyone would bring forward his reason.“At least, fair sirs, for God’s sake let me be brought to 
trial, that I may give an account of my conduct, and that I may answer to all they would say 
against me.” Then said the Duke of Lancaster: “My lord, be not afraid, nothing unreasonable 
shall be done to you”. And he took leave of the King and not a lord who was there durst utter a 
word’.  
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Saul, an abundance of reports supports the view that Richard was tenaciously 
clinging to at least the outward vestiges of his regality and was resolutely defiant 
while in the Tower, before he finally gave in on the 29th of September 1399.522 'At no 
time in the lengthy exchanges with his interlocutors did he accept the idea of directly 
transferring his rights to his supplanter', says Saul who points to the description 
given by the Dieulacres writer who says that Richard eventually surrendered his 
crown and 'placed it on the ground and resigned his right to God'.  
 
According to Froissart, however, a repentant and humble Richard received the 
following reply from Henry when he stated his wish to renounce the throne: 
 
Quant le duc de Lancastre entendy ceste parole, si respondi 
et dist: "Il convient que à ceste parole soient veus et appellés 
plusieures de trois estas d´Angleterre. . . . par ce point vous 
appaiserés et adoulcirés grandement l´ayr et le maltalent de 
plusieurs hommes d´Angleterre; car pour obvier à tous 
maléfices qui trés-fort estoient eslevés en Angleterre par 
faulte de justice, qui de long temps n'avoit ne lieu, ne règne, 
ay-je esté de delà la mer mandé, et me veult de fait le 
poeuple couronner, et court voix et renommée par toute 
Angleterre que à la couronne je ay et ay tousjours plus 
grande action de droit que vous n´avés eu . . . Et, se vous 
eussiés les euvres du prince de Galles enssieuvy et creu bon 
conseil, ainsi que bon fils à son léal povoir en tout bien doit 
enssieuvir les oeuvres de son pére, vous fuissiés demouré 
roy et en vostre estat. . . .' 523 
                                                 
522 Nigel Saul: Richard II. Yale 1997. pp. 420 - 21. 
 
523 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. pp. 199 - 200.  
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'It was to end the disorders, which had arisen in the country through the break-down 
of the judicial system, that I was sent for from beyond the sea,' Henry is reported to 
have said, thus pointing to the will of the people and the well-being of the realm. 
However, had only Richard heeded good advice, ‘like a good son should endeavour 
to follow the example of his father’, and not relied on evil councillors his fate would 
have been different. Froissart, I believe, shared the opinions stated in this first part of 
Henry's speech. However, I find it less certain that he shared the opinions voiced in 
the second part of this speech, discussed in the next section. 
 
Froissart´s account ends with the events of the last months of Richard’s life and his 
death. Richard, he says, willingly renounced the Crown during an assembly at the 
Tower of London.524 Afterwards a parliament was held at Westminster were Henry 
was duly elected by the prelates and clergy of most of England as well as the dukes, 
earls and nobles of the realm and also the commoners of each town.525 Froissart, 
however, deals only briefly with these more technical affairs of the deposition. 
Henry’s coronation on the other hand is described in detail: The Duke, he says, was 
riding bareheaded and wearing the King of France’s emblem around his neck. 
Mounted on a white charger and wearing the blue garter on his left leg he was 
followed by his son and the rest of his retinue. He rode right through the city of 
London and was escorted to Westminster by a great number of noble burgesses, 
Lombards and merchants of London. In addition, all the grand masters of the guilds, 
each guild adorned with their particular emblems, were present together with six 
thousand others. 
 
                                                 
524 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. p. 202. 
 
525 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. p. 203. 
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The streets through which the Duke passed were covered with various kinds of 
hanging decorations, and white and red wine flowed from nine fountains in 
Cheapside, each with several jets, says Froissart who proceeds to describe how the 
Archbishop of Canterbury mounted a platform. At each of the four corners of it, the 
archbishop explained to the people how God had sent them a man to be their lord 
and king and asked if they all agreed that Henry should be anointed and crowned 
king. To this, they unanimously answered yes, says Froissart, and ‘stretched out their 
hands to pledge him loyalty and obedience’.526  
 
In spite of this, Henry and his men may have feared that the support was not so 
unanimous as it may have seemed at the coronation, and according to the author, 
they especially feared the reaction of the French King who was allied to Richard 
through his marriage to Isabella of France. Having received reports that the French 
might be gathering a force to come to Richard’s rescue, Henry was approached by 
men who said that as long as Richard of Bordeaux was alive, neither him nor the 
country would be secure.527 Henry, however, pointed out the promise he had made 
Richard, and said that he would not budge on the matter unless the King of France 
or somebody else made an attack on him.528  According to Froissart, the attack came 
shortly after when the Earls of Salisbury, Huntingdon and Kent as well as Thomas 
Despenser tried to attack Henry first at a tournament at Oxford, and later at his court 
at Windsor.  
                                                 
526 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. pp. 204 - 09. ‘. . . tout le poeuple 
tendirent leurs mains contremont en luy promettant foy et faisent grant liesse’. According to 
Froissart, Henry was duly consecrated, ‘anointed in six places’ and received the Sword of 
Justice and the Crown of St. Edward. At dinner, a knight named Dymoke came riding in, fully 
armed and challenged any ‘knight, squire or gentleman’ who cared to say that Henry was not 
the rightful king. The King also had this challenge cried by a herald-at-arms at six different 
places in the hall, but no one came forward, says the author. 
 
527 The French, who previously had taken Henry so much to their heart, had started to grow 
anxious over the situation in England and to worry about the young Queen, says Froissart.  
 
528 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. p. 222. 
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Enraged by the attacks, Henry sought out Richard in the Tower where he is said to 
have accused his cousin of conspiring. According to Froissart, Richard pleaded his 
innocence, claiming that he ‘was not aspiring to a different role than his present 
one’,529 a statement the author, who at no point shows Richard participating in the 
planning of the plot, seems to have believed. It should also be noted that Froissart 
does not condemn the three noblemen mentioned above and describes how the Earl 
of Huntingdon defended himself ‘like a valiant knight’ when he and the Count of 
Kent were attacked and killed by the bailiff of Cirencester.530 Valiant men both in 
England and elsewhere mourned Kent’s tragic fate, says the author, ‘because he was 
a young and good boy that had been advised against keeping the company that he 
did, but his uncle and the Duke of Salisbury persuaded him.’531 All the conspirators 
were killed and beheaded, and their heads sent to London in baskets. After this, says 
Froissart, the country remained in a fairly peaceful state. 
 
But the peaceful state should not last, and Froissart relates how it was made known 
to Henry and his advisers that the French were preparing for war.532 In this situation, 
Henry was again advised to put his cousin to death, a request he initially turned 
down, according to Froissart, pointing to his previous promise to Richard. But 
                                                 
529 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. p. 226. ‘Richard de Bourdeaulx 
s’excusa trop fort et dist, se Dieu luy peuist aydier et valloir à l’àme, de tout ce il ne sçavoit riens 
et ne tendoit jamai à avoir plus grant estat et que bien luy souffissoit.’ 
 
530 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. p. 229. 'On entendy à assaillier le 
conte de Hostidonne, car bien se deffendoit comme chevallier vaillaint qu’ il estoit, mais la force 
fut si grande sur luy qu’il ne la pot sourmonter, et fut atteré et occis en armes . . .’ 
 
531 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. p. 229. '. . .et avec luy son nepveu le 
jeune conte de Kent qui depuis fut moult plaint de plusieurs vaillans hommes en Angleterre et 
ailleurs, car il estoit jeune et beau fils, et moult envis se mist en celle compagnie, mais son oncle 
et le conte de Saslebéry luy boutèrent.’ 
 
532 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. p. 232. ‘Et se le conte de Hostidonne 
et conte de Saslebéry fuissent en vye, on suppose que les François euissent passé la mer, et 
avoient jà grans aliances en Angleterre.’ 
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Henry’s knights insisted that as long as the French knew Richard to be alive they 
would always make war on the English. 533 To this, says Froissart, Henry made no 
reply, but went out of the room and left them talking together. He went to see his 
falconers, placed a falcon on his wrist,534 and became absorbed in feeding it. Not 
many days afterwards, says Froissart, a true report ran through London that Richard 
of Bordeaux was dead. ‘From what cause he died, I do not know’, states the 
chronicler.535 The connection between the meeting of Henry and his knights and 
Richard’s death is nevertheless made by the fact that he reports Richard’s death 
immediately after the description of Henry’s deliberations with his knights. 
  
Froissart´s chronicles starts out with the tragic history of Edward II who married the 
daughter of the French King and gave his son so many reasons to overthrow him.536 
It finishes with the equally tragic story of the downfall of Richard II.  The symmetry 
between the beginning and the end of the chronicles is thus, evident, says Michel 
                                                 
533 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. pp. 232 - 33. ‘Si fut dit au roy: "Sire, 
tant que Richart de Bordeaux vive, vous, ne le pays, serés en seur estat". Respondy le roy: "Je 
croy bien que vous dittes vérités, mais tant que à moy, je ne le feray jà morir, car je l'ay pris sus. 
Se luy tenray son convenant, tant que apparant me sera que fait il me ara trahison." Si 
respondirent les chevaliers: "Il vous vauldra mieulx mort que vif, car tant que les François le 
sçauront en vie, ils s´efforcheront tousjours de vous guerroier, et auront espoir de le retourner 
encoires en son estat, pour la cause de ce que il a la fille de roy de France. Le roy d´Angleterre 
ne respondy point à ce propos et se départy de là et les laissa en la chambre, et il entendy à se 
faulconniers et mist ung faulcon sur son poing, et ainsi il se oublia à le paistre’. 
 
534 The animals described in medieval texts often have symbolic meaning attached to them, 
though the meaning attributed is by no means universal or unambiguous. Still, medieval men 
were fond of legends attributing peculiar behavior to animals, and relating those examples of 
behavior to human virtues or vices: thus, the animals became emblems of such virtue or vice. 
While a hawk or falcon was a venerable symbol of majesty and power, heraldic writers add that 
the Falcon denotes someone eager, or hot in the pursuit of an object much desired; if seated on 
its 'rest' or perch it may signify a bearer who is ready and serviceable for high affairs.  
 
535 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI p. 233. ‘Depuis ne demourèrent gaires 
de jours que renommée couru parmy Londres que Richart de Bourdeaulx estoit mort. La cause 
comment ce fut, ne par quelle incidence, point je ne le sçavoie au jour que je escipvy ces 
chroniques’. 
 
536 SHF Livre I. Tome II.  § 4 – 5. 
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Zink. 'Symétrie entre les destin des deux misérables rois, tous deux victimes dans 
leur brutalité et de leur faiblesse, tous deux deposés et assassinés dans leur prison, et 
de surcroît tous deux mariés à une fille du roi de France nommée Isabelle . . .'537 In 
the first redactions of the first book, Froissart says nothing of what happened to 
Edward II. However, in the last redaction of the first book, the Rome manuscript, 
Froissart says that he received information about the fate of Edward II when he was 
at Berkeley castle in September 1366. Here an old squire told him that the King had 
in fact been killed in prison.538 Although the author does not say so explicitly, we 
cannot help to get the impression that Richard too was helped towards his death. 
 
Some sources claim that Richard was starved to death, while the author of the 
Chronique de la Traison et Mort de Richart Deux Roy Dengleterre reports that Richard 
was attacked in prison. In keeping with the rest of his account the author of Traison et 
Mort depicts Richard valiantly defending himself against his attackers ‘like a good 
and loyal knight’.539 Walsingham’s version says that Richard became so depressed 
that he refused food and drink and ‘wasted away through natural debility’.540 
Froissart, on his side, evades the whole issue, and, as a result, leaves us with a 
question, rather than an answer.  
 
But the question regarding the nature of Richard's death is not the only question we 
are left with after having read Froissart´s account of the events and fate of King 
                                                 
537 Zink, Michel: Froissart et le Temps. Paris 1998. pp. 103 - 6. 
 
538 Froissart, Jean: Chroniques. Dernière rédaction du premier livre. Édition du manuscrit de Rome 
Reg.lat. 869. ed. George T. Diller. Genèvee. 1972. Chap. XIII, 1. 111 - 114. p. 90. 
 
539 The author of le Chronique de la Traison et Mort de Richart Deux Roy Dengleterre also claims that 
the knight who gave Richard his deathblow confessed to what he had done and lamented the 
fact that they had killed their rightful lord. See The Chronicles of the Revolution, ed. Given-Wilson, 
Chris, Manchester 1993. pp. 230  - 34, 
 
540 Walsingham, T: Annales Ricardi Secundi, in The Chronicles of the Revolution, ed. Given-Wilson, 
Chris, Manchester 1993. pp. 224 - 29. 
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Richard. According to Michel Zink, the last part of Froissart´s work, which describes 
the downfall of Richard II in 1399 - 1400 bears witness to a more lucid and severe 
look on the events he describes.541 Froissart, he says, is no longer blinded by 'le 
panache chevaleresque'. Instead, the author seems to have learned a lot about the 
failings and shortcomings of the great and powerful.  Zink’s observation, I believe is 
right. But what exactly are the values conveyed in this part of the account, and what 
according to the author was the relationship between kingship and chivalry? 
 
4.2. The ideal king 
 
Froissart´s account of the downfall of Richard II is extraordinarily rich in 
information, colourful and tragic. However, it is also difficult to discern what values 
and ideals the chronicler is attempting to convey in his narrative. When summing up 
his analysis of the Rome manuscript of Book I composed around the same time as 
the author set down his account of the downfall of Richard, Ainsworth says: ‘It is as 
though Froissart does not quite succeed in reconciling the many perceived 
contradictions between the old, trusted ideal, and new, model behaviour that are 
reflected in his pages’.542  I would argue that the same is the case for the last book of 
his chronicles, Book IV, and it is easy to see why some scholars in the past have 
argued that Froissart was rather sympathetic to Richard, while others have claimed 
the opposite.543 
 
                                                 
541 Zink, Michel: Froissart et le Temps. Paris 1998. pp. 95 - 96. 
 
542 Ainsworth, Peter F.: Jean Froissart and the Fabric of History. Truth, Myth and Fiction in the 
Chroniques. Oxford 1990. p. 305. 
 
543 See George B. Stow in ‘Richard II in Jean Froissart’s Chroniques’ in Journal of Medieval History 
11 .1985. pp.  333 - 45. 
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As we have seen, Froissart consistently portrays Henry as the more courageous of 
the two men, the more valiant and generous, in particular towards his cousin after 
the capture at Flint. Froissart also downplays the role played by Henry in the revolt 
of the Lords Appellant and omits that he was the commander at the battle of Radcot 
Bridge. These observations, in my opinion, supports the view that Froissart was 
trying to avoid showing Henry in what he may have felt was a too close alliance with 
Thomas of Gloucester. During Henry's stay in France, Froissart describes how the 
Earl's valour and wisdom were recognised by the French nobility who took him so 
much to their heart that he was offered the daughter of one of the most prominent 
magnates in marriage. These prospects were in turn shattered by the intervention of 
the vengeful Richard who is also described to have disinherited his cousin. When 
sought out by the Archbishop of Canterbury in Paris, Froissart portrays Henry as 
exclusively responding to the needs of the English people, and especially the 
powerful Londoners. Derby, in Froissart's account, was their saviour, not a man 
seeking to restore his honour or gain justice and revenge for himself. The decision to 
march against his cousin was not one that Henry took on his own, but in accord with 
the Londoners and his closest advisors. All these events contribute to the picture of 
Henry as an essentially honourable and loyal magnate who became the victim of 
conspiracy. 
 
In contrast, the picture of Richard, who initially, in Book II, is portrayed as being able 
to assert himself and act with courageous authority even when prominent magnates 
felt frightened, increasingly becomes negative as the work progresses, and he is 
frequently shown as irresolute and lacking in determination. His failures are 
summed up in a speech the author attributes to John of Gaunt after his son, Henry of 
Derby, had been banned from England: 
 
'Nostre nepveu le roy d´Angleterre honnira tout avant qu´il 
cesse. Il croit conseil senestre moult legièrement, qui le destruira 
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et son royaulme aussi. Il perdra, se il vit longuement, trop 
simplement et à petit d´armes faire, tout ce qui a tant cousté de 
payne et de traveil à nos prédicesseurs et à nous aussi. Il laisse 
et seuffre engendrer et nourrir haynes en ce royaulme entre les 
nobles et les grans dont ils devroit estre amé, servy et honnouré, 
et le pays gardé et doubté. . . . Il ne veult oyr parler homme qui 
bien luy veuille dire, ne enseigner, ne croire, ne entendre, fors sa 
voulente. Il ne peult mieulx destruire son royaulme que de 
mettre tourble et hayne entre les nobles et les bonnes villes. 
Franchois sont trop soubtils: pour ung mal et meschief qui nous 
vient, ils vouldroient que il nous en venist dix, car autrement ne 
pèvent-ils recouvrer leurs dommages  . . .  Et on voit clèrement 
(et a-on vu tousjours) que tous royaulmes qui d´euls-meismesse 
divisent, sont désolés et destruis.' Ainsi disoit le duc de 
Lancastre. 544 
 
Although Froissart may not have agreed with all the accusations voiced above, the 
speech, I believe, provides information about the author’s perception of kingship:545 
Foremost amongst the accusations against Richard was that he had let himself be 
guided by evil councillors and ‘marmousets’ unable or unwilling to give the King 
‘prudent conseil’. To be able to recognise good advise, was, as we have seen in the 
                                                 
544 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. pp. 98 - 99. Gaunt is said to have 
pointed out several examples of societies ridden by internal divison: ‘On l'a veu par le royaulme 
d´Espaigne, par le royalme de Napples et par la terre de l´Église, et voit-on encoires tous les 
jours par le fait de papes toute leur destruction. De reschief on l'a veu par le pays de Flandres 
comment d´euls-meismes ils se sont destruits. On le voit aussi présentement par le royaulme de 
Frise, lequel nos cousins de Haynnau ont enchargié en guerre, comment les Frisons aussi 
d´euls-meismes, se sont destruis et destruiront. Aussi de nous-meismes, se Dieu n´y pourvoit, 
nous nous destruirons: on en voit trop grandement les apparans.’ I believe that Froissart here 
voices his own opinion. 
 
545 For a further discussion on this ‘Sermon on Kingship and Internecine see Ainsworth, Peter: 
Jean Froissart and the Fabric of History. Oxford 1990. p. 106. 
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previous chapter on Froissart´s descriptions of warfare, one of the marks that 
distinguished good kings and magnates like Edward III, John the Good and the 
Black Prince. It is also a point made by other authors of the day like Christine de 
Pizan who, in her Book of the Body Politic, says that the good prince is he who 
honours the wise.546 Richard, however, is described to have trusted and rewarded 
men who sought to fulfil their own ambitions on numerous occasions. King Richard, 
says Froissart, had a character 'that was such that when he took a liking to a man, he 
elevated him so much that people were amazed', a comment underlining the King's 
lack of even-handedness and wisdom in the distribution of patronage. The King also 
believed the advice of such parvenus more easily than any other king who had ever 
reigned in England, says Froissart, thus, indicating that the King was gullible and 
easily manipulated.547  
 
In Froissart's opinion, Richard was easily impressionable and easy to persuade. This 
is a fairly negative evaluation, but one which also underlines the fact that, in 
Froissart's opinion, the problem was not so much that Richard himself had dubious 
intentions, but that he lacked strength of character or wisdom. Only once do we hear 
that Richard decided to act in a violent manner completely on his own accord, 
namely when he decided to attack the Lords Appellant.548 Reflecting that it was 
better 'to destroy, than to be destroyed', says Froissart, the King, who had been left 
by his uncles to fend for himself against Gloucester, turned to the Earl Marshal for 
                                                 
546 de Pizan, Christine: The Book of the Body Politic. ed. and trans. K. L. Forhan. Cambridge 1994. 
p. 39. 
 
547 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. p. 83 and pp. 89 – 90. ‘Le roy Richart 
d’ Angleterre avoit une condition telle que quant il enchargoit ung homme, il le faisoit si grant 
et si prochain de luy que merveilles, ne nuls n’osoit parler du contraire, et créoit si légièrment ce 
que on luy disoit et conseilloit que oncques roy qui esté en Angleterre, don’t mémoire fuist de 
grant temps.’ 
 
548 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. pp. 26 - 28. See above, note 456. p. 
147. 
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help. As we have seen above, the author states that the dukes of Lancaster and York 
were to regret that they had left the King's court at this stage, and that the following 
events would not have occurred if they had stayed. These comments, I believe, show 
that Richard, in Froissart's opinion, was not the only one to blame for the later 
events.549 
 
Froissart's portrayal of Richard is not the portrayal of an 'evil' king like for instance 
Pedro the Cruel, whom the author says was 'si crueulz et si plains d'erreur et de 
austerité',550 but a king unable to make wise descisions and show charismatic 
leadership. In Froissart´s Book III and IV, Richard is consistently shown as a king 
unable to make people rally around his political idea to establish lasting peaceful 
relations with the French. Instead, his intention to wage war elsewhere rather than 
on France was met with confusion and disbelief, and as we may see above, Gaunt 
states that Richard was wrong in seeking an alliance with the French. The 
consequences of Richard’s actions would be 'the ruin of the realm' and loss of the 
‘inheritance’ given to him by his forefathers. However, in my opinion, Froissart 
himself did not directly disapprove of Richard’s ambition to wage war elsewhere 
than in France, a view I find supported by the account of how the news of Richard’s 
intention to marry the daughter of the French king were received in France. 
Although many of the noblemen of the French King’s council questioned the 
proposal, he says, and believed it unwise for the French King to ally himself to the 
English, a young man, Rainault de Corby, who was ‘valiant and wise’ and 'who 
understood well how the affaires of France should be ordered,' was able to 
demonstrate to the French that the English King had good intentions and that the 
                                                 
549 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. pp. 22 - 23. See above, note 455 p. 
147. 
 
550 SHF Livre I. Tome VI. § 547. 
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marriage was a wise move.551 In his advice to the French King Corby is also said to 
have pointed out that it was Thomas of Gloucester - not Richard’s other uncles, the 
Duke of Lancaster and the Duke of York - who was opposed to the plans of 
establishing lasting peace with France.  
 
Another passage in the chronicles supporting the view that Froissart was favourable 
to peace is his account of how a 'prudent and valiant' knight named Robert le 
Mennoit (later called Robert the Hermit) received a vision during a storm when he 
was returning from his travels abroad.552 In this vision, Robert was told that the war 
between France and England had gone on for too long and that he should seek out 
the respective kings to persuade them to cease the hostilities and establish lasting 
peace. Robert did as he had been told, and approached the King of France at 
Abbeville. Speaking 'softly and wisely', says Froissart, Robert was able to convince 
the King that his vision was the result of 'divine inspiration', and that God through 
Robert had expressed his will.553 However, present at the French court were not only 
the noblemen of France. Also the English lords John of Gaunt, the Count of 
Salisbury, Sir Thomas Percy, Thomas of Gloucester, the Count of Arundel and the 
bishops of Lincoln and London were present, according to the author.554 Most of 
                                                 
551 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XV. p. 184. ‘Pour ce temps avoit en France 
ung chancellier sage et moult vaillant homme durement, qui s’ appelloit messire Reignault de 
Corbie, et moult ymaginatif, et veoit du long et du large toutes les besoingnes de France 
comment elles porroient cheoir et venir, et disoit bien au roy et à ses oncles: "Messeigneurs, on 
doit entrer par le droit huys en la maison. Ce roy Richard d’ Angleterre monstre que il ne veult 
à nous, ne au royaulme de France, que toute amour, quant par cause de mariage il se veult 
aloyer."’ 
 
552 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XV. p. 189. 
 
553 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XV. p. 193. 'Robert l' Ermite vint emmy 
eulx, et là encommencha à parler moult froidement et sagement et à remontrer toute l' aventure 
. . . et disoit et maintenoit en ses paroles que la vision qui luy estoit advenue, estoit inspiration 
divine, et que Dieu luy avoit transmis pour tant que c'estoit son plaisir que il fuist ainsi.' 
 
554 This was due to the Anglo-French peace negotiations. Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de 
Froissart. Tome XV. p. 190. 
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these were inclined to believe that God had indeed showed his intentions through 
Robert, says Froissart, but Thomas of Gloucester and the Count of Arundel did not. 
However, a letter relating Robert's vision was sent to King Richard, who was greatly 
rejoiced by its content.555 Froissart later relates how Robert came to England to speak 
of his vision and met with Richard and John of Gaunt who rewarded him grandly on 
his departure.556 However, he also visited Thomas of Gloucester at Pleshey where he 
tried to persuade the Duke of the merits of peace. But according to Froissart, the 
duke was a hard man who 'loved war more than peace'. Gloucester was not readily 
moved, and Robert left without being able to persuade him.557 Still, Robert, in 
Froissart's account, is said to have pointed out the cruel fate he believed would befall 
those who opposed peace, and as we know Thomas of Gloucester did indeed meet 
with a cruel fate when he was murdered at Calais. 
 
The 'oiseuses’ - ‘foolish’ opinions of Thomas of Gloucester is related in a 
conversation the Duke is said to have had with one of his knights: 
 
'. . . pour le présent, il´n y a point de roy en Angleterre, qui 
veuille, ne qui ayme, ne qui désire les armes, car, se il y estoit, il le 
remonstreroit . . . Et le pueple de ce pays qui désire la bataille à 
plus grant et riche de luy, se adventurroit hardiement pour la 
bonne et grasse despouille qu'il en esperroit avoir, ainsi que du 
temps passé nos gent ont eu du temps du roy de bonne mémoire 
                                                 
555 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XV. pp. 193  -  94. 
 
556 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XV. p. 202. ' A son département, le roy 
d'Angleterre, pour l'onneur et amour du roy de France qui par delà l'avoit envoyé, luy donna 
des grans dons et beaulx, et aussi firent le duc de Lancaster et le duc d'Iorch, le conte de 
Hostidonne et le conte de Saslebery et messire Thomas de Perssy, .  . . ' 
 
557 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XV. pp. 196 - 201. ' Adont il compta de 
mot à mot toute la vision qui advenue luy estoit, pour esmouvoir le cuer du duc de Glocestre à 
pitié et raison; mais certes ce duc avoit le courage dur et auster.' Froissart utilises several pages 
to relate Robert the Hermite's speech to Thomas of Gloucester. 
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mon père et mon frère le prince de Galles. . . se je povoie estre ouy 
et creu, je seroie le premier à renouveller les guerres et à 
recouvrer les tors fais, lesquels on nous a fais et fait encoires tous 
les jours par la simplesse et lâcheté de nous, et par espécial de 
nostre chief le roy qui s´est alyé par mariage à son adversaire: ce 
n´est pas signe que il le veuille guerroier. Nennil, non, il a le cul 
trop pesant, il ne demande que le boire et le mengier, le dormir, le 
danser et l´espringuier: ce n´est point vie de gens d´armes qui 
vueillent acquérir honneur par armes et traveillier leur corps . . . 
Dont on verra temprement une grande rébellion en ce pays; car le 
poeuple commence jà à parler et à murmurer, disant que telles 
choses ils ne veulent plus souffrir, ne porter. Il donne à entendre . 
. . que il veult faire ung voiage en Yrlande et là emploier ses gens 
d´armes et ses archiers, et jà y a-il esté et petit conquesté, car 
Yrlande n'est pas terre de conqueste, ne de proufit. . . .' Ainsi se 
devisoit le duc de Glocestre à son chevallier de telles oiseuses 
paroles et d´autres plus grandes, ainsi que depuis fut bien sceu.'558 
 
If we see the speech above in connection to the numerous negative evaluations of 
Gloucester and his actions in the account, I find it unlikely that the opinions voiced 
above about Richard's lack of martial skills were opinions that Froissart himself held 
of King Richard. 559  However, the speech provides insight into the feelings of the 
                                                 
 
558 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome  XVI. pp. 3 - 5.  
 
559 Richard's lack of martial skills was an often-vooiced accusation. See for instance Walsingham, 
T.: Historia Anglicana, ed. H. T. Riley. 2 vols. London 1863-64, p. 156. Walsingham here states 
that Richard’s knights were 'knights of Venus rather than knights of Bellona, more valiant in the 
bedchamber than on the field'. 'These fellows, who are in close association with the King, care 
nothing for what a knight ought to know - I am speaking not only about the use of arms but 
also about those matters which a noble king should be concerned in times of peace, such as 
hunting and hawking and the like - activities that serve to enhance the honour of a king.' 
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harshest of Richard’s critics, including Gloucester’s allies, the Londoners.560 In this 
manner Froissart is able to make an important and informative observation; namely 
that it was a common held opinion that continental war was the only war that 
mattered to many of the English noblemen.  
 
As we have seen in Froissart´s descriptions of war in the previous chapter, where he 
describes the great spoils made by Edward III and his army, there can be no doubt 
that he too knew that the warfare on the European mainland had been a source of 
enrichment for both noblemen and townsmen alike.561 When Richard refused to state 
his continental claims and choose instead to wage war in Ireland, many believed that 
Richard had not only removed the possibility of material gain from the English 
noblemen, but also the possibility for the English to prove themselves on an 
international arena in order to augment their symbolic capital. According to Thomas 
of Gloucester there was 'neither honour nor profit' to be found in Ireland, a view 
somewhat supported by Froissart´s own account of the primitive state of Ireland and 
how the Irish kings submitted to Richard ‘par amour et doulceur’, rather than by 
giving battle.562 From what we can gather however, this was not something that 
detracted from Richard’s honour in Froissart´s opinion. ‘The cost of the Irish 
                                                 
560 When discussing matters in England with Sir Jean de Grailly, Grailly said this about 
Gloucester: 'Ce Thomas de Glocestre est d'une très - merveilleuse teste, et est orgueilleux et 
présumptueux et de très-perilleuse manière, mais, quoy que il face, ne die, il est tousjours 
advoué de la communaulté d'Angleterre et en est très grandement bien amé. Et tousjours 
s'enclinent à luy et il à euls.' Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XV. p. 154. 
 
561 Froissart's account is supported by for instance the account of Thomas Walsingham in which 
he says that there were few women who did not possess something from Caen, Calais, or other 
overseas towns, such as clothes, furs, or cushions. See Walsingham, T.: Historia Anglicana, ed. H. 
T. Riley. 2 vols. London 1863 - 64.: ‘Tablecloths and linen were seen in everyone’s houses. 
Married women were decked in the trimmings of French matrons, and if the latter sorrowed 
over their loss, the former rejoiced their gain’. 
 
562 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XV. pp. 168 - 170. ‘Lors commença Henry 
Cristède, et dist en telle manière: " . . . Verité est que quatre roys d’Yrlande des plus puissans 
qui y sont selon la fourme du pays, sont venus à obéissance au roy Richart d’ Angleterre par 
amour et doulceur, non par bataille, ne par constrainte. . . "' 
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campaign had been willingly born by the English realm who saw that their money 
had been well spent when Richard returned with honour from this campaign’, the 
‘good and prudent’ knight, Henry Crystede,563 is reported to have said to the 
chronicler.564 However, the author’s statement that Richard 'employed none but 
gentry and archers in the war’,565 indicates that he was aware that the Irish 
campaigns presented few possibilities for gain for the greater magnates.  
 
Richard’s inability to uphold internal peace and justice, however, seems to be a vital 
point in Froissart´s critique, expressed by Gaunt’s accusation that Richard was 
destroying his kingdom by putting ‘trouble and hate between the noblemen and the 
good towns’. Kingdoms who are internally divided, says Gaunt, will always be 
desolate and destroyed, an opinion Froissart expresses several times throughout his 
chronicles, especially in Book II where he relates the Peasants' revolt and the 
uprisings in Flanders.566 The unrest, in Froissart´s description, was primarily caused 
by the opinion of some of the burghers that they could have a better life without the 
nobles.567 To this effect, the people of Ghent killed the Earl of Flanders' bailiff, an 
                                                 
563 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XV. p. 181.  Henry Crystede is initially 
described as 'moult homme de bien et de prudence pourveu et assés bien parlant la langue de 
France' and later as ' bien courtois et gracieux.' 
 
564 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XV. pp. 168 - 69. 'Lors commença Henry 
Cristède, et dist en telle manière: "Il n'est point en mémoire que oncques roy d' Angleterre, pour 
aler en Yrland et faire guerre aux Yrlandois, euist si grant appareil de gens d'armes et d'archiers, 
comme le roy a eu celle saison et tenu plus de noeuf mois sur la frontière d'Yrlande et à grant 
coustages, et tout ces despens a payé trop voulentiers son pays, et tiennent tout à bien employé 
les marchans des cités et des bonnes villes d’ Angleterre ce qu’ils y ont mis, quant ils voient que 
le roy est à son honneur retourné de ce voyage . . .’ 
 
565 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XV. p. 169. ' . . . et n’ a fait sa guerre fors 
de gentils hommes et d’archiers.' 
 
566 SHF Livre II. Tome X. § 212. 'Che fu une mervilleuse cose et de povre fondacion, dont ceste 
pestillensse commencha en Engletière; et pour donner exemple à toutes manières de bonnes 
gens, j'en parlerai et le remonstrerai selonc ce que dou fait et de le incidensse j' en fui adont 
infourmés.' 
 
567 This according to Froissart was also the cause of the Peasant’s revolt and he relates how the 
rebel-leader, John Ball, incited the men to action in a speech: '”Bonnes gens, les coses ne poent 
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event deeply regretted by the ‘good men, sage and rich’ of the town, who 
understood how ungracious people had brought their town into peril and 
destruction, says Froissart.568 Although the Count of Flanders is not a man 
consistently shown in a positive light in the Chroniques,569 Froissart describes how the 
Count in a meeting with the men of Ghent was able to appease them. ‘The Count 
began to speak sagaciously,’ says Froissart, ‘showing them from point to point the 
love and affection he had for them’. Demonstrating how a prince and lord ought to 
be loved, feared, served and honoured, the Count was able to persuade at least the 
'wise' men of the town that they had behaved wrongly, says Froissart, who seems to 
be of the opinion that a good lord was he who was able to establish a climate where 
burghers and noblemen could relate in a peaceful and orderly manner.570 Like 
                                                                                                                                                        
bien aler en Engletière ne iron jusques à tant que li bien iront tout de commun et que il ne sera 
ne villains ne gentils homs, que nous ne soions tout ouni. A quoi faire sont cil, que nous 
nommons signeur, plus grant maistre de nous?  . . .  Il ont les vins, les espisses et les bons pains, 
et nous avons le soille, le retrait et le paille, et buvons l'aige. Ils ont le sejour et les biaux 
manoirs, et nous avons le paine et le travail, et le pleue et le vent as camps, et faut que de nous 
viengne et de nostre labeur ce dont il tiennet les estas. Nous sommes appelé serf et batu, se nous 
ne faissons presentement leur service . . . "' SHF Livre II. Tome X. § 212.  In Tableau de la litérature 
francaise, Jean Giono writes ‘Il (Froissart) ne voit ni le peuple ni le bourgois. Pour fair partie de 
son univers et donc de son histoire, il faut être au moins comte’, a statement which is clearly not 
correct. Giono, Jean: Tableau de la litérature francaise. Paris 1962. pp. 138 - 39. 
 
568 SHF Livre II. Tome IX. § 111. ’Li bonnes gens de Gaind, li riche homme et li notable, qui 
avoient là dedens leurs femmes et leurs enffans et leurs marcheandisses, leurs hiretages ens et 
hors, et qui avoient apris à vivre honnerablement et sans dangier, n’estoient mies bien aisse de 
ce que il veoient les coses en che partie, et se sentoient trop grandement fourfait enviers leur 
signeur. Si regardèrent entre iaulx que il i convenoit pourveïr de remède et amender che fourfait 
ores ou autre fois, et euls mettre en le merchi dou conte; si valoit mieux tempre que tart.’ 
 
569 SHF Livre II. Tome IX. § 129. The author relates how the count had contributed to his own 
troubles by being greedy ‘in the same manner as various lords are likely inclined to seek profit, 
and not think of the consequences, for covetousness deceives them’. The Earl was also 
persuaded to take sides in an internal conflict between two families in Ghent, and John Lyon, 
who lost his office due to this quarrel, would later become the leader of the White Hats. We 
should note that Froissart has no problems with describing the Earl’s more negative traits, but 
apparently this did not alter his general perception of the situation. The Earl, despite his 
foolishness and greed, was the lawful lord of the realm and should be obeyed and respected. 
 
570 SHF Livre II. Tome IX. § 129. ‘La commencha li contes à parler moult sagement. Tout se 
teurent, quant il parla. Là leur remonstra il de point en point l’amour et l’ affeccion que il avoit à 
iaulx, avant que il l’euissent corouchié; là leur remonstra il comment uns sires devoit estre amé, 
cremus, servis et honnerés de ses gens; là remonstra il comment ils les avoit tenus, gardés et 
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Richard II at Smithfield, the Count was able to show courage and ‘sound judgement’ 
when faced with his subjects. However, in Froissart's account, the Count also 
showed clemency and willingness to forgive, provided that his people, in the future, 
would behave better. 
 
 The ideal relationship between a king and his subjects is to be one of love, writes 
Henri de Gauchi (after Gilles de Rome): ‘Li rois et li prince . . . se doivent fere amer 
de lor pueple’, moreover, they should seek to inspire love, rather than induce fear in 
their subjects.571 Gilles de Rome's work De Regimine Principum, written in the 1270's 
enjoyed wide circulation in later medieval Europe and Richard's tutor, Sir Simon 
Burley, is known to have owned a copy.572 A similar view is also expressed by 
Froissart´s contemporary, Christine de Pizan, in her Book of the Body Politic where she 
argues that every member of the body plays a different role and should fulfil the 
function assigned peacefully.573 Harmony between the members of the body, ‘les 
                                                                                                                                                        
deffendus contre tout homme; . . . Là leur remonstroit il plusieurs poins raisonnables que li sage 
concevoient, et entendoient bien clerement que de tout il dissoit verité. Plusieurs l’ooient 
volontiers, et li aucun non, qui ne demandoient que l’enredie. Quant il eut là esté une heure et 
plus, et qu’ il leur ost remonstrées toutes ses intencions bellement et douchement, en le fin il dist 
que il voloit demorer leurs bons sires en le fourme et manière que il avoit esté par devant, et 
leur pardonnoit rancunes, haïnnes et mautalens que il avoit eu à iaulx et aussi malefisces fais, ne 
plus n’en volloit öir nouvelles, et les voloit tenir en droit et en signourie, enssi que tousjours 
avoit fait; mais leur prioit que riens ne fesissent de nouviel et que cil blanc cappron fuissent mis 
jus.’ 
 
571 See reference in Ainsworth, Peter F.: Jean Froissart and the Fabric of History Truth, Myth and 
Fiction in the Chroniques. Oxford 1990. p. 175. Aegedius Romanus (“Gilles de Rome”): Li Livres du 
gouvernement des rois, version franCaise du traité . . . De regimine principum rédigée vers la find du 
XIIIe siècle par Henri de Gauchi. Ed. S.P. Molenaer. London 1899. p. 368. 
 
572 Jones, R.H.: The Royal Policy of Richard II: Absolutism in the Later Middle Ages. Oxford 1968. p. 161. 
 
573 de Pizan, Christine: The Book of the Body Politic. ed. and trans. K. L. Forhan. Cambridge 1994. 
de Pizan’s book takes it name and organizing theme from John of Salisbury’s twelfth-century 
work, Policraticus, in which the political community is described as a body with the king as its 
head, soldiers and administrative officers as the hands, and the peasants as the feet. While John 
of Salisbury attributes this well-known metaphor to a letter from Plutarch to his pupil Trajan, 
most contemporary scholars see this as a polite fiction, and believe the use of the image to be 
John’s own. The human body was later used by several other authors to express 
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princes, la chevalerie et le people’, was perceived as the condition necessary for its 
survival. The good king, according to de Pizan, is he who ‘guards his sheep from 
wolves and evil beasts, and keeps them clean and healthy so that they can increase 
and be fruitful and yield their fleece whole’.574 Froissart makes a similar point about 
the lord's role in relation to his subjects when he says that the Count of Flanders 
demonstrated to the people of Ghent how he had ‘kept and defended them against 
all men, and how he had kept them in peace, profit and prosperity.’575  
 
Richard, in Froissart´s account, was not able to assume the role as the keeper and 
defender of his people, but is accused of not upholding justice and peace in his realm 
on several occasions. As a result, honest men seeking ‘paix, amour et simplesse’, and 
to pay their dues, were prevented from doing so, says Froissart, 576 and did not know 
to whom to turn for protection or justice.577 This was clearly failing one of his 
foremost duties, according to the author, who explores the subject of the king as 
guardian and defender of his people, even against the oppression of his own vassals, 
in his account of a visit the young King of France, Charles VI, made to the south of 
France:578  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
interdependence, hierarchy and duty, depending on the author’s political views. See Struve, 
Tilman: Die Entwicklung der organologishen Staatsauffassung im Mittelalter, Stuttgart 1978. 
 
574 de Pizan, Christine: The Book of the Body Politic. ed. and trans. K. L. Forhan. Cambridge 1994. 
p. 16. 
 
575 SHF Livre II. Tome IX. § 129. ' . . . là leur remonstra il comment il les avoit tenus en paix en en 
pourfit et en toutes prosperités. Depuis que il estoit venus à tière, ouviers les passages de mer 
qui leur estoient clos en son jone avent . . .' 
 
576 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. p. 156. See above, note 491. p. 154. 
 
577 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. p. 156. See above, note 492. p. 155. 
 
578 Chroniques. Livres III et IV. Livre IV. § 4. p. 372. 
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Having visited Burgundy and Pope Clement at Avignon, King Charles is reported to 
have passed through his domains in Languedoc. This region, according to the 
chronicler, had been harshly exploited in the past by Charles’s uncles, the Dukes of 
Anjou and Berry.579 The object of the King’s visit, says Froissart, was to investigate 
the complaints of extortion that had been brought to him.580 In Montpellier the King 
and his councillors discussed the affairs of the town in detail, says Froissart, who 
stresses that this 'revision' was the main aim of the King’s visit.581  
 
In the account of Charles's visitation, the inhabitants from the town and the 
surrounding countryside are described to have awaited their king eagerly in order to 
lay complaints before him against an official of the Duke of Berry called Betisac. 
According to Froissart, Betisac had stripped the surrounding districts of everything 
he had been able to lay his hands on,582 and complaints, which spoke loudly of 
Betisac's scandalous administration and of the impositions and extortion he had 
inflicted on the people, had been brought to the King in the form of petitions.583 At 
Béziers, Betisac, who had been in the King’s company since he left Avignon, was 
summoned to explain himself. Simultaneously, examiners went to Betisac’s house 
and took possessions of all the documents and accounts relating to his dealings in 
                                                 
579 Chroniques. Livrse III et IV. Livre IV. §  4. pp. 379 – 80. 
 
580 Chroniques. Livres III et IV. Livre IV. § 4. p. 381. 'Don’t le roy complaindoit bien les hommes et 
bonnes gens qui avoient eu si grant dommaige, et disoit leur promettoit que il y pourveroit et 
refourmeroit tout le paÿs en bon estat.' 
 
581 Chroniques. Livres III et IV. Livre IV. § 4. p. 382. 'A ces parolles respondoit le roy et disoit: " Se 
Dieux m’aït à l’ame, je y entenderay voulentiers et y pourveray avant mon retour et pugniray 
les mauvais, car je feray faire inquisistion sur les offices de mes oncles qui ont ou tamps passé 
gouverné les parties de la Languedoch et seront corrigiés ceulx qui l’aront desservy" . . .' 
 
582 Chroniques Livre III et IV. Livre IV. § 6. pp. 398 – 99. 
 
583 Chroniques. Livres III et IV. Livre IV. § 7. p. 400. ‘Lors luy furent moustrees une grant quantité 
de letters et de complaintes, lesquelles avoient esté apportees à Besiers et donnees au roy par 
maniere de supplications, qui tout parloient et chantoient du fol gouvernement ce Bethisach et 
des oppressions et extorsion que il avoit fait au peuple.’ 
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the past, says Froissart who is thereby showing that the trial against Betisac was 
thoroughly prepared by the King’s men.584 The next passages in Froissart´s text relate 
the examiners findings and Betisac’s subsequent trial and execution. However, 
Froissart more than hints at the fact that Betisac had performed his extortions in 
agreement with his master, the Duke of Berry.585 
 
Charles VI is not a king consistently praised by Froissart, and he should later fall ill 
and suffer from what the author describes as ‘frénesie’.586 However, at this particular 
point Froissart's portrayal of the King is favourable and he is shown to have been 
able to remove several injustices by which the inhabitants of the South had been 
oppressed. A good king, in Froissart's opinion, seems to have been an authority to 
which his lesser subjects could turn in order to get help and justice, even when 
oppressed and exploited by noblemen and magnates. However, in Froissart's 
account, Charles is not portrayed as possessing the distant regality Richard has so 
often been accused of.587 On the contrary, Froissart places strong emphasis on the 
                                                 
584 Chroniques. Livres III et IV. Livre IV. § 7. pp. 400 – 01. ‘Sy tost comme il (Bethisac) fu 
emprissonnez, les inquisiteurs allerent à son hostel et saisirent tous les escrips et comtes don’t 
du tamps passé il s’estoit ensonniés et les emporterent avec eulx et les visiterent par loisir et 
trouverent ens moult de diverses choses et grans sommes de finances, lesquelles il avoit eues et 
levees du tamps passé ens es seneschaulchees et seignouries du roy dessus nommees, et les 
nombres si grans que les seigneurs en oant lire en estoient tous esmerveilliés.’ 
 
585 Chroniques. Livres III et IV. Livre IV. § 7. pp. 401 – 10. 
 
586 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XV. p. 39. On the nature of the King’s 
illness Froissart says: ‘Dieu, souverain sire des cieulx et de la terre et formeur de toutes chose, 
l’apareille tel que il (Charles) perdy sens et règne, et fut sept ans en tel estat que il vivoit de 
glans et de pommes sauvages, et avoit le goust et l’appétit d’un pourcel et quant il ot fait celle 
pénitance, Dieu luy rendi sa mèmoire . . . A parler par raison et esclairchir vérité, Dieu le Père, 
Dieu le Fils, Dieu le Saint–Esperit . . . fut, est et sera tousjours aussi puissant pour monstrer ses 
oeuvres comme il fu oncques, ne on ne se doit esmerveiller, ne esbahir de chose que il fache . . . ‘ 
 
587 Richard II is usually cast as a man out of touch with the ideals and values of his own time, in 
the sense that he is said to have tried to distance himself from a more feudal concept of 
kingship.  Richard sought to project an elevated concept of the Crown and for instance began to 
require new forms of address, says Nigel Saul in his book Richard II. Parliamentary petitions 
started to address him as ‘very excellent, redoubtable and powerful prince’ and refer to his 
‘highness and royal majesty’. See Saul, Nigel: Richard II. Yale 1997. pp. 248 - 252. Richard gave a 
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'courtoisie' and chivalry of the young monarch when he, in the same part of his 
account, shows Charles agreeing to organize a pan-European tournament at St. 
Inglevert. According to Froissart, this decision was against the advice of some his 
older counsellors who were unwilling to meet the English in friendly contest. 
Charles, however, who was greatly rejoiced by the proposition of some of his 
knights,588 is said to have wanted to get to know the English better and have 'the 
honour of their company', a remark which points to the supra-nationality of 
chivalrous society, but also maybe to a change in attitudes.589 While the older 
generation wanted war, the two young monarchs are described to have been keen to 
establish peaceful relations. Froissart later shows the tournament being a great 
success.590 
 
Froissart also describes the young, joyous French monarch dancing all night with the 
‘lively ladies of Montpellier’, giving gifts like gold rings and clasps ‘to each 
according to his estimation of her worth’. The author's tone is slightly humorous, but 
the account supports the impression that Charles was a polite and courteous King, 
possessing ample amounts of personal charisma.591 After having taken ‘affectionate 
                                                                                                                                                        
new directness, perhaps a new form to the older medieval notions of the royal prerogative’, 
says V. H. Galbraith. ‘His reign is the link between medieval ideas and the later doctrine of the 
divine rights of kings’. See Galbraith, V.H.: ‘A New Life of Richard II’, History, March 1942.  
Richard H. Barber also emphasises the distance between Richard and his men when he says 
that Richard II, with his highly developed aesthetic sense and love of refinement could not 
share his interests with his barons and courtiers; and on his barons his power ultimately rested. 
See Barber, R. H.: Edward, Prince of Wales and Aquitaine. New York 1978. p. 238. 
 
588 Chroniques. Livres III et IV. Livre IV. § 6. p. 397. ‘De la haulte emprise et courrageuse de .iij.  
chevalliers fu le roy de France moult resjoïs.’ 
 
589 Chroniques. Livres III et IV. Livre IV. § 6. pp. 396 – 97. ' "Et prions à tous les nobles chevalliers 
et escuiers estranges qui venir y vouldront que point ne voellent penser ne ymaginer que nous 
fachons ceste chose par orgeuil, haynne ne malvoeullance, mais que pour les veoir et avoir leur 
honnorable compagnie et acointance, laquelle de tous noz coers entierement nous desirons." ' 
 
590 Chroniques. Livres III et IV. Livre IV. § 12. pp. 444 - 55. 
 
591 Chroniques. Livres III et IV. Livre IV. § 4. pp. 382 - 83. ‘Le roy de France se tint en la ville de 
Montpellier plus de .xji.jours, car l’ordonnance de la ville des dames, des demoiselles et leur 
 189
leave’ of the feisty ladies of Montpellier, says Froissart, Charles continued his 
visitation of the South and came to Béziers where he received an equally enthusiastic 
welcome and spent three days in ‘revels and parties with the ladies of the town’.592 In 
spite of the emphasis Froissart puts on the monarch’s role as the guardian of peace 
and justice, Charles is also portrayed as the centre-point of public affection.  
 
Richard, however, never managed to gain the affections of his lesser subjects, and 
especially strained, according to Froissart, was his relationship with the Londoners. 
However, from what we can gather from Froissart´s account, this may have been an 
insurmountable task. Already during the Peasant’s Revolt, the author relates how 
several of the Londoners supported the uprisings.593 Later, the author describes them 
as ‘the most dangerous common people in the world, the most violent and 
presumptuous’,594 able to establish an armed force of more than twenty-four 
thousand men at arms and more than thirty thousand archers, a force to be reckoned 
with.595  This they could because they were so extra-ordinarily rich. ‘The citizens of 
                                                                                                                                                        
estas et leurs esbatemens que il y trouvoit et veoit, et ses gens aussi, luy plaisoient grandement 
bien. Le roy, au voir dire, estoit là à sa nourechon, car pour ce tamps il estoit joennes et de legier 
esprit, si dansoit et carolloit avec ces frisches dames de Montpellier toute la nuit et leur donnoit 
joiaulx, anelés d’or et de fremailles à chacune selon ce que il veoit et concepvoit qu’elle valloit, 
et faisoit bancqués et souppers grans et biaulx et bien estoffez.’ 
 
592 Chroniques. Livres III et IV. Livre IV. § 7. p. 402. ‘Trois jours après se tint le roy à Besiers en 
joye et en revel avec les dames et damoiselles. . . ‘ 
 
593 Chroniques. Livres I et II. Livre II. § 49. 'Lors fist le maire de Londres et plusieurs riches 
bourgeois fermer la porte du pont de la Thamise, mais les menus gens de la ville, . . . , estoient 
de leur secte.' 
 
594 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. p. 190. ‘[Les Londriens] est le plus 
périlleus poeuple commun qui soit au monde et le plus oultrageux et orgieulleux.’ See also 
Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. p. 160-161.  
 
595 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. pp. 190–91. ’Et de tous ceulx 
d’Angleterre Londriens son chiefs, et au voir dire ils sont moult puissans de mises et de gens, 
car ils se trouvoient bien du clos de Londres vingt et quatre mil hommes armés de piet en cape 
de toutes pièces, et bien trente mil archiers; c’ est grant force, car ils sont fors, durs, hardis et 
hausters et tant plus voient de sang espandu, tant sont-ils plus cruels et moins esbahis.’ 
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London, who are rich and powerful’, says Froissart, ‘draw their living chiefly from 
merchandise sent over land and sea which enables them to live in great prosperity'.596 
The Londoners are also described as Gloucester’s foremost supporters and central in 
acts like the trial and beheading of Sir Simon Burley.597 In Froissart´s opinion, the 
Londoners were the real leaders of the kingdom, without whom the rest of the 
country would ‘neither dare nor be able to do anything’,598 and as we have seen 
above, it is the Londoners who are portrayed as the driving – force behind the events 
that led to Richard’s downfall. 
 
According to Froissart, Henry (unlike Richard) was greatly loved by the Londoners 
who are described to have lined the streets when Henry left England for France after 
his banishment. At first view, this may seem as a good example of a lord loved by his 
people. However, in view of the author's many negative evaluations of the 
Londoners, I believe that the relationship the author here describes between Henry 
and the Londoners cannot be compared to the role Charles played in relation to his 
subjects in Southern France. In fact, Froissart may have felt far more apprehensive 
about the relationship between Henry and the Londoners than what is explicitly 
stated in his account. If we also take into accord that the connection between Henry 
and the Londoners, in reality, may not have been so strong as Froissart argues,599 his 
description becomes even more puzzling. Why would the chronicler portray Henry 
                                                 
596 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. p. 158. ‘Les citoiens de Londres qui 
sont riches et puissans et qui vivent le plus des marchandises qui courent par mer et par terre, et 
ont aprins à tenir grans estas su ce . . .’ 
 
597 SHF Livre III. Tome XIV. § 188. 
 
598 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. p. 158. ‘. . . et par lesquels (les 
citoiens de Londres) tout le royalme d’ Angleterre se ordonne et gouverne (ne tout le 
demourant du pays ne pourroient, ne ouseroitent faire autant comme ils font) . . .’ 
 
599 See Caroline M Barron: ‘Richard II and London’ in Richard II. The Art of Kingship. Eds. A. 
Goodman and James L. Gillespie; and ‘The Deposition of Richard II’ in Politics and Crisis. pp. 
132 - 49. 
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as the instrument of the Londoners if Henry, in fact, were the ambitious and 
scheming leader of the disaffected nobility seeking revenge? The question is difficult 
to answer, and it could of course be that Froissart actually believed that Henry acted 
under the influence and protection of this most 'périlleus poeuple commun qui soit 
au monde et le plus oultrageux et orgieulleux.' But are we sure that Froissart 
perceived Henry's reliance on the support of the Londoners as entirely positive? In 
my opinion the answer is 'no', an opinion I find supported by some of the events 
related in the account.   
 
The Earl of Derby, who in Paris is portrayed as reluctant to overthrow his cousin, is 
described to have promised to act in accordance with the will of the Londoners 
almost immediately after his arrival in England.600 Subsequently, every decision in 
connection to the capture of Richard is said to have been in accordance with the will 
of the Londoners, with the exception of the decision to approach the castle of Flint 
with only a few men.601 At Flint Henry persuaded Richard by 'doulces paroles' and 
promised to defend his cousin and plead his cause.602 This is a promise Henry is 
described to have renewed on several occasions in the account. Still, as we know, it is 
a promise that Henry may not have kept. 
 
                                                 
600 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. p. 175. 'Et jà avoient les Londriens 
traittié devers le conte d’ Erby que il seroit leur seigneur et roy et se ordonneroit de tous poins 
par leur conseil, et, à ceste ordonnance et aliance faire, le conte d’ Erby mist en termes que il 
emprendroit le fais et la gouverne du royaulme à demourer perpétuellement à tousjours à luy et 
à son hoir.' 
 
601 A descision Froissart explicitely says Henry took on his own. See Kervyn von Lettenhove. 
Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. p. 181. ‘Le conte d’Erby s’arresta . . . et ot conseil de soy-meismes 
et non d’autry.’ 
 
602 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. p. 181 .’ . . . il feroit tant par traittié, 
se il povoit, que il entreroit dedens par amour et non par force, et metteroit hors le roy par 
doulces paroles et l’asseureroit de tout périls fors de venir à Londres, et encoires luy auroit-il en 
convenant que de sa personne il n’auroit quelque mal et seroit pour luy moyen envers les 
Londriens qui trop fort estoient courrouchiés sur luy, comme bien le monstrèrent depuis.’ 
 
 192
In the speech attributed to Henry after his cousin humbly had given up his Crown, 
(first part related above), Henry accused Richard of relying to heavily on evil 
counsellors, an opinion Froissart probably shared. However, I am not convinced that 
he shared the viewpoints related in the subsequent part of the speech: 
 
 . . . le duc de Lancastre entendy ceste parole, si respondi et 
dist: " . . . commune renommée court parmy Angleterre et 
ailleurs que vous ne fustes oncques fils au prince de Galles, 
mais d'un clerc ou d' un chanoine . . . Et telle est la 
renommée de ceulx de ce royaulme et bien en avés par 
éxperience monstrés les euvres, car vous avés tousjors esté 
encliné à la plaisance de François et à vouloir traittier 
avecques eulx paix à la confusion et grant déshonneur du 
royaulme d' Angleterre. Et pour tant que mon oncle de 
Glocestre et le conte d´Arondel le vous remonstroient bien 
sagement et loyalment et vouloient garder l´onneur de ce 
pays et à leur povoir enssieuvir les oeuvres vertueuses de 
leurs pères, les avés-vous trahiteusement fait mourir.  
 
As we may see, the Duke accused Richard of being Joan of Kent's illegitimate son, of 
favouring the French and of the murder of his uncle of Gloucester and the Earl of 
Arundel. These, says Henry, were men who had guided the young king 'wisely and 
loyally' to preserve the honour of the country and the achievements of their fathers. 
This is an opinion I find in opposition to Froissart's consistent negative portrayal of 
Gloucester and his warmongering. ‘Recognising that there was no use in arguing his 
case’, says Froissart, Richard made himself as humble as he could and pleaded with 
Henry to save his life. 603  
                                                 
603 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. p. 201. 'Le roy Richart entendoit et 
considéroit bien toutes les paroles que le duc de Lancastre luy remonstroit, et ne sçavoit que 
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In Froissart´s narrative, the news of the deposition of Richard was not received with 
joy in other parts of Europe. The Count of Salisbury, he says, had brought the news 
to France604 and according to the author, the King of France who had previously 
taken such a liking to Henry, was so distraught by the news that he suffered from 
another bout of ‘frénaisie’, while the dismayed Duke of Bourgogne is said to have 
predicted Richard’s death. According to the Duke of Bourgogne, Henry’s alliance 
and obligations to the Londoners were such that he would do what they wanted 
‘whether he wanted or not’,605 a comment which, in my opinion, supports the 
impression that Froissart may have looked more negatively on the relationship 
between Henry and the Londoners than what seems to be the case at first glance. 
However, in Froissart´s description, the Duke of Bourgogne was not blaming Henry 
directly, but pointed to the detrimental effect of the past actions of Thomas of 
Gloucester.606  
 
According to Froissart, Richard imprisonment in the Tower and the killing of the 
men of his council was also highly lamented in Gascony, not only because he had 
                                                                                                                                                        
dire, ne que respondre; car très-bien veoit que force et argumens ne luy povoient en riens 
proufitter mais très bien doulcour, amour et simplesse, et se humilioit tout ce qu’il povoit et 
prioit tousjours au du de Lancastre que sa vie luy fusit saulvée.' 
 
604 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. p. 209. ‘. . . et avoit ledit conte porté 
et tesmoignié que le roy Henry estoit fauls, mauvais et traittre, et que ce pechié et malfait ne 
faisoit point à pardonner, mais demandoit pugnition très – crueuse.’ On his return to England, 
Henry incarcerated Salisbury, but pardoned him, when Richard’s half-brother, John Holland, 
intervened on his part. Holland, on his side, had been persuaded to seek out Henry’s patronage 
by his wife, says Froissart. See Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. p. 210.  
 
605 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. p. 212. 'Et dist le duc de Bourgoigne: 
“. . . Puisque ils ont prins leur roy et mis en prison, ils le feront morir, car oncques ne l'àmerent. 
Et pour tant que il ne vouloit point de guerre, mais toute paix, si couronneront à roy Henry, duc 
de Lancastre, qui se aloyera et très grandement obligera à eulx, et fera, vueille ou non, ce qu’ils 
vouldront." ' 
 
606 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. p. 212. ‘ Et dist le duc de Borgoigne: 
“ . . . et tout ce meschief vient et est engendré  par le duc de Gloucestre. . .’ 
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been born and elevated amongst them, but also 'because he had always acted 
lovingly towards them, heeded their requests and received them well'.607 The 
Bordelais who believed Richard to be ‘le plus preud’homme’ of his country was in 
fact so angered by Richard’s dethronement that they threatened to turn themselves 
over to the King of France. Their seneschal, 'a young valiant English knight', sat 
down their grievances in a letter that was brought to London. Here, according to the 
author, the King took council with the Londoners who took it upon them to write a 
reply, 'because they were addressed to the King and the Londoners,' a comment 
underlining the powerful position of the Londoners.608 It may also be that Froissart 
did not want Henry to be associated with the content of the reply where the weak 
position of the cities of Gascony was pointed out in a rather disrespectful manner.609 
The Londoners also informed the Bordelais that they would send Sir Thomas Percy 
to replace the seneschal, a decision, which in principle cannot have been theirs to 
make. This passage, I believe, supports the impression that Froissart may have felt 
that Henry had become too dependent on the support of these mighty burghers. The 
cities of Gascony did not, in fact, turn their back on the English. The cause however, 
as Froissart relates it, was not that they approved of Henry’s actions, but that the 
Londoners had been right when they pointed out that the Gascons would not be able 
                                                 
607 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. p. 213. ‘(Ils) . . . furent moult 
mérancolieux, et par espécial ceulx de la cité de Bourdeaulx, car le roy Richart avoit esté nés et 
nourry entre eulx: si l’aimoient bien, et, quant les Bourdelois venoient devers luy, il les 
recepvoit lyement et doulcement, et s’enclinoit à eulx faire toutes les requestes.’ 
 
608 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. p. 214. 'Pour ce jour y estoit le roy 
Henry, et avoit parlement aux Londriens, lesquels par accord prindrent ces lettres, car elles 
générallement s'adrechoient au roy et aux Londriens. Si furent ouvertes et leutes, et sur ce le roy 
et les Londriens orent conseil, . . . je vous diray quel chose les Londriens en respondirent, 
comme ceulx qui gaires ne fureny esbahis des nouvelles dessus dittes.' 
 
609 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. pp. 214 - 5. 'Et dirent, les lettres oyes 
et entendues: Ce ne séra jà que ceulx de Bourdeaulx, de Bayonne et de Dax se tourneront 
Franchois, car il ne sçauront vivre en leurs dangiers, ne ils ne pourroient souffrir leurs ruses. Ils 
sont et demeurent franchement et aisiéement delés nous et aveuc nous. Et, se les Franchois les 
dominoient, ils seroient tailliés et retailliés deux ou trois fois l'an, laquelle chose ils n' ont pas 
accoustumé . . . ' 
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to accept the heavy taxes they would have to pay if they turned French. Pragmatism, 
as we may see, clearly marked the bourgeois in Froissart´s account. 
 
But is the author in fact also hinting at a pragmatic decision made by Henry when he 
relates how Richard died, only days after Henry’s knights and the Londoners had 
pleaded with the new King to kill his defeated cousin? I believe the answer must be 
'yes'. I also believe that Froissart did not approve of the solution, but, nevertheless, 
found it difficult to write an account directly accusing Henry IV of England of the 
murder. Whether the author himself was motivated by pragmatic concern when he 
wrote his narrative is unknown. Froissart could have written to placate present or 
potential patrons or he could have believed that the events had unfolded as he 
describes. However, although clearly searching for 'the moral truth behind the 
events he writes about,'610 it remains that the author's own opinions and moral 
judgements about the events at times seem difficult to discern at this point of his 
account.  
 
In his book on Froissart, Peter Ainsworth says that the Rome manuscript of Book I, 
undertaken around the same time as Froissart was finishing Book IV, is marked by a 
shift in ethos towards a greater cynicism or pragmatism. ‘More and more frequently, 
in this redaction, we hear the accents of a discreet irony on the chronicler’s part, 
drawing our attention to the gap opening up between the smooth appearances and 
cynical or at least pragmatic motives, or even between two alternative events.’611 
Without having studied the Rome manuscript, I would argue that the gap between 
smooth appearances and pragmatic motives is also apparent in Froissart´s Book IV 
and that the account is marked by the presence of a 'sous-texte' - opinions and 
                                                 
610 Ainsworth, Peter F.: Jean Froissart and the Fabric of History. Truth, Myth and Fiction in the 
Chroniques. Oxford 1990. p. 306. 
 
611 Ainsworth, Peter F.: Jean Froissart and the Fabric of History. Truth, Myth and Fiction in the 
Chroniques. Oxford 1990. p. 264. 
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messages embedded in the narrative without being explicitly stated. Whether 
Froissart was ironic, weary or plainly afraid to state his opinions more openly is 
difficult to say. 
 
The purpose of the knight is to defend his lord, not the people, says Raymond Lulle 
in le Livre de l’Ordre de la Chevalerie.612 'All subjects ought . . . to be loyal towards their 
prince, and evil comes from doing the opposite' says Christine de Pizan.613 ' If there is 
a case sometime when the common people seem to be aggrieved by some burden, 
the merchants ought to . . . go before the prince or the council, and bring their claims 
for them in humility . . .'614 The noble knight on his side  'ought to bring back the 
common people or others who from fear or dread or evil want to rebel and take the 
wrong side . . .'615 says de Pizan. Froissart may not have shared the views stated by 
Lulle or de Pizan, or his opinions may have been more eclectic and nuanced. In the 
description of Enrique of Trastamara's fight for the throne of Castile, the author 
clearly seems to favour the illegitimate, but valiant, Enrique's claim to the throne of 
Castile over his cruel adversary King Pedro. However, in my opinion, it is by no 
means certain that Froissart perceived Richard to be as unworthy of ruling as Pedro. 
I also believe that the ideal king, as he can be synthesized from the pages of 
Froissart´s Chroniques, was not Henry IV, an opinion I believe is supported by the 
author's last comment on the events relating to the downfall of Richard II:  
 
                                                 
612 Lulle, Raymond: Le Livre de l'Ordre de la Chevalerie. Ed. Guy Trédaniel. Introduction, 
traduction et notes par Bruno Hapel. Paris 1990. p. 28.  
 
613 de Pizan, Christine: The Book of the Body Politic. ed. and trans. K. L. Forhan. Cambridge 1994. 
p. 94. 
 
614 de Pizan, Christine: The Book of the Body Politic. ed. and trans. K. L. Forhan. Cambridge 1994. 
pp. 99 - 100. 
 
615 de Pizan, Christine: The Book of the Body Politic. ed. and trans. K. L. Forhan. Cambridge 1994. 
p. 17. 
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Or dis–je Jehan Froissart dessus nommé, acteur de ceste 
histoire, ainsi en considerant toutes ces choses, . . . Ce fut 
quant le roy Henry par les conditions dessusdittes fut 
couronné roy d’Angleterre, et point ne pensoit à la couronne, 
ne jamais n’euist pensé, se Richart de Bourdeaulx se fuist 
porté familèrement et amiablement devers luy. Et encoires le 
firent les Londriens roy pour eschever les grans dommages 
de luy et de ses enffans, dont les Londriens orent pitié.616 
 
There can be no doubt that Froissart believed Henry to have been wronged by 
Richard. However, when summing up the reasons why Henry became king, the 
author does not point out Henry's superior valour, better claim to the throne or his 
charismatic leadership, but to the fact that Henry had been made king 'out of the pity 
of the Londoners', the men the author states were the fiercest and most outrageous 
common people of the world. The message is thus, mixed, and supports the view 
that Froissart may have felt more than a little conflicted. I also believe that the 
statement, when presented to Froissart's contemporary aristocratic audience on the 
Continent, contributed little to Henry's symbolic capital.  
 
Henry should indeed meet with many problems shortly after his ascending to the 
throne. Magnates engaged in local quarrels, parliament was critical of royal 
expenditure and in Gascony the situation of the English soon became critical.617 In 
1401, Philip Repingdon, a royal chaplain and the future bishop of Lincoln, wrote to 
Henry that his ' . . . joy [at Henry's entry into the realm of England] had changed to 
sorrow, while all evils multiply, and the hope of healing have gone out of the hearts 
                                                 
616 Kervyn von Lettenhove. Oeuvres de Froissart. Tome XVI. pp. 235 - 36. 
 
617 Keen, Maurice: England in the Later Middle Ages. London 1973. pp. 306 - 07. 
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of men.'618 By 1402, general discontent had fostered rueful reflections about the 
justification of the revolution of 1399, says Maurice Keen, and by 1403 Henry had 
been left by some of his foremost supporters like the Percies.619 The commons in 
parliament also gave Henry ample amounts of trouble, and appointed treasurers of 
war to supervise the King's expenditure and auditors at the exchequer. 'This is a 
record of sustained action with a consistent objective, and one not flattering to the 
kings' dignity,' says Keen, who also points out that there was never, in the Middle 
Ages, so much plain speaking between the king and the commons as there was in 
Henry IV's reign.620 Although Henry's record as a ruler, in Keen's opinion, should not 
be undervalued, it is clear that no one regretted his days when they were over. 
 
'It's the old story' says the former Monty Python member Terry Jones in the BBC- 
series Medieval Lives. 'Henry Bolingbroke was an illegal usurper who treacherously 
went against all his vows of loyalty as a chivalric knight, stole the throne from his 
cousin and then had him murdered.'621 Although this may be an oversimplification it 
also shows how perspectives and opinions on historical events change as time 
passes. However, Jones's statement also make us wonder whether Froissart would 
have portrayed the events and the people who contributed to Richard's downfall 
differently if he had been able to undertake a new edition of Book IV before his 
death. 
 
 
 
                                                 
618 The Correspondence of Thomas Bekynton. (R.S) vol.1. pp.  151 - 4. This note is from Keen, 
Maurice: England in the Later Middle Ages. London 1973. p. 307. 
 
619 Keen, Maurice: England in the Later Middle Ages. London 1973. pp. 309 - 10. 
 
620 Keen, Maurice: England in the Later Middle Ages. London 1973. pp. 316 - 17. 
 
621 Jones, Terry: Medieval lives. London 2004. pp. 240 - 241. Jones' book accompanies the BBC 
television series of the same name. 
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5. Summary and conclusion  
 
This dissertation started with the famous quote from the Chroniques relating the Black 
Prince's gallant treatment of his adversary John the Good after the French defeat at 
Poitiers, a quote supporting the picture we have of Froissart as a chronicler set on 
celebrating the traditional chivalrous virtues. However, although it may still be 
argued that Froissart is the 'Chronicler of chivalry', the selection of passages I have 
analyzed above indicates that he was so much more. Compared to writers like for 
instance Geoffroy de Charny, who, in his instructive manual, primarily celebrates the 
traditional chivalrous virtues prowess, dexterity in arms, generosity and loyalty, 
Froissart seems to put emphasis on a far more varied set of skills and qualities in his 
descriptions of noblemen. The famous Gaston Fébus, for instance, is portrayed as a 
skilful administrator who would keep a constant eye on the financial affaires of his 
realm. The key words are caution and control, as well as planning for the future.  
 
In the account of the campaigns, sieges and battles of the first phases of the Hundred 
Years War we also find a more complex and pragmatic ideal being propagated by the 
author. Although kings and magnates are clearly celebrated for their courage, 
prowess and ability to encourage men to fight for their honour, they are equally 
praised for their ability to plan and organize, make 'sound judgements' and good 
tactical dispositions. John the Good, in Froissart's account, received the 'prize and the 
chaplet' for his valiant fighting at the battle of Poitiers. However, it was the 
victorious Prince Edward who gained the unanimous recognition of both parties and 
was able to establish himself firmly as one of the leading figures of his time. Thus, 
the best man, in Froissart's opinion seems to have been the man who would reconcile 
the traditional ideals of chivalry and courtesy with caution, sound judgement, 
strategic understanding and tactical skills.  
 200
Bértrand du Guesclin, who rose from humble origins to the office of Constable of 
France, was clearly such a man. Although du Guesclin is described as extraordinarily 
brave and skilled in the martial arts, witty and courteous in his dealings with his 
adversary the Black Prince and humble and loyal in relation to the kings and 
magnates of France, he is also portrayed to have been the one to urge Charles V and 
his council to adopt a different strategy in the war against the English, a strategy 
marked by caution and based on the idea that confrontation should be avoided 
unless the French could be certain of a successful outcome. The advice was heeded, 
with great success, according to the author, who seems to have applauded this new 
French strategy.  
 
In the description of the downfall of Richard II in Book IV of Froissart’s chronicles, 
the ideals and values propagated are more difficult to discern. Although Henry, in 
Froissart's account, was a courageous man celebrated for his nobleness, the author's 
constant focus on the fact that he was acting on behalf of the dreaded Londoners 
leaves the impression that Froissart found it difficult to give the new king his 
unconditional support. This impression of ambiguity is further enhanced by the 
juxtaposition of the description of how Henry's men urged him to dispose of Richard 
and the death of his defeated adversary whom Henry had promised protection on 
numerous occasions. Froissart clearly understood that Richard was a king who 
struggled to establish himself as a 'primus inter pares', and he may have felt that 
Richard contributed strongly to his own fate, but did he applaud the decision to 
overthrow him? This, I believe, is less certain, and, as a result, the picture we get of 
Henry is more nuanced and open-ended than we may have expected. 
 
However, in spite of the fact that no clear answer can be found to the question of 
Froissart's true feelings towards Henry, Froissart's more general ideas about 
kingship and right and proper action can be gathered from what he relates at the end 
of his chronicles. The aging author clearly did not approve of actions that were 
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undertaken by 'orgeuil, presompcie, haynne or malvoeullance', but actions that were 
marked by 'paix, justice, amour and simplesse.' His ideal king was he who did not 
trust ‘conseil senestre moult legièrement’ or let himself be led to 'moult de crueuses 
and hastives justices', alienating the affections of his loyal men or subjects, but the 
king who upheld justice and peace in his realm, was able to recognise and heed the 
advice of his wise and loyal councillors, and related to his subjects ‘sagement et 
doulcement’. Although there can be no doubt that Froissart believed martial 
ambition to be a precondition for symbolic capital, in the sense that it was difficult to 
establish yourself as a charismatic leader of men without ever having proved your 
worth in some sort of armed combat, his ideal king was not necessarily he who 
sought armed conflict at all costs. On the contrary, the impression is that Froissart 
was largely favourable to the prospect of peace between England and France, and 
seems to have supported Richard's strategy to wage war elsewhere than in France. 
He also seems favourable to the fact that Richard had been able to conquer Ireland 
by 'amour et doulceur’, rather than by giving battle.  
 
The observations above, I believe, point in the direction of a more complex and 
eclectic value system than we may have expected from the 'Chronicler of Chivalry.' It 
may of course be argued that the chivalrous ideal had never been as rigid or 
internalised to the degree that some researchers seem to believe.622 However, it is my 
impression that the values propagated in Froissart's account in some respects differ 
widely from the ideals and values found both in historical texts of aristocratic origin 
                                                 
622 See Gillingham, John: ‘War and Chivalry in the History of William the Marshall’ in 
Thirteenth-Century England II. Proceedings of the Newcastle-upon-Tyne conference 1987. Ed. P. 
R. Coss og S. D. Lloyd. London 1988. In his article ‘War and Chivalry in the History of William 
the Marshal’ the English historian John Gillingham argues that the Marshal or other members 
of the aristocracy would by no means have let knightly ideals hinder them in making gains or 
diminish their chances to win a battle. A medieval knight would resort to tricks and sly 
cunning and retreat if he found that his possibilities for victory and gain were not good. In 
essence, the medieval knight would behave, assess and decide in the same manner as a modern 
warlord, says Gillingham.  
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from the earlier Middle Ages623 and in Charny's Le livre de chevalerie. Although the 
essential constituents of chivalry - loyalty, generosity and courage - are still 
celebrated in the Chroniques we cannot, in my opinion, disregard the fact that 
'honour' or symbolic capital was won in far more various ways in Froissart's account 
than in Charny's instructive text. Although both authors may have agreed that 
fleeing from battle detracted from the symbolic capital of a knight or magnate, it is 
highly probable that only Froissart found the defensive strategy adopted by Charles 
V and Bértrand du Guesclin commendable. And although Charny argues that the 
good lord is he who 'gives new life to the territory under his command',624 he also 
states that one should not care about amassing great wealth, 'for the more worldly 
goods a man acquires, the more reluctant he is to die'.625 This leads us to suspect that 
Charny may not have approved of the financial dealings of Gaston Fébus, his focus 
on saving and fear of 'the changing fortunes of this world'. 
 
Michel Zink in his book on Froissart says that Book IV and the Rome manuscript of 
Book I seem to be marked by pessimism.626 Peter Ainsworth in the conclusion to his 
book on Froissart sees the fresh details and episodes found in the Rome manuscript 
to be connected to 'the manner in which a new, emergent ethos threatens to disturb 
the ideology that has hitherto held sway; the new key-words are cynicism, 
                                                 
623 Although it has been demonstrated by several, including John Gillingham and myself, that 
the picture we get of William the Marshal in Georges Duby's analysis of the Marshal's life and 
deeds is far too romantic and traditional, it should for instance be noted that not a single word 
in the chanson celebrating the William the Marshal's deeds is devoted to his estate-
management or financial deelings eventhough the Marshal was one of England's greatest 
landholders. 
 
624 de Charny, Geoffroi: A Knight's own book of Chivalry. Introduction by Richard W. Kaeuper. 
Translation by Elspeth Kennedy. Philadelpia 2005. pp 59 - 60. 
 
625 de Charny, Geoffroi: A Knight's own book of Chivalry. Introduction by Richard W. Kaeuper. 
Translation by Elspeth Kennedy. Philadelpia 2005. p. 64.  
 
626 Zink, Michel: Froissart et le Temps. Paris 1998. pp. 95 - 96. 
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pragmatism, hypocrisy and duplicity.'627 In my opinion, this pragmatism is noticeable 
even before the redactions of Book IV and the Rome manuscript, although I agree 
that the eclectic nature of Froissart's value system and ideals becomes more apparent 
as his work progresses and becomes more autonomous. But tensions are felt even in 
his first book when he relates the Black Prince's massacre of the inhabitants of 
Limoges and praises du Guesclin's suggestion to adopt a new, more defensive 
strategy. We should also note that Froissart already at this early stage of his narrative 
shows considerable interest in disclosing the more profound causes for the events he 
describes, especially by relating the deliberations of kings and magnates to a far 
greater extent than le Bel.  Although a modern audience may find the account of the 
motives of kings and magnates unsatisfactory, in the sense that the author does not 
'explain’ in the same manner as a modern historian, it cannot be argued that Froissart 
in his narrative, even in the earlier redactions of Book I, merely 'represented' or 
'celebrated'.  
 
Whether this more eclectic value system and will to ‘explain’ can be seen to reflect 
changes in the mentality and values of the aristocratic society the author lived in is of 
course difficult to know absolutely. Froissart's Chroniques may not be an account of 
what Brian Stock calls 'perceived change' in the sense that the author himself 
believed that the aristocratic ideals and values were changing or that chivalry was in 
decline.628 Although the people of England may have lamented the days of Edward 
III 'when justice was upheld', the changes in outlook and ideals are not pointed out 
or reflected directly. However, in my opinion, the Chroniques indirectly bear witness 
to a change in the aristocratic mentality of the late 14th century. The fact that 
Froissart's work became so widely read and popular amongst the rulers and 
                                                 
627 Ainsworth, Peter: Jean Froissart and the Fabric of History. Truth, Myth and Fiction in the Chroniques. 
Oxford 1990. p. 305. 
 
628 Stock, Brian: Listening for the Text. On the uses of the Past. Philadelphia 1990. p. 76. 
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magnates of his age indicates that the aristocracy itself was no longer content with 
historical narratives that merely 'represented'. In a tumultuous age marked by 
unexpected martial defeats, evolution in military technology, plague, popular 
uprisings and the deposition of kings and emperors, texts that could 'explain' rather 
than 'celebrate' and which propagated a more eclectic and complex ideal could have 
been highly welcome. Although the concept of chivalry may have lost none of its 
force in the 15th century, as argued by Keen, Vale and Flori, the modifications to the 
ideal may have been more profound than many have believed, incorporating 
elements of the mentality normally connected with the Merchant ethos; caution, 
control and planning for a successful and prosperous future.  
 
Modern historians need to learn afresh how to read Froissart productively, said 
Albert Varvaro at the 2004 Lille-Valenciennes conference.629 It is my hope that this 
dissertation has been a contribution in this respect and that my findings can create 
the basis for a further discussion on the ideals, values and society depicted by 
Froissart in his Chroniques. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
629 For reference see Ainsworth, Peter: 'Jean Froissart: a sexcentary reappraisal' in French studies. Vol. 
LIX, No.3. 2005. p. 372. 
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